



SPECIAL ISSUE



# Newsweek

January 28, 1991 \$2.50

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# The Storm Over Baghdad

**THE WAR  
DESERT  
STORM**

With the thunderous razzle-dazzle of a Tomahawk missile launch, America unleashed the full fury of modern warfare on the Middle East last week. It seemed effortless, antiseptic and surreal: casualties were very light, and all the high-tech gadgets in the U.S. arsenal seemed to work with surgical lethality. Like a day at the office, one pilot said—but Scud missiles were falling on Tel Aviv, and the ground war lay ahead. **Page 12**



Fighter action on the carrier John F. Kennedy



Demonstrators in New York City

The mood of the nation was tense as U.S. forces went to war. Antiwar activists staged protests; other Americans took solace in prayer and tried to address their children's fears. Meanwhile, CNN's dramatic on-scene reports changed the scope of television news. **Page 36**

**THE WAR  
LOOKING  
AHEAD**

The gulf conflict raises new questions about the future of the Middle East. Former secretary of state Henry A. Kissinger proposes a postwar agenda: he says that a new balance of power in the region could create prospects for progress in the Arab-Israeli conflict. **Page 44**



Saddam with Mubarak. **The Big Lie**

The gulf crisis began with gross American blunders. Then Washington caught its balance: with wild improvisation and deft bluffing, it deployed a massive military machine and stitched together a formidable diplomatic alliance. An inside account of the prelude to Desert Storm. **Page 54**

## THE WAR Desert Storm

America at war	12
The strike against Iraq	15
How the electronic warriors pulled the plug on Iraq	20
Architect of the air war	24
Israel: the Scud attacks	25
Will the Israelis retaliate?	26
The killing field: the coming ground attack	28
Schwarzkopf: "You must be the thunder and lightning"	31
Mismatch in Kuwait, by Col. David H. Hackworth	32
A course at the "college of Rommel!"	33
Bush: trying to project an image of control	34

## THE WAR Home Front

The peace movement comes to sudden life	36
"One big family" in Crystal Springs	38
Children's fears about the war	40
When CNN hit its target	41
Facing a medical challenge	42

## THE WAR Looking Ahead

A postwar agenda, by Henry A. Kissinger	44
The Palestinians: caught in the cross-fire	48
Using terror as a second front	50
A recovery as early as spring? by Jane Bryant Quinn	53

## Road to War

Missed signals: the blunders before the invasion	54
A line in the sand: deciding on the initial U.S. deployment	57
Defense to offense: a frantic "Dunkirk in reverse"	60
Before the storm: Bush's political endgame	63

## Departments

Periscope	4
Letters	8
Perspectives	11
George F. Will	86



Israeli Hawk antiaircraft battery

**THE  
ROAD TO  
WAR**

*Letters to the Editor should be sent to NEWSWEEK, 444 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022, and subscription inquiries to NEWSWEEK, The NEWSWEEK Building, Livingston, N.J. 07039. NEWSWEEK ISSN 0028-9804, January 28, 1991, Volume CXVII, No. 4, is published weekly except for two additional issues during the months of May and September, \$41.08 a year, by NEWSWEEK, Inc., 444 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022. Second Class postage paid at New York, N.Y., and at additional mailing offices. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to NEWSWEEK, The NEWSWEEK Building, Livingston, N.J. 07039.*



Why weren't the Israelis ready? American Patriot

## ISRAEL

**Missing Missiles**

**I**n the wake of the Iraqi Scud missile attacks on Tel Aviv and Haifa, the United States hurriedly sent several batteries of American Patriot anti-missile missiles to Israel. Patriots could have stopped the incoming Scuds, but the Israelis had none at the ready. Why? In the mid-1980s, Israel rejected the Patriot in favor of its own anti-missile missile, called the Arrow; more than \$150 million has been spent on

development. Israel banked on the Arrow because it covers a much wider area than the Patriot. The Arrow's first test launch this fall was less than successful: it was destroyed when it turned toward the test site. After Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Israel decided it couldn't wait and secured two Patriot batteries in October. Before the latest shipment, Israeli technicians were taking a crash course in how to operate them. But American experts have come along to handle the new Patriots, which will be immediately operational. ■

## REAGAN WATCH

**In the Know**

Ronald Reagan may be out of office, but he's not out of the loop. He was on a short list of people to whom President

Bush gave advance word of the air attack on Iraq. Reagan's son Michael, who hosts a daily radio show in San Diego, called Dad before air time on Wednesday afternoon for his opinion on

the prospect of war. But Nancy refused to put her husband on the phone. A few hours later, war began. After the show, Michael confirmed with Nancy that Bush had in fact called to brief Reagan about the action. ■



Briefed

## KUWAIT

**Getting Ready to Rebuild**

The Kuwaitis are already making plans to rebuild their oilfield operations once the conflict is over. "Anything that had any value was stolen by the Iraqis—street lamps, stop signs, window shades—and all the equipment," says Larry Flak, of Houston's OGE Drilling Co. The Kuwaiti-owned Santa Fe International Corp. has reportedly purchased wellhead equipment from Ingram Cactus Co. and stored it in Houston warehouses for shipment to Kuwait when the war ends. Kuwaiti officials have also had discussions with several Texas firms about supplying consultants, oilfield workers and equipment for the recovery effort. "We've been asked for quotes, but we haven't any orders yet," says a company official. ■

## Stockpiled parts: Kuwaiti oil rig



## CONVENTIONAL WISDOM WATCH

**Desert Storm Edition**

The overall CW on the prospects in the gulf war changed from a strong up arrow at the outset, to something more like a sideways. But hawkishness is still in.

## PLAYERS

## George Bush

↑ War critic? Who, me? Mr. President, the CW was *always* your biggest backer.

## Saddam Hussein

↓ Overrated, cruel, despised, dangerous—and still a hero to Palestinians.

## Israel

↑ Iraq's missiles a terrifying PR bonanza. A new Israeli-Egyptian coalition?

## U.S. Air Force

↑ Old CW: Drained our national treasury. New CW: Terrific surgical accuracy.

## Scud Missile

↓ Mobile, but inaccurate. The Scud's a dud—except as a political weapon.

## The Democrats

↓ Support troops but not policy. Huh? If war ends quickly, so will '92 hopes.

## Conventional Wisdom

## Masked: Saudi women

## SAUDI ARABIA

**Under the Veil**

Habit is a very hard thing to shake in Saudi Arabia—even in times of crisis. Conservative Saudi women veil their faces at all times while in public. Last Friday a missile scare sent everyone in the crowded Dhahran International Hotel scurrying into the basement air-raid shelter, where they were told to put on gas masks immediately. Two Saudi women, covered head to toe, then confronted a decided new difficulty: how to put on a gas mask in a large crowd without revealing their faces. The women managed to solve this problem somewhat unsatisfactorily by asking a relative to shield them as they faced a wall, then slipped the masks under their veils. ■

## THE MIDEAST

**After War, Geopolitics**

Since the first Operation Desert Shield deployment, the Bush administration has been grappling with the problems of a postwar Middle East. NEWSWEEK has learned. Joint Chiefs Chairman Colin Powell's staff has met weekly with Mideast experts to consider the political repercussions of different war scenarios. Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, head of the U.S. Central Command in the gulf, has had his staff poring over think-tank papers on the political impact of his war tactics. And the State Department has held "war gaming" sessions where staffers have practiced responding to simulated postwar situations. Aides to Jim Baker, for example, have played the roles of Arab leaders reacting to political turmoil after the war. ■



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**LEAKS**

## Scooping the World

**L**ongtime peace activist Daniel Ellsberg, the former government official who leaked the Pentagon papers to The New York Times in 1971, still has friends with inside in-

formation. At 3:30 p.m. on K-Day, Ellsberg received a phone call from a journalist who told him the U.S. war against Iraq would begin at 4:30 Eastern standard time.

Ellsberg watched his TV set for the next two hours to see if the tip was correct. It wasn't until 6:50 that ABC News broke the story that Operation Desert Storm had begun—when planes took off at 4:27 EST. Ellsberg's source was three minutes off. ■



Ellsberg



A momentous broadcast: The president tells the nation it's at war

**THE PRESIDENT**

## A Record-Breaking TV Audience

**A** side from sending George Bush's approval rating soaring, Operation Desert Storm has also made the president the most popular television attraction ever. His address to the nation Wednesday night was seen by nearly 79 percent of all Americans with televisions in their

homes. Only once has such a huge percentage been surpassed: John F. Kennedy's 1963 funeral attracted 81 percent of all viewers. But because there are far more homes in the country today, many more people saw Bush's speech. ABC's 16.1 rating led the prime-time numbers battle the first night of fighting. NBC followed with 15.7; CBS trailed with a disappointing 13.4. CNN's 11.1 was remarkable for a cable channel that normally averages under 1 point in prime time (each point represents 931,000 homes). ■

**SHOWBIZ**

## Coming Soon: Iraq, the Sequel

**H**ollywood's always quick to exploit the news, but last week art came too close to reality. ABC postponed an episode of its new TV show "Under Cover" because the subject was "too sensitive." It was about an Iraqi plot to attack Israel with chemical weapons. But filmmakers are cranking out other gulf-exploitation features. "Target U.S.A." tells of a U.S. town attacked by Iraqi terrorists. "Desert Shield," originally about the Iran-Iraq War, is being reworked as a tale of Navy SEALs sent to take out Iraqis before they invade an oil-rich neighbor. And the Libyan villains in "Shield of Honor" are now Iraqis. ■

Preparing a French jet

**FRANCE**

## Profit Politics

**W**hile French fighter-bombers have participated in allied air attacks over Kuwait, they won't be flying any missions over Baghdad. French officials have decided their forces will not fight deep inside Iraq as the war progresses. They say this decision is in keeping with President François Mitterrand's claim that the war is strictly "a question of liberating Kuwait," not punishing Iraq. But many experts guess that, by backing off, France is angling for good postwar relations with the Arab world—major customers for French weapons. ■

**Too close: 'Under Cover' agents****MEDIA**

## Editorial Views

**T**he nation's newspapers aren't as antimilitary as people think. Vincent Carroll, editorial-page editor of Denver's Rocky Mountain News, reports in the Washington Journalism Review that his paper was the only strong antiwar voice among the nation's 25 largest newspapers prior to war. Here are the positions of some big papers:

**Militant:** The Wall Street Journal, the New York Post, The Dallas Morning News.

**Cautiously supportive:** The New York Times ("fighting may eventually become necessary"), the Boston Globe.

**Skittish:** USA Today, the Minneapolis Star-Tribune, the Cleveland Plain Dealer ("a case could be made for international action"), the St. Louis Post-Dispatch.

LUCY HOWARD AND NED ZEMAN  
with bureau reports

**BUZZWORDS**

**T**he military jargon used by American servicemen and women in the gulf is always changing. Here's some popular slang:

**Golden BBs:** American fighter pilots' derisive term for the Iraqis' antiaircraft artillery.

**Wadi:** A deep valley in the desert, from the Arabic.

**Collateral damage:** Civilian casualties.

**Homers:** Iraqi commanders. As in Homer Simpson, the bumbling cartoon character.

**Frogfoot:** An Iraqi attack plane.

**Zoom bag:** Flight suit.

**Fur ball:** Pilot talk for the hectic confusion of air-to-air dogfights.

**Bone domes:** Helmets, which used to be all white. Now they're camouflaged.

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## On the Eve of War

So NEWSWEEK designates Saddam Hussein "Gambler of the Year" ("Saddam's Endgame," SPECIAL REPORT, Jan. 7). Why play cute? Lives are in the balance.

RON CHESBROUGH  
Jeffersonville, Vt.

I was glad NEWSWEEK chose (in "More Than a Madman") to note a few of Saddam's accomplishments: decreasing hunger and illiteracy in Iraq and granting Iraqi women equal pay for equal work as well as paid maternity leave. Thank you for giving us a multidimensional portrait of someone typically depicted as evil incarnate.

BETH A. KULENSZA  
Philadelphia, Pa.

Yes, Saddam is "more than just a madman," as your cover says. He knows the United States has the power to destroy Iraq. And he also knows that, if history is a guide, the United States will probably rebuild his country after all the destruction. Eventually, after years of U.S. economic assistance, Iraq will be strong enough to start buying up what's left of our impoverished country—what's left, that is, after Japan and Germany finish shopping.

LOUIS J. KAPOSTA  
Southlake, Texas

## The Will to Conserve

Thanks for detailing how President Bush may "botch" national energy policy ("Will Bush Be Bold?", NATIONAL AFFAIRS, Jan. 7) by promoting increased production instead of conservation. As you noted, many options are now available to conserve energy—the problem lies in finding the political will to end our dependence on foreign oil and protect the environment. As it stands now, Bush seems to lack that will. What's more, he insults the soldiers he has sent to the gulf by doing nothing to conserve the oil they are risking their lives for.

TOM LENT  
San Francisco, Calif.

## Delinquent Justice

Jogger Aileen C. Hefferren's "An Incident in the Park" (MY TURN, Dec. 17), which describes how she was injured by a 12-year-old masher, was one of the most incisive pieces I have read on the subject of violence against women. Anyone, of course, can become a victim. But does a man have to fear walking across a college campus at night, living alone or being in a crowded place in broad daylight? Women have won many battles for reproductive choice and equal job opportunities, yet rape, sexual assault

MAIL CALL

## Prelude to War

**In the weeks leading up to the Persian Gulf War, NEWSWEEK readers offered disparate and emotional opinions about what the United States should do. Most readers, it should be pointed out, came down firmly against military action.**

*"This needs to stop before men start dying," wrote one who urged the United States to "stop taking my friends and family away" to fight. Another wrote that, while Americans excoriate Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, they should remember that their own country was seized from Native Americans. There were also many pro-force letters, often from military personnel. A common response: "Aggression left unchecked leads to further aggression."*



and domestic violence continue to overwhelm us. Until we change a world that tolerates such violence, women will be neither safe nor "equal."

LISA M. LUMPKIN  
Guilford, N.Y.

How could Hefferren possibly conclude that society barely took notice of—indeed, accepted and dismissed—her assault in the park? By her own account, a sympathetic crowd gathered, another jogger chased down the suspect, a passing Secret Service agent radioed for help and a fire chief administered first aid. Later, a detective insisted on attempting to prosecute the suspect. I found her story full of evidence that, at a time when indifference is endemic, many people are ready to lend a hand.

JOHN W. MOORE  
Watertown, N.Y.

Hefferren says she was nauseated, dehydrated, "shaking uncontrollably" and in shock after being knocked down by a boy and his bicycle. She acknowledges that her "story will strike some readers as very mild"; in fact, it is ludicrous, almost a parody of an effete woman's introduction to reality. This hothouse flower suggests that the criminal-justice system's relative unconcern with her case demonstrates society's deranged priorities. The prosecutor

who declined to issue a warrant for the 12-year-old's arrest was right to ignore her posturing. Hefferren's anxiety is neurotic compared, say, with that of many inner-city women obliged to raise a family in an arena of shootings, knifings, drugs and rape.

MICHAEL SLOAN MACLEOD  
Scotts Valley, Calif.

Hefferren rightfully complains about being harassed in front of witnesses by a juvenile delinquent who, although identified, goes unpunished. That unfortunate outcome may have resulted, however, from her hesitation to press charges immediately, out of fear, as she put it, that it "might be a waste of time." Our justice system works best when victims have the courage to stand up and express in court the feelings Hefferren so eloquently sets forth in her essay. She still can—and should—aggressively assert to local law-enforcement officials her desire to seek justice in this case.

CRAIG SILVERMAN  
Chief Deputy District Attorney  
Denver, Colo.

## Women's Health Counts

You were right to say in "Our Bodies, Their Selves" (HEALTH, Dec. 17) that a National Institutes of Health study on aging did not include women when it began (in 1958). But you were wrong not to mention that women have participated in the study—the Baltimore Longitudinal Study of Aging (BLSA)—since 1978, when it became a top priority of the newly established National Institute on Aging. Of the current 1,100 BLSA volunteers, about 40 percent are women.

T. FRANKLIN WILLIAMS, Director  
National Institute on Aging  
Bethesda, Md.

## Surveying the Survey

As the underwriter of the "Voices of Young America" survey, we were pleased that NEWSWEEK found the poll results worthy of coverage ("Vital Statistics," PERISCOPE, Dec. 24). However, a clarification: although the poll was conducted, as you noted, by The Gallup Organization, it was conceived and commissioned by the Magnetic Products Division of Fuji Photo Film U.S.A., Inc.

GENE KERN, Advertising Manager  
Fuji Photo Film U.S.A., Inc.  
Elmsford, N.Y.

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A photograph showing a person bobsledding down a long, dark, curved slide. The slide is surrounded by lush tropical foliage and rocks. The person is wearing a patterned shirt and shorts, and is holding onto the safety bars of the sled. The slide leads into a pool of water.

Next week, go bobsledding Disney-style.

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## Overheard

**C**learly I've never been there, but it feels like we are in the center of hell."

*CNN anchorwoman BERNARD SHAW,  
reporting from Baghdad as bombs  
sounded around him*

**W**e have before us the opportunity to forge for ourselves and for future generations a new world order, a world where the rule of law, not the law of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations."

*GEORGE BUSH, addressing the nation  
after war began*

**I**'m gonna pop some popcorn and watch the war."

*A University of Oklahoma student, after  
President Bush's address to the  
nation Wednesday*



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*Not to be critical, your excellency, but perhaps you should have accepted Bush's letter.'*

**I**'m the consul for information, but I don't have any information."

*OFRA BEN-YAAOCHE of the Israeli Consulate in Chicago, immediately after word came that Iraqi Scud missiles had hit Israel*

**O**ur thoughts are with the troops over in the Middle East and with those families here whose members might be over there. All we are saying is give peace a chance. Here's Bart Simpson."

*MTV veejay MARTHA QUINN, introducing a Bart video on Jan. 15*

**S**addam was my classmate. He was not good in his studies. In fact, he was an imbecile. A real zero, especially in English. I tried to help him. I can't believe that a dunce like him is now leading a country that threatens Israel. However, he was charismatic and he was the class president."

*RAPHEL GOOHARY, an Iraqi Jew now living in Israel, on his former schoolmate*

**W**e hit some big things pretty good."

*An American military official, when asked by ABC News to assess the success of the first American air attacks*



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THE WAR

# DESERT STORM


**Awesome air power opens up the first front in the campaign against Iraq**

**W**ith the thunderous razzle-dazzle of a Tomahawk missile launch, America unleashed the full fury of modern warfare on the Middle East last week. The first results were spectacular and terrifying. As Baghdad's baffled defenders filled the night sky with futile pyrotechnics, the combined forces of Washington's anti-Saddam coalition steered their precision-guided munitions into the bunkers and command posts of Iraq's outgunned military establishment. It all seemed effortless, antiseptic and surreal: casualties were very light, at least among the attackers, and the high-tech gadgets in America's multibillion-dollar arsenal seemed to work with surgical lethality. Like a day at the office, one pilot said. This one's for you, Saddam.



A Tomahawk cruise missile from the USS Wisconsin lights the night sky









At home, millions of Americans tuned in to watch the high-tech sequel to The Living Room War. Washington fought euphoria, and the nation, swallowing its misgivings, rallied 'round the commander in chief. But there was foreboding, too—an intuition that this war, like Vietnam, would sooner or later go horribly wrong, or that the Scud missiles crashing down on Tel Aviv were omens of some larger Armageddon. In the chill wastes of Saudi Arabia, the troops of Desert Storm waited for the great land battle that seemed all but inevitable. Barring a miracle, they knew, the true face of war would be revealed in terror and blood.



'Triple A'—antiaircraft artillery fire—lights up the night sky over Baghdad and a U.S. pilot returns to base



At a base in Saudi Arabia, a U.S.  
airman primes an F-15 for action



# A New Kind of Warfare

A mighty air armada strikes Iraq, and war technology seems to cross a threshold to a new generation

## THE WAR DESERT STORM

BY RUSSELL WATSON AND  
GREGG EASTERBROOK

It seemed almost too easy. With eerie precision, "smart" bombs dropped down air shafts and burst through bunker doors. Cruise missiles, lethal robots launched from warships in the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, slammed into the Defense Ministry and the presidential palace in Baghdad. Hot streams of antiaircraft fire lit up the night, while bomb explosions bloomed above the skyline. Out in the desert, the Iraqi Air Force hid in its hardened shelters; the few pilots who came up to challenge the intruders were quickly shot down or turned tail and fled to the north. To television watchers back home, the bombardment of Baghdad seemed like a kind of video game, at once impersonal and fantastic. It was intensely real to the pilots who had to fly through the Iraqi flak, but even they brimmed with confidence about their high-tech toys. "You pick precisely which target you want . . . the men's room or the ladies' room," said Col. Alton Whitley, who commands a wing of F-117A Stealth fighters.

When Desert Shield turned into Desert Storm last week, aerial warfare seemed to cross a threshold into a new generation. High-tech weapons, maligned in the past for their stratospheric cost and earthbound fallibility, suddenly seemed to work almost flawlessly. The Navy's Tomahawk became the first cruise missile to be used in battle, and of the first 150 that were fired, more than 85 percent hit their targets, Pentagon sources said. The Army's Patriot became the first missile to shoot down another missile under combat conditions, destroying what was thought to be an Iraqi Scud launched toward a base in Saudi Arabia. Electronic countermeasures befuddled Iraq's air defenses. Bombs and air-launched missiles, guided by laser beams, infrared images and television pictures, slammed into target after target, erasing memories of embarrassing misses in earlier attacks on Libya and

MARK PETERS—DOO POOL

Panama. It is in the nature of war that some missiles will go awry and some weapons misfire in the campaign ahead. Already the edge has been taken off Desert Storm's triumph by the inability of the air campaign to prevent Iraq from firing Scud missiles at Israel, which raises the specter of a wider regional war. But with most of the technology working well, the strategists' dream of the decisive "surgical strike" may now be one step closer to reality.

The early successes heartened an American public that had dreaded the outbreak of war against Iraq. In a NEWSWEEK Poll taken just after the fighting began, George Bush's approval rating soared to 83 percent, the highest of his highflying presidency. Approval of his actions in the gulf surged to 85 percent. The president and his advisers kept pinching themselves: the long-awaited war against Saddam Hussein had to be tougher than this. "We must be realistic," Bush cautioned at a news briefing on Friday. "There will be losses. There will be obstacles along the way. And war is never cheap or easy."

**Rope-a-dope:** "We're into euphoria control around here," said one of the president's closest advisers. "It's going to get a lot worse." Even as the air war seemed to be going almost entirely their way, American officials worried that perhaps Saddam was holding back, absorbing the first blow from the allies and saving his strength for a bloody land battle later on. "The guy's doing a rope-a-dope on us," fretted a top U.S. strategist.

Bush tried to keep everyone's eye on the goal: to force Iraq to withdraw unconditionally from occupied Kuwait. But Saddam soon muddled the waters with an old-tech weapon of his own. On Friday and Saturday, his forces fired Scuds into Israel from launchers in western Iraq. Straining at the limit of their range, the obsolescent missiles exploded almost harmlessly and hurt few Israelis. Saddam's intention was to provoke, hoping that Israeli retaliation would transform the fight over Kuwait into an Arab-Israeli conflict, a crusade he would be only too happy to lead. But Israel held its fire (page 25). Bush said allied warplanes were conducting "the darnest search-and-destroy effort that's ever been undertaken in that area" to eliminate Saddam's remaining Scuds.

By the end of the week, however, the job still had not been done. Air Force officers believed that Saddam still had about 50 operational Scud launchers. The preliminary air



## The Biggest Airstrike

■ **Allied forces flew more than 1,000 sorties in the first 14 hours of combat; in the Rolling Thunder campaign in Vietnam, U.S. pilots averaged 3,050 sorties per week in September 1965.**

■ **The allies dropped some 2,232 tons of high explosive in the first 24 hours—more than the daily tonnage of the intense Linebacker II campaign in Vietnam, December 1972.**

■ **In more than 2,000 combat sorties, only eight allied planes went down; at the start of the 1973 war, Israel lost three to four craft per 100 sorties.**





TODD BUCHANAN—DOD POOL



GEORGES MERILLON—GAMMA LIAISON

An F-14 leaves its carrier, smoke rises from a Saudi refinery hit by Iraqi artillery. combat control on the USS Wisconsin

bombardment of Iraq had been planned to go on for nine days before the ground war began, NEWSWEEK learned. Now, bad weather in the region and the failure to knock out the Scuds had prolonged the aerial campaign.

That was the only known setback of the campaign's first few days. But in the opening stages of the conflict, the Americans and their partners in the air war—Britain, Saudi Arabia, France, Italy, Canada and exiles from Kuwait—had been lucky. Several factors made the allied forces much more successful than they might have been in another setting. Among them:

■ **The Right Weather.** The night on which the war began was clear and dark, with a new moon just arrived. Those are the best condi-

tions for the night-vision equipment used on allied fighter-bombers and for their smart bombs. The climate also was ideal for cruise missiles. The optical scanner that guides a Tomahawk in its final approach to the target can get confused if it has to look through fog, clouds, smoke or dust. After the first 36 hours, however, the weather turned cloudy, and some allied jets were forced to return to base without dropping their bombs, even though some of the warplanes were loaded with "all weather" devices.

■ **The Right Time.** The early air raids were extremely complex, but commanders of the international coalition had plenty of time to plan and practice during the five months they spent waiting for the war to start. They had time to coordinate different forces so that their planes would not be jamming or shooting at one another. They had time to build new airfields in Saudi



JOHN McCUTCHEON—DOD POOL




REUTERS  
Saddam Hussein prays on Iraqi television

Arabia to accommodate ground-based aircraft and to provide refueling facilities for carrier-based warplanes committed to the battle in Kuwait and Iraq. American commanders also had time to prepare the elaborate digital maps that have to be programmed into cruise missiles in advance of an attack. Such maps did not exist in early August. Incredulous, the regional commander, Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, used his considerable temper to get them made. In a faster-starting, more fluid war, the cruise missiles might have been much less effective.

**The Right Terrain.** Iraq and Kuwait are open country, where guidance systems and night-vision devices can readily pick out targets. In forests or jungles, the same targets might be harder for pilots and some of their sensors to locate. And the war is being fought in a relatively small area, close to allied air bases and launching platforms. "You have to wonder if the technology would appear to be working so well against the Soviet Union," says Col. Andrew Duncan, a military-affairs expert at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London. The Soviets have much more sophisticated air defenses than Iraq, deployed over a much larger arena. "Think of a

## Controlling the Skies

The alliance's show of power drew on strengths ranging from T cruise missiles to the venerable, high-flying B-52 bomber. But the next night Iraq attacked Israel (inset) with its first volley of surviving Scud missiles.





A-6

DAVID F. BROWN/BOEING


BEN PROTHERO—ARMS COMMUNICATIONS, DAVID F. BROWN



TORNADO GR-1



A-10

JOHN FICARA—NEWSWEEK  
Bush briefs reporters before the war

battlefield stretching all the way from northern Norway to Turkey, at least 10 times the current area," says Duncan. "There might simply not be enough technology to cover all of that. In a larger theater, you eventually run out of resources."

**The Right Display.** When the Americans hit Baghdad, television recorded the high-tech blitz. Allied warplanes made their own visual records, as well, and when U.S. generals played some tape for the press, they selected highlights from the most successful missions. Reporters were not shown tapes of bombs or missiles that went astray. And no one, except the Iraqi victims, witnessed the old-fashioned onslaught of the giant B-52 bombers dumping loads of bombs on troops cowering in their bunkers. The B-52s attacked targets that were outside the range of television's prying eye.

**The Right Enemy.** In the final analysis, Iraq is a dictatorship run by a leader who may be mad in the clinical sense—and whose notions of modern warfare are somewhat quaint. Armies led by tyrants often lack effective officers, because strong opinions and individual initiative are not encouraged. This was apparent during Iraq's war with Iran. In eight years of fighting against one of the world's most disorganized states, Iraq managed to gain only slivers of territory. Iraqi commanders appeared hesitant and insecure, failing to assert themselves in the most obvious

ways, such as pursuing shattered Iranian columns. Last week the Iraqis once again seemed unsure of themselves, except for the diversionary attack on Israel.

Last Tuesday morning, more than 12 hours before the United Nations deadline for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, President Bush signed an order for the war to begin the next day. Wednesday morning, when the deadline had passed without any concessions from Saddam, Bush saw no reason to change the timetable, which called for an air attack to begin shortly before 7 o'clock that night (3 a.m. Thursday in Baghdad). The allies were notified of the pending air war, and doubters climbed on the bandwagon. France, which had failed with a peacemaking effort at the last minute, put its forces in the gulf region under U.S. command—though not for airstrikes deep inside Iraq. Turkey, which had hedged on the question of a second front, eventually decided that bases on its territory could be used for attacks on Iraq by American warplanes.

**In the cross hairs:** One strategic target on the first night of the war was Iraq's command-and-control system, the network of telephone lines and microwave communications that connects Baghdad to outlying Army headquarters and to the country's four air-defense centers. The capital itself was protected by surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), antiaircraft guns and fighter planes, none of which had been knocked out yet. Thus American planners chose to attack the main telecommunications buildings in Baghdad with an F-117A Stealth

fighter-bomber, the angular, slow-flying plane that is nearly invisible to radar. One of the F-117s neatly dropped a 2,000-pound, laser-guided smart bomb onto the building. In a videotape shown to pool reporters later, the cross hairs of the plane's targeting system focus on the telecommunications building and then the bomb hits it, showering debris from all sides (chart, page 23).


Other targets on the first day included air defenses, missile launchers and troop concentrations. Some allied planes jammed Iraqi radars or knocked them out (page 20). Others, including the British Tornadoes, cratered the runways of Iraqi airfields, temporarily closing them down. United States Navy A-6Es and F/A-18s bombed Scud missile platforms in western Iraq, where they threatened Israel. Iraqi troops in or near Kuwait were attacked by tankbusting A-10s and Apache helicopters and by the ponderous B-52s.

Some of the most sophisticated attacks were carried out by single planes delivering single, precisely targeted bombs or missiles, rather than by waves of attack planes, which might have caused enough smoke or dust to confuse one another's guidance systems. To get to the target, however, each attacker was enveloped in what the planners call a "force package," a team of aircraft playing various roles. Standard U.S. tactics against a defended position call for the first players onto the field to be the "defense suppression" aircraft. An EF-111 would jam the Iraqis' long-range radar, forcing the

## Patriot vs. Scud

Soviet-made SS-1 missiles, also known as Scuds, hit three Israeli cities last week. The U.S. destroyed one over an air base in Saudi Arabia using the Patriot air-defense system.

1 The Iraqi Scuds probably originated from mobile launchers in southern Iraq. Their original range of 186 miles has been improved by the Iraqis to approximately 500 miles, although the longer reach decreases the 2,167-pound payload. Accuracy is poor.



2 Each Patriot station contains four missiles and a trailer housing radar. After launch, a radar beam illuminates the Scud. Missile antennas pick up reflections and relay data to the ground. Commands are transmitted back to the missile's guidance system.

# Blinders for Iraq's Defenses

Electronic warriors pull Saddam's plug

Navy Cmdr. John Leenhousts expected the worst. The radar flickered with the symbols for approaching Soviet-made MiG jets as his A-7 Corsair streaked through the darkness toward Baghdad. Through years of training and months of waiting, the 40-year-old fighter pilot had readied himself for this moment. Then, before it started, it was over. "They acted as if they were overwhelmed," he said later of his would-be foes. "In some cases I don't think they had a very clear picture exactly who was out there." He was right. One reason for Iraqi impotence in the early gulf war was U.S. mastery of the electronic battlefield. Moments before each bomb run, Navy and Air Force jets packed with powerful jamming transmitters cleared the way by throwing a high-tech shroud over Iraqi radar and antiaircraft missile systems. "You're talking about an environment that was electronically obliterated," says one Air Force officer.

In its simplest form, electronic countermeasures (ECM) achieve the same effect as turning on a vacuum cleaner or a mixer near a television set: electronic interference. Every radar has its own distinctive characteristics, including the radio frequency at which it operates, sending out electromagnetic pulses that reflect off invading aircraft. Once a radar's signature is identified with the help of an on-board computer, ECM specialists transmit patterns of blinding "white noise" causing radar screens to go blank. They can also produce false or exaggerated echoes that lead missiles and fighters away from bombers. ECM can wreak havoc for hundreds of miles around. "One EA-6B off the East Coast of the U.S. could shut down every airport ground-control station from Boston to North Carolina," says one congressional defense aide.

Since the Vietnam War, when surface-to-air (SAM) missiles caused heavy

losses among American pilots, the United States has invested billions in ECM technology. American and Saudi pilots spent the prewar months running cat-and-mouse probes of Iraqi radar, prodding them to switch on their defenses and tip their hand. European analysts say pilots may also be the beneficiaries of jamming secrets supplied by the Soviets, one of several contributors (along with the United States, France and Kuwait) to Iraq's hybrid radar. Last week over Baghdad, the work paid off. Navy EA-6B Prowlers and Air Force EF-111 Ravens quickly detected Iraqi battle radars and blocked them from providing targeting information to missiles and fighters. Air Force officers told NEWSWEEK that the Iraqis managed to scramble a handful of Mirage and MiG-29 jets but that jammers cut the planes off from their ground-based command and control centers. They promptly fled north to avoid the American warplanes. "When you knock



## THE WAR DESERT STORM

A Wild Weasel with antiradar missiles

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What happened to Iraqi air defenses? The allies expected tenacity. But Israeli military analysts say the defenses may have been overrated to begin with. Reconnaissance from the Israeli Air Force

were well versed in close air combat.

American officials say they take nothing for granted. Air Force officers assume that Saddam's commanders are using intelligence gathered from initial assaults to adjust and improve defenses. At the weekend, they were proving more troublesome. Shorter-range tactical SAMs still pose a problem, as well as thousands of antiaircraft guns still defending troops in southern Iraq and Kuwait. Hundreds of Iraqi planes may have survived the allied onslaught, possibly held in reserve for use in the coming ground campaign. Cratered runways can be repaved and SAM radars can be repaired in a matter of days; al-

lied warplanes may have to return time and again. Some resistance has been fierce. SAM defenses around a major concentration of elite Republican Guards in southern Iraq proved so impenetrable during the first night of attacks that an entire wave of jets broke off without dropping a single bomb. One U.S. plane was shot down before the mission was aborted. "We're not running around here saying

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station launcher

**2** Each Patriot station contains four missiles and a launcher trailer housing radar. After launch, a radar beam illuminates the Scud. Missile antennas pick up reflections and relay data to the ground. Commands are transmitted back to the missile's guidance system.

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## THE WAR DESERT STORM

A Wild Weasel with antiradar missiles

switched off to elude detection. British Tornado bombers used the ALARM missile, which can hang from a parachute until it finds an active transmitter. What happened to Iraqi air defenses? The allies expected tenacity. But Israeli military analysts say the defenses may have been overrated to begin with. Because Iran's puny Air Force posed little threat during its eight-year war with Iraq, Saddam's ground troops got the lion's share of the military budget. They also suggest that Iraqi anti-air gunners, like soldiers in other Arab countries, are trigger happy—long on emptying magazines and short on fixing targets. Allied experts add that Iraqi pilots are not

well versed in close air combat.

American officials say they take nothing for granted. Air Force officers assume that Saddam's commanders are using intelligence gathered from initial assaults to adjust and improve defenses. At the weekend, they were proving more troublesome. Shorter-range tactical SAMs still pose a problem, as well as thousands of antiaircraft guns still defending troops in southern Iraq and Kuwait. Hundreds of Iraqi planes may have survived the allied onslaught, possibly held in reserve for use in the coming ground campaign. Cratered runways can be repaved and SAM radars can be repaired in a matter of days; allied warplanes may have to return time and again. Some resistance has been fierce. SAM defenses around a major concentration of elite Republican Guards in southern Iraq proved so impenetrable during the first night of attacks that an entire wave of jets broke off without dropping a single bomb. One U.S. plane was shot down before the mission was aborted. "We're not running around here saying we're kicking butt," says one Air Force colonel. For the United States and its Desert Storm allies, control of the skies is clearly within reach. But it may require a vigorous effort to keep.

BILL TURQUE with DOUGLAS WALLER and THOMAS M. DEFRANK in Washington, THEODORE STANGER in Jerusalem and DANIEL PEDERSEN in London

## Clearing a Corridor

**Missiles:** Shrike or HARM missile homes in on the enemy radar beam, destroying the transmitter.



**Jamming Pod:** High-power signals generated on the enemy radar's precise wavelength blank out the radar long enough for the aircraft to get clear.

**Chaff Dispenser:** Radar-reflecting aluminum foil or Mylar is dropped from the plane, screening the aircraft from enemy radar.

**Infrared Flares:** Expendable flares released from the aircraft divert enemy heat-seeking missiles by creating an even stronger heat source.



**E**lectronic countermeasures (ECM) have become an integral part of the "force package" in modern aerial warfare. Before each airstrike over Iraq last week Air Force and Navy planes rigged with sophisticated jamming equipment blinded enemy radar. Their interference cleared a "safe corridor" that protected allied pilots from detection and pursuit by Iraqi missiles and fighters. The shield allowed them to use "smart" bombs on key military targets.

SAM crews to turn on their own battery radar. Then an F4-G Wild Weasel would fire a missile to knock out the radar, grounding the SAMs.

Next would come the fighter planes, such as F-15s or F-16s, to protect the attack aircraft. Finally the bombers would come into play—any of a half-dozen models, depending on the mission. The planes in the force package, which come from different bases and travel at different speeds, would not have to fly all the way to the target together. Instead, they would arrive there in a precisely timed pattern, with AWACS command planes acting as traffic cops in the crowded and unfriendly skies.

After 36 hours of almost trouble-free bombing, the weather turned cloudy, and some coalition aircraft with daytime roles were unable to complete their assignments. Their commanders preferred aborted missions over the risk of hurting innocent civilians. So instead of jettisoning their bombs and missiles in the desert or the sea, the pilots returned to their bases and made dangerous landings with the weapons still attached to their planes. Some pilots said cynically that the bombs and missiles were too expensive to dump. While the weather hampered pilots based to the south of Iraq, American warplanes began to attack from Turkey, presumably aiming at northern airfields that had provided sanctuary for Iraqi pilots in earlier battles.

**Parked indoors:** As the air war continued, the coalition gradually shifted to new targets. On Saturday, Gen. Colin Powell, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said the attacks would begin to concentrate more heavily on the elite Republican Guards and other Iraqi ground forces stationed in or near Kuwait. But one original objective of the air war still had not been achieved: to knock out the Scuds. Although most of the fixed launchers apparently were destroyed, some mobile launchers—no one knew exactly how many—survived the onslaught and were able to hurl rockets at Israel. The threat posed by Scuds tipped with conventional or poison-gas warheads may continue for the rest of the war. "They're parked indoors," said Col. Duncan of IISS. "No matter how many satellites you have overhead or how many search-and-destroy missions you do, nobody can see through a roof."

Even though they held the upper hand technologically, most of the coalition's young pilots found their first experience of combat to be as frightening as it was exhilarating. "It was the most scary thing I have ever done in my life," Flight Lt. Ian Long, the pilot of a British Tornado, told pool reporters. "We were frightened of failure, frightened of dying," he said. Inevitably, a few of them died, despite the weakness of Iraqi air defenses. American, British, Ital-




A Tomahawk nears a test target



The war head detonates as planned



The target below is destroyed



## THE TOMAHAWK

Range: 780 miles



1. Wings deploy after launch, cruise engine starts. 2. Missile noses over to avoid radar detection. 3. TERCOM system matches terrain to stored memory tapes.

PHIL SCHUER

ian and Kuwaiti planes went down in the first two days. The first American plane to disappear was an F/A-18 from the aircraft carrier USS Saratoga, piloted by Lt. Cmdr. Michael Scott Speicher, a 33-year-old father of two from Jacksonville, Fla. His plane was hit by a SAM, and by late last week he was still listed as missing.

It may have been some consolation to the pilots of high-tech attack planes that their bombs and missiles produced little "collateral damage"—the military euphemism for death and destruction among civilians. The accuracy of modern munitions permits makers to give them relatively small warheads. The Maverick air-to-ground missile, for example, can knock out a tank or a bunker, but its "destruct radius" for that purpose is only about 10 feet, which means that it may cause no widespread destruction if it lands in a suburban street. After the pounding of Baghdad on Wednesday night, some eyewitnesses were surprised by the lack of damage to civilian areas of the city. "You expected to see, the following morning, a devastated landscape, but what you saw in fact was a very surgical operation by the Americans," said Nigel Baker, a producer for Britain's Independent Television News, who traveled overland from Baghdad to Amman after covering the first night of the war.

**The stuff works:** Some of the best examples of precision bombing were collected in a videotape shown to the press last Friday by Lt. Gen. Charles Horner, the Air Force commander in the Persian Gulf region. One clip shows two smart bombs slamming into a Scud missile bunker; in another, a bomb is directed straight down the air shaft in the middle of "my counterpart's headquarters in Baghdad," according to Horner. In the examples shown, there was no smoke or bad weather to disorient the guidance systems, and the Iraqi air defenses were not energetic enough to keep the pilots away from the targets. There was no footage of the 20 percent of warheads that missed the target, by official reckoning. Still, the videotape showed emphatically, as Norman Friedman, an American weapons analyst, put it, that "The stuff works. It works unbelievably well."

In the right conditions, unmanned weapons can work even better. The cruise missiles achieved a slightly higher success rate than the bombers, without any risk to pilots. Tomahawks are best suited to stationary targets in situations that allow time for elaborate guidance programs to be written. In such circumstances, live air crews are probably a needless risk. The success of the Patriot anti-missile missile was equally impressive. Before dawn last Friday morning, ground crews at the Dhahran air base saw the sky light up with the bright flash of a midair explosion. "They said, 'Oh my God, it's a Scud,'" transportation Sgt. Robin Mi-

## 'Smart' Bombs at Work

The operator brings the target into cross hairs on a cockpit video display, then locks the bomb's imaging infrared camera onto it. The camera keeps the bomb on target.



**GBU-15(V)2  
Glide Bomb**

WEIGHT: 2,450 lbs.

LENGTH: 12 feet 9 inches

GUIDANCE: Imaging Infrared

JARED SCHNEIDMAN



A U.S. warplane focuses on its target in Baghdad during the opening attack

DOD

lonas, 38, a reservist from Tacoma, Wash., said later. The thunderous boom she heard next was the sound of the Patriot intercepting the Iraqi missile thousands of feet above the runway. "People cheered," said Milonas.

The improved accuracy of high-tech weapons may take warfare into a new era of truly surgical airstrikes. In World War II, the typical accuracy of U.S. bombing put explosives within about a mile of the target. By Vietnam, the circle had shrunk to about a quarter mile, and at the time of the Libyan raid in 1986, it was down to perhaps

500 feet. That sounds impressive, but for many military targets, a 500-foot miss is as bad as a mile. If recent advances have brought the margin of error down to 30 feet or less, as appears to have been achieved during parts of Desert Storm, and if the electronics are now as reliable as they are said to be, then the age of surgical bombing is finally at hand.

To their admirers, smart weapons can seem downright humane. They spare civilian lives, limit destruction and promise quick results. Yet they hold a darker promise, as well. After the gulf war, dozens of

other countries will scramble to acquire the technology employed by the United States and its allies. Almost all of it, unfortunately, can be used with nuclear, chemical or biological warheads or with the ballistic missiles that many nations are now adding to their arsenals. In the regional conflicts to come, smart bombs and missiles may be the weapons of choice for any country that can afford them.

With JOHN BARRY, DOUGLAS WALLER,  
THOMAS M. DEFRAZ and  
MARGARET GARRARD WARNER in Washington,  
THEODORE STANGER in Jerusalem  
and bureau reports



CHARLES PLATIAU—AP

American forces interrogate the first prisoners of war after taking Iraqi antiaircraft positions on oil platforms in the Persian Gulf

# Architect of the Air War



'He's a warrior': Horner's sophisticated armada of fighting jets is pounding Iraq

**H**e's known as a "fast flyer" in the Air Force, a commander who rose through the ranks piloting the nation's premier fighting jets. Today Lt. Gen. Charles A. Horner heads the U.S. Central Command's Air Forces, whose sophisticated armada of B-52s, Stealth fighters, F-15s, F-16s, A-10s, F-111s, F/A-18s, A-6s and A-7s has been steadily attacking installations in Iraq and Kuwait. By the end of the first 14 hours of battle, Horner's pilots had flown more than a thousand sorties with just one plane reported down—an opener so exhilarating that Joint Chiefs chairman Colin Powell had to tamp down early speculation that air power alone could win the war.

Horner, 54, was little known to the public until last week, when many Americans met him during a televised briefing from Riyadh on the second day of war. As Horner provided voice-over to videotapes of pilot's-eye views of air raids, viewers saw smart bombs drop with precise accuracy on Iraqi targets. "This is my counterpart's headquarters," the general wryly remarked, as a modern high-rise building in Baghdad took a hit.

**Stacks of books:** Horner has been air commander for U.S. forces in the Middle East for nearly four years, and he is thoroughly familiar with the region. On his desk back at Shaw Air Force Base in

Sumter, S.C., are stacks of books on the Middle East. Horner has cultivated contacts with Arab officers throughout the gulf, and he regularly brings in experts for political briefings. Aides say he often hops into a fighter plane and flies over Saudi terrain to get a better feel for the environment his pilots will encounter.

"He's a warrior," says a senior Air Force officer who's worked with the general. An Iowa native, Horner joined the service after graduating from the University of Iowa in 1958. Since then he has racked up more than 4,500 flying hours in the Air Force's modern fighters. He flew 111 combat missions over North Vietnam as an F-105 Wild Weasel pilot; and it was a successor to the F-105—the F-4G Wild Weasel—that flew in the very first sorties over Iraq last week, jamming and destroying enemy radar systems. In his 32 years of service Horner has won a slew of medals and decorations, including the Silver Star and the Distinguished Flying Cross.

"He's a big, tough-looking kind of guy," says one aide. "But he's very understated and soft-spoken." Nevertheless, aides say he can make junior officers cower just by walking into a room. And he can be demanding. After a rash of jet-fighter accidents in Saudi Arabia in August and September, the general hauled his wing commanders into a room and gave them

hell. "Every plane you lose to an accident gives Saddam Hussein a victory without him firing a shot," Horner thundered. The accident rate quickly dropped.

"He thinks of the military as a calling," says a colleague. "But he's very quiet about it." Married to a church organist from Iowa, Horner is deeply religious and patriotic, but wears neither on his sleeve. Around Sumter he is best known as an easygoing general who mixes well with the local folks. "He can knock a golfer a country mile, although he doesn't always know where it's going," says Sumter Mayor Stephen Creech, who regularly golfs and hunts quail with Horner.

**Choosing his words:** In a service preoccupied with high-tech hardware, Horner hasn't lost touch with people. In the second week of Operation Desert Shield, when the Air Force still worried about a possible Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia, a staff officer phoning the Air Force's temporary command post in Riyadh from Langley Air Force Base in Virginia was surprised to have Horner pick up the phone—it was midnight, Saudi time. The officer needed routine approval for an editorial that would run in the base newspaper, under Horner's signature. But the general—who was serving as the temporary on-scene commander of all the U.S. forces before Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf arrived—didn't like the copy. He spent the next hour dictating a new editorial over the phone, choosing his words carefully to reassure the nervous families waiting at Langley. "He wanted to make sure that the families back home knew he was taking care of his people," says the staff officer.

Fellow officers insist that Horner doesn't have the parochial streak that cost Air Force Chief of Staff Michael Dugan his job last September, when he boasted that the Air Force by itself could bring Saddam to his knees. "He realizes the Air Force is part of the solution, not the entire solution," says a colleague. Yet Horner would like nothing better than for his pilots' achievements to cut back or even eliminate the need for ground warfare. With the end of the cold war, the Air Force faced huge budget cuts: its conventional war mission—blasting Soviet tanks from the sky and dueling MiGs in Europe—has all but disappeared. Now the service is eager to prove it can be first to win a war. If Horner's pilots continue to perform well in the Middle East, their success may determine how the service performs in a more unpredictable war—the battle over the future size and shape of the Air Force.

Douglas Waller in Washington



ALAIN KERJER—ODYSSEY MATRIX

Iraqi Scuds landed in several Tel Aviv neighborhoods, but did limited property damage—and caused no loss of life

# 'Keep Smiling,' Israel

Saddam's missiles stretch the tolerance of a nation that always strikes back

Tel Aviv Mayor Shlomo Lahat used to joke that no Iraqi missile would come to his city because there is no place to park. Last week a Scud-B launched in western Iraq flashed toward a crowded Tel Aviv neighborhood of cement-block houses—and cratered a dirt parking area. How many miracles could there be? By Sunday, two Iraqi missile attacks had shattered Israeli walls and windows but somehow caused no serious injuries. As sirens after nerve-racking siren warned of possible new barrages, people simply hunkered down in their gas masks and waited for the next bang. "There is no need to panic," Mayor Lahat told people as he walked the streets. "Whoever lost a house, we'll take care of them. We'll build them a bigger and better house."

With grit and spirit, the nation that never turns the other cheek managed to refuse Saddam Hussein's early invitations to transform the gulf conflict into an Arab-Israeli holy war. After each Iraqi attack on Israel, George Bush was on the phone with Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir offering

sympathy and urging restraint. Israeli officials threatened the kind of devastating reprisal they had unleashed in the past (box, page 26), but left it up to Saddam Hussein to guess when they would strike.

The nation that always fights its own wars recognized that U.S. air power had already launched an intensive campaign against Iraq's mobile missiles, said Defense Minister Moshe Arens, and "we are not sorry to depend on them." On Saturday, U.S. forces rushed more Patriot missiles to Israel complete with American operators—the first U.S. troops ever stationed in Israel with a combat mission.

Israel was gambling its peaceful future that Arab foes will not read its restraint as a new weakness to be exploited. Its fundamental doctrine demanded a retaliation massively greater than any attack. Shamir faced unrelenting pressure from fellow Likud hawks like Housing Minister Ariel Sharon, who is challenging him for the party leadership and was already clamoring that Israel risked becoming "an American protectorate or satellite [that] cannot

exist by itself." On the other hand, American forces were pulverizing the military machine of Israel's foremost enemy with extraordinary thoroughness. And a quick victory could net Shamir years of grateful support—and military assistance—from a Bush administration that had often clashed with his hard-line policies in the occupied territories.

**False alarms:** It helped that the first Scuds caused so little damage. Israeli hospitals treated hundreds of people—some for superficial wounds and many more who, fearing that Saddam Hussein had launched chemical weapons, accidentally poisoned themselves administering the antidote atropine. The psychological damage was also growing. Millions of Israelis had been ordered to closet themselves in sealed rooms and don gas masks for two actual attacks and four false alarms. It was a perfect metaphor for the mood of the country: tense, claustrophobic, angry, impotent. After a Scud blast exploded the windows in her Tel Aviv home, teenager Ronit Israeli swore that "we will give them back twice what they did to us." "Israel should use their bombs," said Hagit Davidi, 14, whose

## THE WAR DESERT STORM

three brothers were slightly injured. "Not to kill the Arab people, but to kill Saddam Hussein."

That was one option. Shamir went into virtual seclusion with his limited Defense cabinet to consider a range of alternatives. Israeli government sources on the outside speculated that the Air Force could simultaneously bomb several sites where Saddam Hussein might happen to be at a given time; the attackers could use penetration bombs to reach his underground shelters. But targeting Saddam Hussein was considered the least feasible option. Alternatively, the Israelis could send the Air Force or their Jericho missiles to hit Baghdad civilian areas in an eye-for-an-eye retaliation. Or they could attack Iraqi chemical and nuclear facilities already targeted by the allied forces.

The most obvious option might be least productive. Finding and destroying mobile Scud launchers in western Iraq would be at least as tough for Israel as for the allied forces, Israeli military officials conceded. Israeli jets would have less time for hunting targets because of longer flight distances. In addition, Israel promised not to

overfly Jordan or Syria in any attack on Iraq. Jordan's King Hussein said he would send up his jets to intercept any outsiders penetrating his nation's airspace without permission. Syria has concentrated reserves and tanks near the southern Golan Heights as an added inducement for Israel to respect Jordan's territorial sovereignty. There is still one open attack route: in 1981 Israeli jets are thought to have overflew Saudi Arabia on their way to destroy Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor. Taking the same route 10 years later would deeply embarrass the Saudis, but would be less likely to crack the anti-Iraq alliance.

**The Arrow:** In part Israel can blame itself for its vulnerability to the Scuds. In the mid-1980s its strategists decided to develop their own surface-to-air intercepting missile, the Arrow. But the Arrow will not be operational until the mid-1990s. As the confrontation with Iraq escalated, Israel received an emergency shipment of two batteries of U.S. Patriots—but the weapons are not yet operational because Israeli crews are still training to fire them. Last week's delivery of additional Patriot batteries from Europe complete with U.S.

crews was meant to give Israel at least a minimal sense of security—and a reason to avoid striking out at Iraq immediately. The batteries would be ready for action "within hours," promised David Ivry, director general of the Israeli Defense Ministry. "[The Americans] understand our distress. They want to help us defend ourselves."

The more often Iraqi missiles hit Israel, the more likely a quick Israeli retaliation. As if the Scuds were not enough, Israeli military spokesmen warned that the Iraqi Air Force might still fly into action. Israel also stated plainly that it would regard any Iraqi ground incursion into Jordan as a cause for war. Israelis already weary of air raid sirens and numbing explosions also had to consider that Saddam Hussein could still throw warheads of nerve gas into their midst—an intolerable affront to the Jewish state. In Tel Aviv, Mayor Lahat toured one stricken area and found that "the people are very angry, but they are behaving well." "Keep smiling," he advised the neighbors. "This is not the last missile."

TOM POST WITH THEODORE STANGER  
in Jerusalem, JEFFREY BARTHOLET  
in Tel Aviv and MARGARET GARRARD  
WARNER in Washington

## Do Unto Others As They Have Done

**T**he scenario is chilling. Hours after 20 long-range missiles slam into civilian settlements in Israel, Phantom jets race toward the enemy's ancient capital. At noon, six planes bomb the central square, smashing homes, the defense headquarters, a hospital and a cultural center. The attack kills or wounds 100 people, some of them incinerated in cars.

A description of a future Israeli strike against Baghdad? In fact, it's already happened. In October 1973, Israel hit Damascus hard to avenge Frog-7 missile attacks by Syria against kibbutzim and farms in the Upper Galilee. (Most Israelis had been evacuated and there were few casualties.) Seventeen years later, with Israel facing two waves of missiles from an Arab enemy, a strike against Iraq seems likely at some point. But will it be a quid pro quo response to Baghdad's raids, which at the weekend have caused just a handful of injuries, or a far more



An Israeli ground crew loads a missile aboard an F-16

deadly escalation of the war?

For the moment, political realities took precedence over military concerns. Weighing the possible consequences of an attack against Iraq on the fragile U.S.-led coalition, Israel refrained from an immediate response. On Saturday, Israel's Deputy Foreign Minister Benjamin Netanyahu refused to say what his country was planning. "We have said

from the start that if attacked, we'll respond," he said. He added: "I think on the nature, the timing, the forces used, the targets chosen . . . we prefer to keep Saddam guessing."

Given Israel's penchant for effective, merciless retaliation, the Iraqi ruler has plenty to worry about. In October 1985, six days after Palestinian gunmen killed three Israeli civilians aboard a

yacht moored in Larnaca, Cyprus, Israel struck back with vengeance. A squadron of F-15 fighter-bombers, refueling in midair, traveled 3,000 miles across the Mediterranean to Tunis and back. Evading radar, the jets unleashed a six-minute blitz of bombs and rockets on the headquarters of the Palestinian Liberation Organization. The raid destroyed three PLO buildings—and killed dozens of Palestinian and Tunisian men, women and children.

More recent Israeli reprisals, aimed at PLO guerrillas in southern Lebanon, have been no less deadly. In January 1990, responding to attacks on Israeli soldiers by the radical Hizbullah faction, Israeli warplanes destroyed two bases near Sidon, killing and wounding dozens. With Saddam zeroing in on Tel Aviv, Israel may contemplate scrambling its jets again. But with American missiles and planes already filling the Iraqi skies, and the anti-Iraqi alliance hanging in the balance, it could decide that sitting on the sidelines for now is the wisest policy.

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LARRY DOWDING—NEWSWEEK

As the U.S. air war raged on, U.S. Marine Corps ground units practiced for possible assaults on dug-in Iraqi positions

# The Killing Ground

The allied strategy for the war's next phase calls for a blitzkrieg in Kuwait—and Iraq

**F**erocious as it is, the bombing campaign against Iraq is probably only the prelude to an even more monumental land battle. Unless air power forces Saddam Hussein to his knees, Operation Desert Storm will shift after a matter of weeks to a vast ground campaign to evict his forces from Kuwait. As key military sources sketch it for NEWSWEEK, the plan drawn up by Desert Storm commander Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf is a modern blitzkrieg—the first test ever of the U.S. Army's post-Vietnam doctrine of "AirLand Battle." Says retired U.S. Marine Corps Gen. George Crist: "It's going to be violent, Patton-like armored thrusts, perhaps an amphibious end run... We will [be] moving so fast that the Iraqis won't know what hit 'em."

The timing and exact points of attack are not known, but the strategic heart of the plan is a sweeping flanking maneuver around Saddam's forces in Kuwait.

NEWSWEEK has learned that weeks ago President Bush made the decision to permit U.S. forces to enter Iraq, giving Schwarzkopf freedom to maneuver well above the southern Iraqi city of Basra; below that line Iraq has some 545,000 troops, 4,200 tanks, 2,800 armored vehicles and about 3,100 pieces of artillery. But Schwarzkopf has his sights on the "center of gravity" of Saddam Hussein's military and of his regime: the 150,000-man elite Republican Guard tank divisions just north of Kuwait (chart).

Saddam, of course, has other ideas. Iraqi doctrine, developed over the last four years of its brutal war with Iran, is built around the notion of "defense in depth," which calls for Iraqi forces to fight from behind redundant fortifications and obstacles. In essence, Saddam has turned the entire territory of Kuwait into a gigantic version of such a layered defense. The first layer is made up of divisions entrenched along the

## THE WAR DESERT STORM

length of the Kuwaiti coast, then west along the Saudi-Kuwaiti border. For up to four miles in front of these lines, the Iraqi combat engineers have laid barbed wire, tank traps, sand berms and minefields. Many of Iraq's tanks are dug into sand, their turrets sticking out an artillery.

Behind these lines, Iraq has deployed small armored units to confront any enemy forces that might break through. Farther back still, stretched west of Kuwait City, Saddam has several divisions of additional "operational reserve" forces. Finally, just south of Basra, lie the Republican Guards. They are equipped with artillery, antiaircraft batteries and T-72 Soviet tanks. If the United States hit these lines frontally, Americans would find themselves reliving World War I's gory Battle of the Somme, in which Britain and France took more than 600,000 casualties in a futile four-month effort to pierce German entrenchments.

Gen. Colin Powell, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has already dismissed that idea as "mindless"; Schwarzkopf agrees. Instead, he plans to induce the Re-

publican Guards to leave their defensive positions by sending a tank force to meet them, end-running the western end of the Iraqi lines. Schwarzkopf's strike force consists of the crack U.S. tank forces from Germany—the First and Third U.S. Armored Divisions, and the Second Cavalry Regiment—plus the First Mechanized Infantry Division out of Fort Riley, Kans. Reports from Saudi Arabia say that the 168 Challenger tanks of Great Britain's First Armored Division are deploying west, possibly to join this force. Says Maj. John Chapman, of the U.S. First Armored Division: "I see us employing tactics that capi-

talize on the speed of our tanks. We will probably use our night-fighting capabilities. I see us massing our combat power, focusing on a narrow point to penetrate those initial defenses. After that, it will be like a kid in a candy store. Only our fuel supply will slow us down."


Schwarzkopf believes terrain can work in his favor. The Tigris and the Euphrates rivers join at Al-Qurna, just north of Basra, to form the Shatt al-Arab, which then flows into the gulf. Its delta on the Fao Peninsula is a wilderness of marshes; the Republican Guards' tanks cannot escape that way. Similar obstacles face them to

the north, where the Euphrates meanders east to Al-Qurna through swampland and a great lake, the Hawr al-Hammar. If the United States cuts the bridges over the Euphrates and the Shatt al-Arab, the Republican Guards' only escape would be west, along the Euphrates.

That is where Schwarzkopf wants to create his killing ground. To beat U.S. tanks, the Iraqi corps commander would have to keep his forces concentrated. But if the tanks bunch together, they can be hit by U.S. aircraft. If they disperse again to avoid this aerial assault, they will be carved up by Schwarzkopf's ground forces, supported in

## The Ground War Still to Come: A Likely Scenario

In the first hours of battle it almost seemed that the war might be won with air power alone. But eventually soldiers and Marines must finish the job on the ground. This time, the land war will be as distinctive as the earlier air war. It will mark the first test of the U.S. Army's post-Vietnam doctrine of "AirLand Battle"—a modern blitzkrieg characterized by rapid, violent armored thrusts—against Saddam Hussein's 545,000 troops in Kuwait and southern Iraq. Below, one scenario drawn from NEWSWEEK's correspondents, military insiders and analysts:



**2 U.S. tanks go in** Alliance forces avoid a frontal attack on the Soviet-style layered defenses in southern Kuwait. Instead, the largely Arab forces arrayed on the Saudi side of the border launch a holding attack. Meanwhile the American VII and perhaps XVIII Corps make an end run west of the fortifications, slicing northward to swing behind the Iraqi forces in Kuwait—a classic envelopment maneuver.

**3 Destroying the guard** Having survived earlier B-52 strikes, the Republican Guards emerge from their bunkers to face the allies. B-52s pulverize the exposed guards. Tanks and aircraft pick off survivors.

**4 Marines take the line** After bombing smashes the Iraqi defensive line on the Kuwait border, the Marines push through it. They work north to link up with a Marine amphibious landing near Kuwait City to retake the Kuwaiti capital.

**M-1A1 Abrams**

This top-of-the-line U.S. tank carries a 120-mm smoothbore gun and can reach 45 miles per hour. But it's a gas guzzler (9 gal./mile), and its high-tech features may be too vulnerable to enemy fire.

**M-2 Bradley**

An Infantry Fighting Vehicle, the Bradley transports seven grunts. It has heavy armor and TOW missiles as well as a chain gun and machine gun.

**AH-64A Apache**

An attack helicopter with a 30-mm automatic cannon, it can carry such antitank missiles as the Rockwell Hellfire. But its high maintenance needs could cause problems.

the air by A-10 tank-killer aircraft, and Apache helicopters.

Schwarzkopf has put together two other corps—self-contained groups of forces, each over two divisions strong. In the east there are the U.S. Marines, now representing the biggest amphibious assault force since the Inchon landings. After the Iraqi defense line in Kuwait has been pulverized by bombing—and only then—the Marines' task could be to power through the lines, probably to link up with a simultaneous Marine amphibious landing farther north up the coast of Kuwait, supported by the 16-inch guns of the battleships Wisconsin and Missouri in the Persian Gulf.

Schwarzkopf's second force is the XVIII Airborne Corps, consisting of the 82nd Airborne Division, the 101st Air Mobile Division, the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division and parts of the Third Cavalry Regiment. This force, assisted by French, Egyptian, Saudi and Syrian forces, may act as a "pinning" force, engaging the Iraqi lines in order to prevent them from moving out to block the U.S. end run. The First Cavalry Division would remain in theater reserve.


**Strike force:** Precisely where Schwarzkopf intends to penetrate the Iraqi defenses and make his run north is a closely guarded secret. "He has several choices, some more ambitious than others. Which he chooses depends on how many divisions he sends," says one official. Much also depends on how much time he is given to ready his strike force. This explains the pleas of Schwarzkopf and his deputy, Lt. Gen. Calvin Waller, for more time. In October Schwarzkopf convinced the president that his plan could work only with the divisions from Germany. They have been practicing AirLand Battle for a decade, and have a long experience of working intimately with the American and British Air Force units sent from NATO to the gulf. But these forces arrived only on Jan. 15, and are still a month away from reaching top form in desert conditions. Col. Jimmy Hitt of the 11th Aviation Brigade said last week that a quarter of his

helicopter crews were still at the "walking" stage of readiness.

Unreadiness is only the first kink in the plan. Land battle in the desert has always meant severe logistical strains (box, page 33). Until they get to the Euphrates, Schwarzkopf's forces will be depending on a supply line up from Saudi Arabia for every drop of water. A modern tank division uses 600,000 gallons of fuel a day—twice as much as Gen. George S. Patton's whole Third Army needed each day in World War II. As of Jan. 15, European military sources say, Schwarzkopf had only 50 percent of the munitions he wants.

The Arab allies are also a question mark. The Syrian mechanized division has al-

ready been shifted from the immediate combat area because of concern over its willingness to fight, according to Egyptian military officials. It is now well to the west of other Arab forces. U.S. ground commanders say Syrian and Egyptian forces operate according to Soviet doctrine, which calls for them to advance more quickly; they could get ahead of the pack, endangering units to their right or left. "There's a lot of Pickett's Charge quality to their tactics," says a U.S. Army colonel, referring to the disastrous rush by Confederate troops into Union lines at Gettysburg. One of the Army planners' biggest fears is that allied forces might accidentally start firing on one another because of communications



'Stormin' Norman' inspires deep loyalty among the troops of Desert Storm

BOB DAUGHERTY—AP



HANS HALBERSTADT—ARMS COMMUNICATIONS

## BGM-71B TOW II

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## MLRS

**Twelve missiles can be fired by this mobile rocket launcher, each containing six tank-seeking bombs; if these bombs don't detect a tank by the time they return to earth, they act as mines.**

problems among multinational troops operating frequently at night.

But perhaps the biggest imponderable facing Schwarzkopf is the human factor. Says Edward Foster of the Royal United Services Institute in London: "The ground phase of the war depends more on morale, training and momentum. It will be our armor plate and human bodies against those of the opposition." U.S. troops are trained volunteers who think of themselves as professional soldiers. But whereas the Iraqi forces have spent eight of the last 10 years living through the deprivation and violence of near-constant war, Americans are accustomed to economic prosperity and regular weekend passes. Except for some

officers who fought in Vietnam, their combat experience is limited almost entirely to drills. The ferocity of AirLand Battle, in which hundreds or even thousands of Americans could be either wounded or killed, will tax their morale. Last week some Marine units were visited by a military psychiatrist who attempted to prepare them for the psychological side of battle.

Meanwhile, the Republican Guards are dug in deep—dozens of feet below the ground in some cases, with much of their munitions, including tanks and antiaircraft batteries, protected in bunkers. They are getting blasted by round-the-clock B-52 bombing strikes. Air-war advocates say the onslaught could break their will, just as

Egyptian forces were made to surrender in the Sinai desert by Israeli airstrikes in the 1967 war. But the Republican Guard may not crack quickly. "You can pound them with [massive raids] and do lots of damage," says retired Marine Gen. Bernard M. Trainor, who spent two months covering Iraq's troops in the Iran-Iraq War as a New York Times correspondent, "but these are Iraqi nationalists and they'll fight."

However the battle ultimately takes shape, Saddam's objective is not to limit his own troops' losses: he sacrificed more than a hundred thousand lives against Iran and seems willing to do so again. Instead, he will seek to maximize the casualties inflicted upon his enemy. To him, apparently, American public opinion itself is the war's center of gravity. Trainor says Saddam formed his contempt for United States staying power in 1983, when President Ronald Reagan pulled American peace-keeping forces out of Beirut after losing 241 Marines in a suicide truck-bomb attack. The Iraqi dictator is seeking to make the coming ground struggle "the mother of all battles." Norman Schwarzkopf and the U.S. military see their chance to exorcise the ghosts of defeat in Vietnam once and for all.

CHARLES LANE with JOHN BARRY and DOUGLAS WALLER in Washington, CAROL BERGER in Cairo, TONY CLIFTON in Saudi Arabia and DANIEL PEDERSEN in London

## 'You Must Be the Thunder and Lightning'

Army Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf III doesn't mince words when he talks about his Iraqi enemies. The commander in chief of the allied forces in the Persian Gulf has vowed to "kick [Saddam's] butt," termed the Iraqi senior command "a bunch of thugs" and belittled Iraqi soldiers as "lousy." But as he addressed the troops of Operation Desert Storm last Wednesday night, Schwarzkopf sounded positively Churchillian. "I have seen in your eyes a fire of determination to get this war job done quickly," he said, hours after the first allied bombers streaked toward Baghdad. "My confidence in you is total, our cause is just. Now you must be the thunder and lightning of Desert Storm."

By turns earthy and eloquent, cautious and cocky, Schwarzkopf inspires deep loyalty and admiration among the 450,000 American troops stationed in the Middle East. High-ranking military officers are equally enthusiastic. They give the 56-year-old general credit for assembling "the right mix and blend" of armor, artillery and air power. He's also commended for keeping morale high and exercising tact in holding together an uneasy coalition of 27 countries including Saudi Arabia, Syria, Kuwait and France. "He's a superb strategist, a brilliant tactician, tough as nails and a real troop handler," says retired Marine commandant and longtime colleague P.X. Kelley.

Schwarzkopf is also a con-

tradictory figure. A burly West Pointer nicknamed both "Stormin' Norman" and "The Bear" (he prefers the latter), Schwarzkopf is a ballet and opera aficionado and speaks fluent French and German. He is a devoted family man who used to perform magic shows for children's birthday parties. During the Vietnam War he served two tours as a junior officer, winning a chestful of medals, including two Purple Hearts. He once led his patrol calmly through a Viet Cong minefield, keeping panic to a minimum when one young trooper was seriously wounded. Yet he's no warmonger. Schwarzkopf has spoken of the "profanity" of battle and before leaving for the Persian Gulf he vowed, said his sister, "to car-

ry out whatever orders he gets with as little cost in blood as possible."

Although he is gregarious with the "grunts" in the field, Schwarzkopf has a prickly temper. He has a reputation for intimidating his staff and is hypersensitive to media criticism. He frequently chews out senior commanders when he sees a critical quote from a soldier—even if it appears in an otherwise positive article. Army veterans are fond of an old saying: "Sometimes you get the bear—sometimes the bear gets you." Many of Schwarzkopf's underlings are still reeling from their confrontations with The Bear. Now he has set his sights on Saddam.

JOSHUA HAMMER with THOMAS M. DEFRANK in Washington and DAVID HACKWORTH in Dhahran

# Mismatch in Kuwait

The Iraqi Army is not nearly as good as advertised



LARRY DOWDING—NEWSWEEK

**U.S. Marines practice firing a 60-mm mortar at a location somewhere in western Saudi Arabia**

BY COL. DAVID H. HACKWORTH

**A**s an old doughboy who spent the last 45 years bitching about flies, often standing knee deep in mud and leeches as they flashed overhead in air-conditioned comfort, I have to say: this time they deserve their air conditioning. They've delivered the most impressive demonstration of air power in history, and the effect on Saddam Hussein's ground forces cannot help but be profound. The U.S. military's Central Command briefers here in Saudi Arabia keep saying how formidable the Iraqi Army is, how well entrenched. I doubt it.

The belief in Iraqi capabilities grew out of the last phase of the eight-year war with Iran. In 1988 Iraq seized the offensive in that war, spearheaded by the newly formed Republican Guards with their high-quality French and Soviet gear. By the end, the

Iraqis were burning through decimated Iranian defenses like a blowtorch through crepe paper, sometimes enjoying force ratios of 50 to 1 over Iran. These victories were not alone due to superior Iraqi firepower or tactics, but to steamroller tactics not unlike the human wave onslaught used by the Chinese in Korea. As a result, veteran Iraqi soldiers are physically and mentally hard. But they are also war-weary. And many more Iraqi combat soldiers, notably many of those dug in in Kuwait, are untried recruits of dubious morale. Colonel Sharaf, the spokesman for the Saudi Arabian Army, told me that more than 400 Iraqi soldiers defected to their forces along the Kuwait-Saudi Arabia border before the first shot was fired in this war. The Egyptian Fourth Armored Division, deployed along the Saudi-Kuwait border, reported that 200 Iraqi soldiers, with their officers and 50 tanks, defected to them on K-Day. Colonel Sharaf said that he could not confirm this.

However, he did not deny it. Perhaps this tank unit will disappear like the six helicopters that did not defect last week even

though David Evans of the Chicago Tribune was on site with a U.S. Marine Corps unit and heard over the Marine radio that the birds were incoming, landed and defected. He believes that the birds disappeared for political reasons. Clearly, if these reports are accurate, they paint a picture of a shaken and dispirited military.

A Kuwaiti officer here told me that underground forces in Kuwait City have reported that many Iraqi soldiers are throwing down their weapons and fleeing. He also said that many Iraqi soldiers have surrendered to underground forces and asked for shelter.

How good is the Iraqi Army now? A serving soldier observed Iraqi soldiers on a daily basis for four months as the captive of a Republican Guards unit following the invasion of Kuwait. He considers the Guards "damn good for an Arab force" but no match for the allied forces assembled here. The Iraqi soldiers he saw "were mainly city or farm boys who were unfamiliar with the desert." He said that during the four months that he was with them he "never saw them perform maintenance on the vehicles or tanks" and that "the tracks were so loose on the tanks that they looked as if they might fall off at any time." Never in the four months did he see them open up the engine compartments of their tanks. Nor did they train or do battle drill. "They had incredible logistics problems and sometimes went days without food," he said.

He said that the soldiers were frightened of their officers and especially of their political minders and were instantly obedient. The junior-grade Iraqi officers were much like the old-style British officers with a superior elitist attitude complete with batmen and a funky to carry their maps. The soldiers functioned more out of fear than spirit.

On one occasion, he observed an artillery battery setting up. Its commander chose a site under shade trees. The position was not tactically sound, compared with one a few hundred yards away that would have been far better for firing. It was, however, more comfortable. Throughout the time this position was occupied, no one dug in, laid the guns, camouflaged, performed maintenance or trained. And this was an elite Iraqi unit, part of the key echelon of the three-layer, Soviet-style defense system

(Continued on page 33)

*The author retired from the U.S. Army in 1971, after a 25-year career including service in Korea and Vietnam. He is in Saudi Arabia on special assignment for NEWSWEEK.*

THE WAR  
**DESERT STORM**

We're honored  
to be  
America's favorite cars.  
But that's not all  
we're honored for.



# Motor Trend Car of The Year.



## CAPRICE CLASSIC LTZ.



The new Caprice LTZ was rigorously designed to meet or surpass the very definite standards of its traditional buyers.

Yet one look will tell you how radically it redefined that tradition of full-size luxury and value.  *Motor Trend*:

"This attention to detail will result in a significantly improved driving experience over the long run, the kind an owner will brag about to friends."

Renowned for its smooth rear-wheel-drive performance, the new Caprice can now boast of the best V8 highway mileage in its class.\* 

Yet "The LTZ has a level of power...no other car in its class can match...a well-made driver's sedan." 




More spacious than ever, quieter than ever, with more safety features than ever—like driver's-side air bag and four-wheel anti-lock brakes—and offering luxuries you won't find in cars costing thousands more, the new Caprice is truly "...a new benchmark in a high-quality performance-oriented family sedan, destined to be an important car on the American scene." 





\*Excludes other GM products. This fuel economy challenges many smaller V6s. (EPA estimated MPG city 17, highway 26.)



"When you can  
win over attitudes  
like ours  
with a car like this,  
it's got to be good.  
This one is terrific."

-Motor Trend



Lumina Sedan.  
*Family Circle's*  
Domestic Family  
Car of the Year.  
Thousands of  
families agree with  
*Family Circle.*

They've made the Lumina Sedan the best-selling new car name in America.\*

They're treating themselves to a contemporary family car designed to respond to their every need. They're relaxing in one of the roomiest cars in its class. They're enjoying the comfort of plush cloth seating for six with Scotchgard™ Fabric Protector. How many times does that come in handy, Mom?



For a family sedan, Lumina is surprisingly agile. Its Corvette-inspired rear suspension, available 3.1 Liter V6 and standard 4-wheel power disc brakes help provide a confident sense of control on the road.

Lumina's graceful lines are also very functional. They help it achieve the best highway mileage of any V6-powered car in its class.† EPA estimated MPG city 19, highway 30.

And Lumina's beauty was designed for the long run, with better rust protection than Ford Taurus or Honda Accord. Because we want all the time your family spends in a Lumina to be quality time.



Spend some quality time  
with your family.



Based on manufacturer's reported delivery of new GM vehicles May 1, 1987 - Oct. 1992.  
GM vehicles include GM divisions and other GM products.



In its first year of production,  
J.D. Power and  
Associates ranked  
Lumina Coupe as  
the most trouble-free  
mid-size specialty car.\*

While it's obvious that the Lumina Euro Coupe is the epitome of what the adult sport coupe should be—responsive, comfortable, agile and elegant—it may come as a surprise that one of Lumina's more winning qualities is its dependability. Take its finely tuned sport suspension: It uses a Corvette-inspired fiberglass rear-leaf spring design, but it also has a "lubed-for-life" front suspension. Its generous use of two-side-galvanized steel goes a long way toward fighting corrosion. In fact, you'll never have to rustproof your Lumina! And speaking of protecting your investment, you'll find Lumina's cloth seats and door panels have Scotchgard™ Fabric Protector for stain resistance and easy cleanups.

Finally, a brisk drive will amply demonstrate Lumina's proven chassis technology, not to mention its eager Multi-Port Fuel-Injected 3.1 Liter V6. This is, after all, a sport coupe, though one designed to win a lot of friends for a long time.

\*J.D. Power and Associates 1990 Initial Quality Survey™ based on owner-reported problems during the first 90 days of ownership.



Our quality  
is winning lots of friends.





*Consumers Digest* chose nine of our cars and trucks as "Best Buys" in their class.

*Consumers Digest* looks long and hard before they choose "the best automotive values in today's excellent market." They want to help you make the most intelligent buy possible. So they judge products against a wide and stringent set of criteria, including: overall design, ergonomics, ride quality, and fuel economy. After this careful scrutiny, nine of our products were awarded "Best Buy" designations. Chevy Corsica, for instance, was recognized for its thoughtfully redesigned interior, plusher seats, user-friendly dash, and the security of a driver's-side air bag. But the bottom line for *Consumers Digest* is value. Of course, that's been Chevrolet's strong suit for many years. But then, why take our word for it—when you can take theirs?

Standard Powertrains

EPA Estimated MPG

Vehicle	City	Highway
Corsica	24	33
Chevy Beretta	24	33
Caprice	17	26
Geo Metro XFi	53	58
Geo Tracker	25	27
Full-Size Pickup	17	23
Sportvan	15	19
Full-Size Blazer 4x4	12	14
S-10 Blazer 2WD	17	23





Don't take our word for it.  
Take Consumers Digest's.



Corvette ZR-1.  
The automotive press  
has finally found  
enough superlatives to  
accurately describe the  
awesome ZR-1. *Road &*


*Track* "As for its world-class credentials, consider acceleration in the sub-5.0 range to 60, with the quarter mile following in a mere 13.4 sec.

"Ponder a skidpad performance of 0.94g. And if you doubt a Vette's agility, check its 65.7-mpg slalom."

How awesome? We're talking about a technological tour de force capable of 375 horsepower at 5800 RPMs; 370 ft.-lbs. of torque at 4800 RPMs.

We're talking about the car that set ten World and International Speed/Endurance Records in 24 hours. A specially modified ZR-1 ran the equivalent of *ten* Indy 500 races back to back—at an average speed of over 175 MPH! We're talking about the Ultimate Corvette. The latest and greatest version of the legendary American Dream Car. Very simply, one of the best cars in the world.





“One of the  
Ten Best in the World.”  
—Road & Track



Chevrolet has won more races this year than anyone, from Indy to Daytona. The fact is we race to learn, to develop the performance technology of your Chevy. But there's

no doubt that our track record is very gratifying. Our Chevy Indy program went undefeated this year 16-0, including our "Three-Peat" win at the Indy 500. The Chevy V8 helped power Al Unser Jr. to his first CART Driving Championship.



The race-modified Lumina Coupe dominated the NASCAR Circuit—and won the Daytona 500. And Dale Earnhardt raced Chevy to its 8th Manufacturer's Cup Championship in a row.



In SCCA Trans-Am racing, two ICI Berettas helped us win the Manufacturer's Championship.



A Chevy Sport truck set a new Indy Endurance Record.



And a specially modified 4x4 Chevy won the Pikes Peak Hill Climb in record time. Want to find

a Chevy on the track? Look for the one with the huge crowd behind it.



Our Chevrolets  
have a huge following  
on the track.



The Borg-Warner Trophy is a registered trademark of Borg-Warner Corporation.



Chevy C/K. A big reason more truck owners switched to Chevy last year than to any other truck.\*

Start with a bigger cab, with better visibility, more standard horsepower and payload, a heavier frame, two-tier loading and the highest 2WD full-size pickup gas mileage,† and you begin to see why so many truckers prefer Chevy over Ford. Compare mileage and you'd see: Chevy trucks get better fuel economy than Ford in 36 different powertrain combinations. And durability is built into every one of our hardworking trucks. Maybe that's why a higher percentage of Chevy trucks registered over the last ten years are still in use than Ford. From our rugged W/T1500 with the exclusive resilient Duragrigle, to the only stepside on the street with the biggest V6 you can get,‡ Chevy Sportside. Or the world's most powerful production  $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton full-size pickup: the 255-horsepower Chevy 454 SS. There are powerful reasons why so many people are switching to Chevy.





You don't get to be America's  
favorite half-ton pickup on  
looks alone.

\*Based on 1989 light-duty truck registrations.

<sup>†</sup>Comparisons exclude other GM vehicles. Chevy C1500 ½-ton: EPA est. MPG city 17/hwy. 23.



Geo. The highest-mileage line of cars and trucks in America.\*

Passing gas stations in a Geo is becoming a popular pastime. There's the zippy little Geo Metro XFi, the highest-mileage car in America. EPA est. MPG city 53/hwy. 58. And the highest-mileage convertible. EPA est. MPG city 41/hwy. 46. There's



the smart, responsive 16-valve kick of Geo Prizm. The thrifty 4-wheel fun of Geo Tracker. And the daring style and

sporty moves of Geo's multi-valve DOHC 2+2 Storm sure don't inhibit its efficiency. And Geos don't just save you gas. *Consumers Digest* rated Geo Metro and Geo Tracker as "Best Buys." Maybe that's why in its first year Geo sold more than Honda, Toyota and Nissan *combined* in their first two years.† So get to know Geos, and a few less gas stations.

### Geo Fuel Economy

Standard Powertrains	EPA Estimated MPG	
Vehicle	City	Highway
Metro XFi	53	58
Tracker	25	27
Storm	30	36
Prizm	28	34

\*Based on EPA estimated combined city and highway MPG for all Geo models. †Based on R.L. Polk registrations.



A low-angle, close-up photograph of a yellow Ford Mustang. The car is angled towards the viewer, showing its front grille, headlights, and hood. The background is a blurred landscape, suggesting motion and speed. The lighting is warm, typical of a sunset or sunrise.

Get to know  
fewer gas stations.

Over the past two years, we've introduced more new cars than ever before.

We've invited people to get to know Geo, and they did.

In fact, in the past year Chevy outsold every other car in the nation.\*  
From the largest selection of models to the most extensive and  
convenient sales and service network in the country.

we're committed to giving you cars and trucks you can be proud  
of, you can depend on, for years to come. Giving you more  
than you expect is the way we do business.

The awards and applause are great. But what matters most  
is a driving experience you can look forward to every day.



GET TO KNOW

**GEO**

\*Based on R.L. Polk registrations, 1990 model year.

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Contents based on latest available information at time of printing.

(Continued from page 32)

employed in Kuwait and southern Iraq.

This allied officer rates the Iraqis as being grossly overconfident because of their easy win over Iran, and says, "They're comparable to a second-rate Home Guard unit." The impressive and effective air-attack phase will continue for several more weeks before the ground attack into Kuwait jumps off. By that time the Iraqi defenders will be in shock and totally battle-rattled from all of the explosives dumped on them.

On several occasions in Vietnam I saw the effects that B-52 raids had against dug-in North Vietnamese troops. At Dak To in 1966 my 101st Brigade caught the North's 24th Regiment right on the chin with a B-52 arc-light strike. It was stagger-

ing. North Vietnamese soldiers had glazed eyes. They were bleeding from the nose and ears. There was no fight left in them. General Tra, the commanding general of all Viet Cong forces in South Vietnam, recently told me in a four-hour talk in New York City that the B-52s almost had his Army on the ropes, even though they were dug into deep, hard underground positions.

This is the same fate I predict for the Iraqi Army of Kuwait. Once maximum air power is concentrated on the Kuwait battlefield—and that will be done as soon as the critical targets in Iraq are destroyed—the Iraqi Army's easily identifiable fortifications will be leveled. When I was near the Kuwaiti border last week, I had a feeling of being on the moon. It is empty terrain. Infantry and the other fighting

elements cannot dig in well. It is being suggested by Pentagon experts that the Iraqis will hunker down and take the allied air pounding as they did the Iranian artillery barrages. But this is comparing a spring rain with a hurricane.

The Iraqi forces in Kuwait will soon be like the Germans at Stalingrad—cut off and ground down remorselessly. Since it is an Army held together by fear rather than discipline, it will not fight to the bitter end. Air power will break its will to fight. I would not be surprised if it were to cut and run before the war's ground phase begins sometime in February. Indeed, I hope the Army brass will not push Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf into battle prematurely just to assure their service a piece of the action. ■

## A Course at the 'College of Rommel'

Winston Churchill, who served with Kitchener in the Sudan before becoming Britain's First Lord of the Admiralty, had a favorite analogy for desert combat. He compared it to naval warfare: a contest over undulating, trackless terrain as far as the eye could see. The desert is both a tactician's dream (few natural obstacles to mobility) and a logistician's nightmare (exposed supply lines). As the biggest armored battle in history looms near, the side that best exploits the desert's unique advantages—and blunts its gritty toll on delicate components—will enjoy a decisive edge. Some lessons from the past:

The first great desert tank confrontation was in North Africa during World War II, pitting Britain against German and Italian armor under the command of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel. While some German tanks were better, the British outnumbered them two to one. But Rommel was a far superior tactician: his Afrika Korps excelled at swift, unexpected thrusts. His men were resilient: they learned to survive on as little as one canteen of water a day.

Rommel discovered that in the desert, the most formidable enemy was logistics. In the summer of 1942, he made a



FOTO: RIA NOVOSTI/TASS-SOV FOTO  
A Russian tank corps on the move near Moscow in 1944

last-ditch drive to take the Egyptian port city of Alexandria—the pathway to the Suez Canal. But he outran his supply lines. His tanks, deprived of fuel, were exposed to British air power. "Tanks are very heavy consumers of supplies," notes Texas A&M military analyst Art Blair. "You must always have a logistical tail vulnerable to bombing. The way we beat Rommel was through air superiority."

Another lesson gleaned at what armor experts call the "college of Rommel" was that tank units reveal their movements by their dust plumes. Rommel turned this to his advantage, using dust-stirring truck columns as decoys. Today, however, the United

States' high-resolution satellite photos would expose such tricks. (Iraq lacks such a capability.)

In the 1967 Six Day War, the Israelis routed the Egyptians with fast-moving wedges of tanks. Yet when they tried the same gambit during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, they absorbed horrendous losses from their dug-in opponent's Soviet-made antitank missiles (1,500 tanks were demolished in just two weeks). The Israelis—and, presumably, American armor tacticians—took away two lessons: the need for infantry, artillery and aerial support and for a tank design with a heavy emphasis on crew protection.

The U.S. M-1A1 tank that

will engage the Iraqis in Kuwait is, at least on paper, a devastating high-tech killer. But while it can outrace and outshoot Iraq's best, its turbine engine guzzles inordinate amounts of fuel and its electronics system may be overly vulnerable to shrapnel. M-1A1 crews have been so plagued by maintenance problems that some have written home requesting pantyhose to protect the tank's filters from sand.

In any case, few are expecting a replay of traditional tank-against-tank frontal assaults. If the Iraqis learned anything from their eight-year war with Iran, it's the wisdom of ensconcing their tanks behind mounds of sand so they become, in effect, artillery pieces on treads. Currently, some have only their turrets—their metal eyes and ears—exposed. That could mean that U.S. armored forces will advance across the desert until aircraft detect an Iraqi tank emplacement, then take cover behind dunes and try—along with missile-firing helicopters and jets—to pick off the enemy. Or to put it in movie terms, the mother of all tank battles may resemble not so much an outtake from "Patton" as the climax of "High Noon."

HARRY F. WATERS with  
GINNY CARROLL in Houston and  
GREGORY CERIO in New York

# 'Strong and Steady'

Bush wants to project an image of control

**E**very president, in wartime, has an image he wants to project. During World War II, Franklin D. Roosevelt was confident, even cocky, with his jaunty cigarette holder and fireside chats. John F. Kennedy wanted to be effortlessly cool. "I guess this is the week I earn my salary," he winked as the Cuban missile crisis broke. Lyndon Johnson wanted to be tough and resolute in Vietnam, but he became self-pitying and obsessed, spending his nights in the basement of the White House picking bombing targets.

George Bush wants to show self-control. According to his advisers, his model of how not to behave is Alexander Haig, the former secretary of state who announced to the nation, "I am in control" when Ronald Reagan was shot in 1981. Haig meant to reassure the public, but to George Bush—Reagan's vice president and constitutional successor at the time—Haig seemed hyper and panicked, unable to control his own emotions. Bush wants to appear unruffled and unflappable in times of stress. To openly grieve or gloat, he has been taught since school days, is a poor show.

The problem is that Bush is, by nature, an emotional man. He is an enthusiast with a kind of rambunctious, goofy charm. He can also be sentimental, weepy or blue. His private moods have swung in very human ways over the months of the crisis—from fear to resolution to impatience to calm and back to edginess again, say his aides. They picture him communing with God at Camp David during Christmas, weighing the burdens of command. But an equally telling picture was of him horsing around in the snow. With Arnold Schwarzenegger at his side, the Leader of the Free World careered down the hill in a toboggan. "Bail out!" he gleefully shouted as his wife Barbara's sled veered toward a tree. (She didn't, and broke her leg.)

In private, Bush speaks movingly about the horrors he saw in World War II. During his August vacation in Kennebunkport, he recalled his anguish at seeing a friend decapitated by a plane crashing on the flight deck. Yet when it



CAROL T. POWERS—THE WHITE HOUSE  
At a Camp David worship service

came time to address the nation last week, Bush cut out any mention of his own combat experience. He thought it was too boastful and hokey, says his aides. He also cut out several sentences referring to the "innocents"—civilians on all sides—who might suffer in the war. In practice sessions, his voice caught every time he delivered the lines. "George Bush believed it was important he be as strong and as steady as he could be," said a senior White House official. "His emotions were not relevant here. In fact, it was important to him that they not show."

**Poker face:** To choke up in public, at a time of crisis, would be unforgivable to Bush. But he has a poor poker face. As he often does in televised addresses, the president fixed an anxious half grin on his face last week as he spoke to the nation of subjects that are grave—and obviously emotional to him. His pursed lips curled up in a kind of grotesque good cheer as he recounted how Saddam had "maimed

and murdered innocent children." The speech, largely written by Bush himself and seen by the largest American television audience in history, was straightforward. But it was oddly flat for so momentous an occasion. Bush's reticence must seem puzzling to a public that reads about his occasional outbursts, like his vow to legislators that Saddam would get his "ass kicked."

The president is taking pains to show the American people that he is keeping to the normal routine. As H-hour approached last week, Bush met with a group of education advisers. "Hey listen, life goes on," he told reporters. When UPI reporter Helen Thomas said, "You look grim," Bush replied, "Come on, Helen, lighten up." The Rev. Billy Graham spent the night at the White House on the evening war began, and Washington cynics assumed the evangelist had been summoned to stage a photo-op prayer with the president in his hour of crisis. (Lyndon Johnson used to call on Graham, he said, when he needed some "good tall praying.") But Bush often turns to ministers for support, and presidential aides noted that Graham, the president's close friend of 20 years, is a frequent houseguest. At the weekend Bush returned to Camp David, presumably for more sledding in between briefings on the war. He cautioned against "euphoria" over the early returns from the gulf but declared that routine life, and even the Super Bowl, should go on.

Bush knows that he is a poor public speaker, at least when he's staring into a camera. He does better when he can talk face to face. That explains why he has given 91 press conferences and only five televised addresses in the past two years. Asked by UPI's Thomas why he was so outraged by Iraq's retaliation against Israel, Bush shot back, "Against a country that's innocent and not involved? That's what I'm saying." Bush was firm and formidable. At these moments the public can sense his basic decency.

Bush doesn't really need to be an inspirational spokesman as long as the war seems to be proceeding with push-button efficiency. But if the military bogs down in the desert, Bush will have to summon up more than his personal stoicism to call on the nation for sacrifice.

## THE WAR DESERT STORM

EVAN THOMAS with THOMAS M. DEFRAKIN  
and ANN Mc DANIEL in Washington



“Views From  
A Heartland  
Campus”

# “In John Doe We Trust” Is Not A Good Motto.

A generation ago, a former president of Harvard remarked, “The least that can be expected from a university graduate is that he or she pronounce the name of God without embarrassment.”

That minimum requirement is no longer being met today.

Modern education, dominated by a cold naturalism and a shallow humanism, is often hostile to any expression of faith.

Courses in science and literature often dismiss or caricature religion. Psychology texts often treat religious motivations for behavior as neuroses and God as a psychic aberration. Throughout the academic disciplines, objective standards of moral values have given way to a normless diversity and a pervasive attitude that it is better to accept all values, all beliefs, than to choose among them. The danger is, Chesterton observed, not that man will believe in nothing, but that he will believe in anything.

But our concept of the dignity of the individual, our laws, our very freedom — these are all products of Judeo-Christian, Western values that have been central to our history and the American experience for over two hundred

years. To ignore their importance on the campuses of our universities is to deny our human qualities and simply make us intelligent barbarians.

Nature alone simply can't account for the miracle of life or for the heights that are reached by man's spirit, his dreams and his inward longing for truth. Nor can an anonymous God-in-general or a John Doe God or scientism alone satisfy.

In denying God and all moral authority, we can ultimately deliver ourselves into the coercive powers of the state.

Immanuel Kant once wrote: “Two things impress me with increasing awe — the starry heavens without and the moral law within.” Education should embrace both the universe without and the soul within us.

At Hillsdale College we stress the liberal arts, but we also believe that a truly educated person should have a spiritual dimension to his or her academic experience. We are not afraid to discuss the place of God in our heritage and in our lives.

We hope our students leave our campus with values to guide them that will help shape not only individual lives but communities and countries as well.



*I would like to tell you more about Hillsdale College and the philosophy of its leadership. Write me, George Roche, for more information about the educational principles of Hillsdale College and why it refuses federal funds and federal control, though we provide a substantial number of our students with private financial assistance. We would like to explain our reasons for encouraging a national discussion of the need to revive the spirit of the authentic American revolution. Write Hillsdale College, Dept. NM-6, Hillsdale, Michigan 49242. Or call us, toll free, at 1-800-535-0860.*

Dr. George Roche  
President, Hillsdale College



HILLSDALE  
COLLEGE

# Prayers and Protest

The peace movement comes to sudden life with some new faces singing old songs

## THE WAR HOME FRONT

History will record that the first missiles of the gulf war were not Navy Tomahawks fired at Iraq but snowballs hurled at a military recruiting station in Cambridge, Mass., by a crowd of demonstrators marching from Harvard Square to Boston City Hall last Tuesday. The antiwar movement, nearly somnolent all through the military buildup in Saudi Arabia, gathered force in the days leading up to the Jan. 15 deadline and, once fighting actually began, erupted with a passion not seen in this country for nearly

20 years. Daniel Ellsberg, a veteran campaigner against the United States military since quitting the government in 1969, was arrested along with Dick Gregory in a small protest outside the White House—Ellsberg's 54th arrest. "On the day of the deadline," he said, "I felt the only respectable place to be was in jail because I was so ashamed of my country." Two days later San Francisco police arrested nearly 1,000 protesters after a raucous spree that disrupted traffic all over the city—more than were arrested on any one day during the Vietnam protests. If America's military leaders, determined not to repeat the mistakes of Vietnam, compressed a decade of escalation into a few days—well, America's antiwar leaders showed they had learned a few things from history as well.

There were no signs that opposition to the war posed a serious political threat to the administration. A NEWSWEEK Poll taken after the first wave of attacks showed nearly a 5-to-1 margin of support for military action. Throughout the country, the news of war fostered a rare sense of community and a mood of somber reflection. Americans flocked to Red Cross centers to donate blood for troops in the gulf. They filled churches for prayer services and gathered anxiously before television screens, united in the sense that the business of daily life could, for once, wait. Psychologists were reminded of how trauma can bring a fractious family together.

Though the antiwar activists defied popular sentiment, they were not just rebellious kids. Compared with the Vietnam protests, which at the outset were overwhelmingly the work



AL GRILLO—SAABA

Opposing the war at a candlelight vigil in Anchorage

of students, opposition to the gulf war enlists a much broader constituency. Its leaders are veterans of the various peace movements—Vietnam, Central America, nuclear disarmament—many of them now middle-aged and middle class. The heads of nine big unions, including the United Auto Workers and the Communications Workers of America, signed an antiwar advertisement in the week before hostilities began. Families of servicemen and women play a much bigger role now than they did in the '60s. So do churches. And so do minority members, who support the military effort by a far slimmer margin than whites (55 percent vs. 82 percent, according to the NEWSWEEK Poll). Even mainstream Republican figures like John Connally and H. Ross Perot have expressed opposition to a gulf war in recent weeks. The protesters are "people who don't have a reason to be radicalized or estranged from their society," observes William Chafe, chairman of the history department at Duke Universi-



NINA BERMAN—SIPA

ty. "They just see the war as stupid."

Consequently, the gulf-war protests start off with a legitimacy that it took years for other movements to win. Protest as such is no longer regarded as unpatriotic by most Americans, and the rhetoric this time around is not as offensive. Vietnam-era protests often were directed at the soldiers themselves, revealing an ugly streak of elitism at best; this year's demonstrators see the GIs as victims. "You won't see protesters spitting on soldiers as they come off the plane," predicted Greg Sommers, director of the Fayetteville, N.C., branch of Quaker House, a pacifist organization. At least some of the opponents to the war in Vietnam actively sought a communist victory, but there is no comparable constituency for Saddam Hussein. "No one is going to carry the Iraqi flag," says Todd Gitlin, a '60s radical who is now a professor of sociology at the University of California, Berkeley. "It's not hate-America time."

### Should people opposing the military action continue to protest actively or should they stop protests?

38% Protest 57% Stop

### Should the government continue to permit protests or should they be banned?

66% Permit 23% Ban

For this NEWSWEEK Poll, The Gallup Organization interviewed a national sample of 752 adults by telephone Jan. 17-18. The margin of error is plus or minus 4 percentage points. Some "Don't Know" and other responses not shown. The NEWSWEEK Poll © 1991 by NEWSWEEK, Inc.

Clenched fists and antiwar signs returned to the streets of New York

But some protesters are conspicuously more radical than others. An early split developed between the two main umbrella groups over whether or not to oppose Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. One, the National Campaign for Peace in the Middle East, which represents mostly mainstream antiwar groups such as SANE/Freeze, denounced the invasion and supported the United Nations sanctions against Iraq. But the National Coalition to Stop U.S. Intervention in the Middle East, founded in part by Gregory (who is fasting until the troops come home) and former attorney general Ramsey Clark, refused to denounce the invasion and opposed sanctions. Its membership includes chapters of the radical AIDS group ACT UP and the Palestine Solidarity Committee. Originally the two groups scheduled separate marches on Washington—the Coalition last Saturday, the National

Campaign for this coming—but after the bombing began they set aside their differences and jointly endorsed both protests. An estimated 25,000 demonstrators—a diverse lot from all regions of the country—descended on Washington last weekend.

The unifying principle of the protests is the same one Jane Fonda (who has not been heard from in this conflict) enunciated back in the '60s: that a political fight on the other side of the world isn't worth a lot of American lives. Even some of the chants are familiar, *mutatis mutandis*: "Hell, no, we won't go, we won't kill for Texaco!" But the protests embrace a baffling array of causes and grievances. An Atlanta rally that attracted 1,000 protesters included members of the Georgia chapter of NOW ("we consider Saudi Arabia and Kuwait gender-apartheid," explained president Clara Bostic) and bicycle clubs who consider it pointless to go to war over something as unnecessary as oil. "The money, energy and personnel going into the war is money, energy and personnel not going into health care," said Amanda Udis-Kessler, who



San Francisco police arrested nearly 1,000 protesters in a single day—more than on any one

## 'One Big Family' in Crystal Springs

Just hours before the United Nations deadline ran out, 700 residents of Crystal Springs, Miss., gathered at the local high-school auditorium to pray. Heads bowed and hands clasped, they sang hymns, saluted the flag and joined the Rev. David Williams in an emotional rendition of "God Bless America." As the crowd blinked back tears, National Guardsman Richard Belding read a message from S/Sgt. Charles Barranco of the 162nd Military Police Company of the National Guard, now awaiting combat in Saudi Arabia. Replying to a letter from a sixth grader named Kristie, Barranco wrote, "I tell you this so you will always know as you are growing up: the price of freedom and democracy is high."

Many American towns are poised to pay the price for the war in the gulf, but few more than Crystal Springs (population: 5,600). At least 160 of the area's residents have been deployed to the war zone, including 127 members of the 162nd. Reminders of friends and neighbors overseas are every-

where. At Railroad Park in the town center, a tree ablaze with 160 yellow ribbons bears the names of all the activated guardsmen. And at Sam Green's Photo & Frame Studio, where people usually gather for a friendly game of dominoes, the discussion has turned to the fate of the fighting men and women of Crystal Springs. "Everybody's concerned," says Green, a World War II veteran. "We could have a lot of death. [But at the same time] I think people feel we ought to be there."

Such ambivalence is not surprising in Crystal Springs, where the military presence has brought both pride and pain. Located just down Interstate 55 from Jackson, the rural community was once a thriving produce-shipping center, known as the Tomatoopolis of the World. After World War II the rise of trucking and the decline in produce farming brought the industry to a virtual halt. Since then the military has put bread and butter on the tables of many townspeople, feeding the local economy and providing week-

end work for guard members. It has also helped foster racial harmony in Crystal Springs, whose population is almost evenly divided between blacks and whites. Says military wife Bobbie Jones, "We're just like one big family trying to make it through."

**Ribbons and flags:** The going hasn't always been easy. Like all military families, the community has experienced its share of tragedy. A monument in the Courthouse Square at nearby Hazlehurst bears the names of 110 men who died in World War II; 13 in Korea, and an additional 11 in Vietnam. Jones, whose husband, Garcelle, was dispatched to Saudi Arabia in October, feels as though she's reliving the past. Her husband's first call to arms came during the Vietnam War, while she was pregnant with their first child. When he returned 11 months later he met his son, Jimmie. Now Jones and her 19-year-old son and 15-year-old daughter are alone once more. "This is something I thought I'd never have to go through again," she says.

For Jones and her neigh-

bors, the march to war began on Sept. 29, when the guardsmen of the 162nd reported to the nearby armory for deployment to Fort Benning, Ga. Robert Sims, director of the city water department, was so determined to give the troops a proper sendoff that he called every number in the local telephone book and implored residents to come out for the farewell.

They did. Accompanied by police cars and serenaded by the high-school band, the townspeople escorted the soldiers out of town with a parade that snaked from the armory past the local high school. Residents lined the main streets

Gathering spot: Owner Sam Green





JERRY GROPP—SIPA  
day of protests during Vietnam

marched in the Boston protest. But that issue can cut both ways: one heckler told a San Francisco protester that the demonstration was taking food from babies' mouths by costing the city huge sums in police overtime.

The most poignant arguments were those made on behalf of the families of the troops in the gulf. The Military Families Support Network, which claims more than 5,000 members nationwide, is protesting the Pentagon's decision to suspend the traditional military honors for the coffins of soldiers killed in action—presumably so as not to call undue television attention to casualties. But many of the protesters make the more sweeping claim that it is unfair to soldiers to make them fight. Ending the draft was supposed to end this particular form of oppression, but as far as the protesters are concerned, it's only made things worse. During the Vietnam War everyone knew what it meant to be drafted. But now, antiwar activists say, the Army lures impressionable teenagers with promises of job training and upward mobility, while

burying in the fine print the danger of dying in combat. "The people who are over there," says Greg Garland, a Los Angeles minister and head of the Westside Ecumenical Conference, "even though they volunteered, there's a sense that they didn't volunteer to go to war."

The old arguments never die; neither do the songs, even if the people who first sang them have. (Sean Lennon's updated version of his father's "Give Peace a Chance" has emerged as the unofficial anthem of the gulf-war protests.) But history is not just repeating itself; the doubts this time came even before the body bags started arriving back in the States. Once they do, dissent can only grow, predicts Art Blair, a Korea and Vietnam veteran, deputy director of the Mosher Institute for Defense Studies at Texas A&M. "People," says Blair, "are more deeply aware that war is the most horrible thing man can do to man."

**JERRY ADLER with CLARA BINGHAM in Washington, DEBRA ROSENBERG in Boston, MICHAEL MASON in Atlanta, GINNY CARROLL in Houston and bureau reports**

cheering and waving as the motorcycle passed, a sea of flags and yellow ribbons shimmering in the morning air.

The final moments were especially painful for S/Sgt. Charles Funchess, whose 6-year-old son, Isaac, came to bid him goodbye. Just as Charles turned to go, the little boy leaped into his father's arms, hooked his ankles around his waist and hung on for dear life. Charles hugged his son fiercely. "Daddy's man! Take care of everything!" he said. Then he quickly set Isaac down, turning so that the boy could not see his tears.

The ensuing days have been filled with potluck suppers,

prayer meetings and countless anxious phone calls. On Jan. 9, six days before the U.N. deadline, Terry Beazley, wife of S/Sgt. Roy Beazley, watched a grim-faced James Baker on television explaining that talks with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz had failed. The next day she called her husband in Saudi Arabia—and for the first time since he left, she cried. Nearby, military mom Judy Kelley was fluctuating between optimism and rage. "I was angry at Bush, [until] I realized he was under probably as much stress as a human being could be under."

**Prophecy borne out:** As the deadline for Iraqi withdrawal came and went, Susie Kellum grew increasingly tense. The day before, she phoned her husband, Sgt. 1/C Paul Kellum, in Saudi Arabia. "He said everybody was in pretty good spirits, but they expect something to happen," Susie recalls. On Jan. 16 she made sure that her children, Jeffrey, 14, and Amber, 9, put through a call to their father, too. Shortly after 6 p.m. local time, her husband's prophecy was borne out on the evening news. "My first reaction was to go tell [the kids] before somebody else told



MIKE CLEMMER—PICTURE GROUP  
**'Come back': Students await the return of the town's heroes**

them," she says. "But my legs felt like rubber."

Now the people of Crystal Springs continue to pray for a speedy end to the conflict, banding together for strength and solace. In the morning, many congregate at Hamilton's bakery to exchange news and lend support; in the afternoon and evening they drop by Trinity Cafe, where words of consolation come free with the hamburger steak and fried chicken. Susie Kellum keeps up with her support group for families with relatives in the

gulf. Flags continue to sprout on mailboxes, and yellow ribbons bearing the name of each unit member stretch along a chain-link fence at the armory. But perhaps no one has expressed the sentiments of Crystal Springs better than one man who was there when the troops rolled out of town that fateful day last September. "I love you, boy," he shouted as he bolted into the street alongside a guardsman's jeep. "Come home."

**VERN E. SMITH and ANNETTA MILLER**



(right) and shop patrons  
MIKE CLEMMER—PICTURE GROUP

# When Little Children Have Big Worries

Fears about the war

## THE WAR

## HOME FRONT

"How long will it last?"  
"Can bombs reach this far?"

"How do the bombs know where to go?"

The questions, direct and uneasy, began pelting teachers and parents even before the gulf fighting began. For American children, especially those with relatives in the military, war no longer seems remote or abstract.

Television has made it as vivid as a bomb-blasted building in a rubble-choked street. Many children are evincing deep anxieties, and for the youngest, it doesn't seem enough to be assured that it is all happening far away. "Far away," for one Boston 5-year-old, is where his grandma lives, and he knows he can get there on a jet. "It's hard for young kids to separate time and space," says Richard Lodish, director of preschool through fourth grade at the Sidwell Friends School in Washington, D.C. "They're asking, 'Are the bombs going to fall on my house? Am I going to be killed?' For a kid sitting home alone now watching TV, it could be a very bad trip."

As it happens, there is also an unprecedented array of counseling services available to children these days. Across the country, parents, teachers and psychologists are advising and guiding war-worried youngsters, using everything from maps to role-playing to allay their fears. In Minneapolis, school counselors sent parents a letter urging them to let children know their concerns are real and important, while helping them feel safe. In Massachusetts, children from kindergarten to 12th grade are participating in assemblies and classroom discussions about Middle East events, and they are being encouraged to seek individual help from counselors. "We're addressing emotional needs and questions we




**At home in Austin, Texas, watching television**

The eruption of fighting has brought out concerns that young people have harbored for months. One 8-year-old in New Jersey told his parents he was afraid his school bus would be blown up by terrorists. Some children worried about Iraqi children being assaulted by American bombs. Laurie Tucker, a clinical psychologist in West Los Angeles, Calif., says most of her young patients keep mum until she broaches the subject—"then there's a flood of response." Some, Tucker found, were extremely frightened by the Jan. 15 deadline. "Kids are so concrete," Tucker says. "They imagined that a bomb would explode near their house at 9:01 p.m."

Children's responses to the war threat vary at different ages. Six-year-olds may play soldier and show bravado; teenagers may tackle it on moral grounds. With all kids, counselors say, the most constructive approach is to get them engaging actively with the subject—by holding debates or writing reports. This gives them a sense of control. At the Lindley Avenue Baptist School in Tarzana, Calif., teacher Kathleen Shilala dramatized the gulf conflict for her preschoolers by snatching one of the students' shoes, then explaining complications that could arise in negotiating its return. "How does that make you feel?" she asked. "Sad," said a few small voices. "Sad and mad that you still have my shoe," piped its owner, Darien Mathews.

With younger children, the challenge is to be honest without stirring up even more fears. Grown-ups themselves may be worried about the war, and even very young children pick that up. "The adults are feeling it and the children are little mirrors," says Miami guidance counselor Gloriajai Harvey-Owen. Counselors recommend being candid but calm. "It's reasonable to say, 'I'm scared but I intend to go on with my normal activities,'" advises William Beardslee, clinical director of psychiatry at Boston's Children's Hospital. "You don't want kids to feel rudderless."

Steady as she goes seems to be the order of the day. But Rutgers University psychology professor Milton Schwabe's message to parents could be as much a prayer as a prescription. "They should tell their children straight out," he says. "Our country is at war. We are upset. People are going to be hurt and be killed. But we, here, are going to be safe. Mom and Dad and the country will be safe and taking care of you."



**A plea to the U.S. president from a youngster in Iraq**

## Helping Kids Cope

**AGES 3 TO 5:** Even at this age, they sense a lie. Explain things in terms they can grasp. Assure them their parents will protect them, no matter what.

**AGES 6 TO 9:** They may be overimaginative and susceptible to scare stories about the war. Adults should help them sort out what's real.

**AGES 10 TO 12:** They understand more and you can discuss the issues with them openly, but they still need reassurance that they'll be safe from harm.

**13 AND OLDER:** They're idealistic and ready to debate the morality of the war. Prepare to be challenged, and treat their arguments seriously.

DAVID GELMAN with CAROLYN FRIDAY in Boston, MARCUS MABRY in Washington, LINDA BUCKLEY in Los Angeles and bureau reports

# When CNN Hit Its Target

## Was it 'The Night the Networks Died'?

The gulf war may not create a new world order, but it could signal a new television order. Big events do that. The 1963 Kennedy assassination marked the emergence of live TV as the pre-eminent medium for the coverage of breaking news. It helped lead to a system of three powerful television networks that gathered news everywhere but were essentially American. The beginning of war in the gulf, the most watched TV event ever, may lead to a restructuring of that system along global lines. CNN's historic scoop on the first night of the war was the most stunning sign yet of how that 24-hour network, the only one with true global reach, is changing the news business forever.

It's not just that world leaders now publicly admit that they communicate through CNN. The ramifications of this central role in diplomacy have been widely discussed for months. The difference last week was a new understanding of the effect of CNN on the other networks and on their very existence as news-gathering organizations. Scores of independent stations, radio stations and even several network affiliates have been relying on CNN in this crisis. NBC's Tom Brokaw even interviewed CNN anchor Bernard Shaw from Shaw's hotel room in Baghdad. Most ominously for the old TV order, CNN came close in the ratings to the other networks on the war's first night, which is remarkable considering that cable penetration in the United States is still only 60 percent. That didn't even include the millions who saw CNN on independent stations.

Some called Jan. 16, only half jokingly, "The Night the Networks Died." Don Hewitt, founder of CBS's "60 Minutes" and a TV news pioneer, said last week: "I was there when it all started; I'd hate to think I was there when it all finished. But maybe it's time for a news service for the networks. It would have the best reporters from CBS, NBC and ABC no longer competing with each other, but with CNN." Under a reorganized system, says Hewitt, "the who, what, where would be handled by these two [video] wire services—the why by the networks" as currently constituted. While less competition would clearly be worse for viewers, the economics of



Reporters in gas masks at the bureau in Jerusalem

worldwide news gathering may demand it. The old networks have already closed many bureaus. CBS, for instance, no longer even has one in Chicago.

After the war, the whole style of TV news could change, too. The performance under fire of CNN's Bernard Shaw, John Holliman and Peter Arnett in that ninth-floor hotel room in Baghdad last week reminded many older viewers of Edward R. Murrow during the London blitz at the beginning of World War II. Without video, they were reduced (or perhaps elevated?) to being radio reporters, alone for several hours with the biggest story in the world. But the similarities to that earlier achievement end there. Murrow glorified broadcasting for an entire generation; it's impossible to imagine him admitting to hiding under a table or hoarding tuna fish, as did the "boys in Baghdad." They were more like competent, humanizing wire-service reporters. Arnett, in fact, covered Vietnam for the AP. In pre-CNN days, Holliman would have been considered too ordinary-looking for television. Shaw (apparently the most nervous of the three in Baghdad) has refused for years to smile on camera or play the typical role of anchor monster. In that, these three typify their network. Their roles as heroes of the early war coverage were symbolically fitting for the new, workmanlike era of TV news.

The other networks aren't exactly rolling over, of course. ABC News in particular

is popular and stuffed full of talent. But there is plenty of sour grapes about CNN. Some competitors accuse it of coziness with the enemy. Why else, they argue, would CNN reporters be the only ones allowed to stay in their hotel rooms talking to the world through a satellite-connected "four wire" approved for CNN by the Iraqi government? CNN's official explanation is that its access was the result of complex logistical arrangements made in Jordan and Iraq in November. The truth probably lies somewhere in between. In order to get its signal into almost 100 nations, CNN ingratiated itself with ministries of information throughout the world, including Iraq's. Although they were eventually forced off the air, Shaw and Holliman even thanked Iraqi officials for easing their departure.

As riveting as it was, the gulf war was hardly made for television. Watching the procession of talking heads, political consultant John Buckley joked that Iraq's ancient city should be spelled "Babylon." While the war was packaged almost like a mini-series and the attacks on Iraq and Israel both began conveniently in prime time, all of the satellite technology did nothing to speed the flow of real information. The military provided few briefings, most of which were virtually fact-free. Pool footage of the inaccessible air war was often 24 hours late.

But if the world's first live war seemed oddly detached, there were plenty of TV "moments" nonetheless. CBS juxtaposed news of a missing pilot with the same man's videotaped Christmas message—a device the networks may all use to turn casualty statistics into human faces. Sebastian Rich, a British cameraman who had just crossed the border into Jordan, explained on ABC how the first video of the bombing of Baghdad "spent 14 hours in my underpants, so it's a little bit sweaty." As CNN was interviewing Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Benjamin Netanyahu live, an air-raid siren sounded and he was hustled off. In Tel Aviv, CNN's Richard Roth ran into conductor Zubin Mehta in his bomb shelter. Over on ABC, Dean Reynolds, struggling with his gas mask, was heard saying, "I can't imagine what my mother is thinking." In the postwar world of TV journalism, the gas masks will no doubt feature built-in microphones and the special logo of each network. If there's any such thing.

JONATHAN ALTER with bureau reports

### THE WAR

### HOME FRONT

# Facing a Medical Challenge

A ground war could produce immense carnage



PETER TURNLEY FOR NEWSWEEK

In Saudi field hospitals, medical teams rehearsed for an onslaught of traumatic injury

In the heady hours that followed the first bombings of Iraqi military installations last week, war almost seemed fun: no grim images of Americans dying in the desert, just a lot of deftly demolished machinery. "We went out there and ran our first play," a fighter pilot told TV cameras. "Scored a touchdown. There was nobody home." Unfortunately, airstrikes are not the whole game plan. Should U.S. and other ground troops move to reclaim Kuwait, the scorekeeping will center increasingly on casualties—and given the ferocity of modern weapons, the sound-bite similes won't concern sporting injuries. Says Dr. John Beary, former assistant secretary of defense for health affairs: "It's potentially the biggest medical challenge we've faced since World War II."

With the possible exceptions of chemical and biological weapons, Iraq's armaments would inflict the same kinds of injuries that soldiers have suffered since medieval times: burns, shock, blood loss, organ damage. "It's not that there's a whole new breed of injuries," says Dr. John Pastore of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. What has changed is the volume and intensity of possible carnage. Some of the specific hazards American troops could confront:

**Bullets.** Iraqi infantry rely largely on Tabuk assault rifles and AK-47s, the Soviet-made guns that U.S. forces encountered in Vietnam. Bullets from these weapons trav-

el at astounding speed and create a shock wave effect, causing penetration wounds that far exceed their own diameter. A quarter-inch AK-47 slug makes a wound several inches wide and can ravage various systems on its way through the body.

**Artillery.** The shrapnel thrown off by mines, mortars and artillery shells can kill without ever penetrating the flesh. The sheer impact of shrapnel shatters bones, severs veins and can damage the brain and other organs. Ground troops might also encounter "improved fragmentation munitions," artillery shells designed specifically to fill the body with innumerable tiny fragments. Their purpose, notes Dr. Arthur M. Smith, a specialist in military medicine at the Medical College of Georgia, is not to kill but to "create a diverse and widely distributed spectrum of tissue damage." The grisly logic is that wounded soldiers are a greater burden than dead ones.

**Fuel-air explosives.** Unlike artillery shells, these new devices contain no metal; they're just highly compressed fuel capsules with horrendous explosive force. (A fuel-air bomb caused the 1983 explosion that killed 241 U.S. Marines in Lebanon.) When one of these devices is detonated above ground, the blast extends hundreds of yards. Everything in its path is incinerated, and the resulting shock waves can

damage or destroy lungs and other organs.

**Chemical weapons.** Many analysts question the strategic value of chemical agents, but Saddam has threatened to use them. Nerve gases, which Iraq unleashed in Iran and Kurdistan, cause convulsions and death by poisoning the central nervous system. Mustard gases are less lethal (only 1 percent to 5 percent of those exposed to the fumes die), but they're highly toxic to eyes, skin and lungs.

**Biological weapons.** Saddam denies he is equipped to practice germ warfare, but he is widely thought to have stockpiled the agents responsible for such diseases as typhoid, tularemia, anthrax, botulism and cholera. U.S. officials have shown particular concern over the anthrax toxin (which can be delivered by missile) and over the deadly botulin toxin, a few ounces of which can poison an entire water supply. Botulism can be treated with antitoxin, but keeping the patient alive often requires respirator.

Inner-city emergency rooms are rife with the kinds of wounds a ground battle might produce; the military actually uses them to train combat doctors. But there are important differences between treating civilian trauma and dealing with war injuries. Battlefield doctors have fewer resources, yet they receive larger onslaughts of patients and the patients tend to suffer multiple wounds.

Consider what happens when a modern antitank weapon hits an armored structure. Flying metal fragments may pierce or fracture the skull, bones and organs. Meanwhile, the blast itself sends a shock wave through the body, destroying delicate lung tissue. As fire breaks out, it not only sears unprotected flesh but creates a cloud of toxic smoke. "The same soldier may be burned, shocked, penetrated and poisoned," says Col. David Sa'adah, a clinical adviser to the Army surgeon general's office. And the gulf war could produce such injuries "in numbers we haven't experienced before."

Though battlefield treatments have improved vastly in recent decades, analysts say quick evacuation is still the key to saving lives. In Vietnam, ground troops were rarely more than an hour's helicopter ride from a full-service army hospital. Blowing sand and lack of cover could impede initial rescue efforts in the desert. And as field and floating hospitals fill up, the wounded could end up traveling as far as Europe or the States for definitive treatment. With more than a million troops amassed in the gulf, the potential for carnage is immense. For the U.S. military, dealing with it could prove the toughest part of the gulf mission.

## THE WAR HOME FRONT

GEOFFREY COWLEY with  
DANIEL GLICK in Washington



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# A Postwar Agenda

A new balance of power could create prospects for progress in the Arab-Israeli conflict

BY HENRY A. KISSINGER

**W**hen I first heard that the war had begun, I thought of President Bush. In a movie, people run around during a crisis, picking up telephones and yelling instructions. In a real crisis, the top people are very much alone. Many officials head for the foxholes, occasionally throwing out memoranda designed to absolve them of responsibility for their actions. Usually there are only two or three people willing to make tough decisions. President Bush has earned the nation's gratitude for his fortitude in holding the coalition together during the months of buildup, gaining Congressional backing and steering the country to the point where allied and domestic support coincided. But even in the best-planned operation, there are hours in which a leader in his position must wonder why he ever expended so much time and effort trying to get elected.

I also thought of the challenges the President will have to face once the war is over. After all, the purpose of victory is to ensure a lasting peace. To that end, the United States should move to implement a number of measures in the immediate aftermath of the war:

- An arms-control policy for the gulf to prevent a recurrence of the weapons race that contributed to this conflict.

- Some kind of agreement on economic and social development under the auspices of the Gulf Cooperation Council, which embraces the nations of the gulf. Other Arab allies of the U.S. could join this effort, which would be designed to defuse the argument that this is a conflict of rich against poor.

- A process to address the original Iraqi-Kuwaiti dispute. Direct negotiations between the two countries would be inherently unbalanced, because of the disparity in

their size, which has only been compounded by Iraq's invasion and pillaging of its neighbor. But some issues are susceptible to legal determination, such as drilling rights or the location of the boundaries. These could be put to the International Court of Justice, while remaining issues are handled within the framework of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

- An international program for imposing tough sanctions against terrorism. The world must not again stand impotently transfixed by thousands of hostages. Countries harboring terrorist groups must be confronted with severe reprisals, including military measures if other pressures fail.

Over the long run, our biggest challenge will be to preserve the new balance of power that will emerge from this conflict. And that will not prove easy, given conventional American thinking about foreign policy. Today, it translates into the notion of "a new world order," which would emerge from a set of legal arrangements and be safeguarded by collective security. The problem with such an approach is that it assumes that every nation perceives every challenge to the international order in the same way, and is prepared to run the same risks to preserve it. In fact, the new international order will see many centers of power, both within regions and between them. These power centers reflect different histories and perceptions. In such a world, peace can be maintained in only one of two ways: by domination or by equilibrium. The United States neither wants to dominate, nor is it any longer able to do so. Therefore, we need to rely on a balance of power, globally as well as regionally. We must prevent situations where the radical countries are tempted by some vacuum every few years, forcing us to replay the same crises over and over again, albeit with different actors.

This is why, in the final analysis, all of

## THE WAR LOOKING AHEAD



An Israeli soldier with Hawk anti-aircraft missiles near the Jordan Valley

the so-called diplomatic options would have made matters worse. Each would have left Iraq in a militarily dominant position. None addressed the root problem of the gulf's lack of security, which drew 415,000 Americans into the region in the first place—a deployment that certified the gap in military capability between Iraq and the moderate Arab countries. Any diplomatic solution that did not produce a dramatic reduction of Iraq's military power would have been a victory for Saddam Hussein. From then on, he would not have needed to engage in actual physical aggression. He could have let Iraq's demonstrated superiority speak for itself, progressively undermining the governments that supported the United States. He would have



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Yet ironically, maintaining equilibrium in the region requires us to navigate between a solution that leaves Iraq too strong and an outcome that would leave Iraq too weak. After all, one of the causes of the present crisis is the one-sided way the Western nations rushed to the

defense of Iraq in its war against Iran, forgetting that if Iran was excessively weakened Iraq might become the next aggressor. It would be ironic if another bout of tunnel vision produced an Iraq so weak that its neighbors, especially Iran, seek to refill the vacuum.

Ideally, one military goal should be to pull the teeth of Iraq's offensive capability

stability but a contribution to it.

The new balance of power in the region cannot be based on the permanent presence of American ground forces. This was the weakness of diplomatic solutions that would have kept Iraq's military preponderance intact. A major Western ground force in the area would inevitably become the target of radical and nationalist agita-

# A Postwar Agenda

A new balance of power could create prospects for progress in the Arab-Israeli conflict

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## A revived peace process should begin by redefining the objectives

been able to exploit his position within OPEC to achieve an increase in oil prices, as well as a greater share of production. These two steps would have given Iraq vast additional resources to increase its already huge military buildup, including nuclear and missile programs. The United States would have been left with the choice of keeping major ground forces in the gulf, or of destabilizing the region by withdrawal. The practical result of the military operations now in motion will be to bring into balance the military capability of Iraq against its neighbors in the gulf.

Yet ironically, maintaining equilibrium in the region requires us to navigate between a solution that leaves Iraq too strong and an outcome that would leave Iraq too weak. After all, one of the causes of the present crisis is the one-sided way the Western nations rushed to the

defense of Iraq in its war against Iran, forgetting that if Iran was excessively weakened Iraq might become the next aggressor. It would be ironic if another bout of tunnel vision produced an Iraq so weak that its neighbors, especially Iran, seek to refill the vacuum.

Ideally, one military goal should be to pull the teeth of Iraq's offensive capability

without destroying its capacity to resist invasion from covetous neighbors. We should take care that Scud missiles are not reintroduced. We should prevent Iraq from importing high-technology equipment, including high-performance aircraft with long ranges, and from reacquiring the means to manufacture biological and nuclear weapons. However, Iraq's capacity to defend itself with conventional weapons against ground attack from its neighbors would in the long run not be a threat to stability but a contribution to it.

The new balance of power in the region cannot be based on the permanent presence of American ground forces. This was the weakness of diplomatic solutions that would have kept Iraq's military preponderance intact. A major Western ground force in the area would inevitably become the target of radical and nationalist agita-

tion. The cultural gap between even the best-behaved American troops and the local population is unbridgeable. After a brief period, American ground forces would be considered foreign intruders. There would be a repetition of our experiences in Lebanon, including terrorism and sabotage. American ground forces in the area should be withdrawn after victory; residual forces should be stationed beyond the horizon—at sea or perhaps at a few remote air bases. Any monitoring of Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait should be done by Arab members of the coalition.

The difficulty of stationing Western ground forces in the area for an extended period was one reason why sanctions almost surely could not have achieved our objective. It would have been impossible to keep over 400,000 troops in the area for the 12 to 18 months that even optimists thought were needed for sanctions to succeed. But if we started to withdraw any American forces during that time—or to rotate them, as the term of art had it—it would have set off a panic among our Arab allies.

Military equilibrium, however, cannot be the sole aim of American policy in the gulf. It is essential that America learn to become less dependent on oil and generate a viable energy program. We cannot suffer through an energy crisis every decade. We should stress conservation and develop alternative sources of energy, avoiding the self-indulgent attitudes of the 1980s, when plentiful oil caused the search for alternative energy sources to be largely abandoned.

We must also remember the possibility of renewed Soviet designs on the region. For the time being, domestic problems keep the Soviets from running any significant foreign risks. But 200 years of Russian expansionism toward the gulf indicate a certain proclivity. And this drive may be compounded as Moscow's preoccupation with its more than 50 million Muslim citizens grows. After some domestic equilibrium is restored, the Kremlin may become more active in the Middle East—especially in Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Turkey, which border the Soviet Union. The intensity of that thrust will depend on internal developments within the Soviet Union. If the Muslim republics remain Soviet, Moscow will be wary of Muslim radicalism lest it inflame its own Muslim population. But if the Muslim republics break off and become independent, Moscow may seek favor in the breakaway states by embracing Islamic radicalism—especially if the Muslim world turns more extremist.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a new balance of power will revive prospects for progress on the Arab-Israeli conflict. A peace process dominated by Saddam Hussein, or heavily influenced by him, would have been a debacle. For it would have taught the lesson that radicalism, terrorism and force are the road to diplomatic progress in the Middle East. This is why President Bush was right in resisting the linkage of the Kuwait and Palestinian problems.

But with Saddam defeated, moderate Arab leaders will gain in stature, America's credibility will be enhanced and Is-

raeli doubts about every one of these propositions.

First, I am very skeptical about an international conference. For the United States would be totally isolated at such a forum. The behavior of France just prior to the gulf war is a small foretaste of what would happen. Instead of being a mediator, America would be maneuvered into the role of Israel's lawyer, while Israel would regard any independent position we took as a betrayal of its interests. No sensible nation would voluntarily throw itself into such a maelstrom. Since everything depends on our influence with Israel anyway, I would much prefer a diplomatic process in which the United States, the moderate Arab countries and Israel are the principal participants.

Second, for Israel a return to pre-1967 borders and the creation of a Palestinian state are not negotiating issues but matters of life and death. The distance from the Jordan River to the sea is less than 50 miles; the corridor between Tel Aviv and Haifa in terms of the 1967 frontiers is about 10 miles wide. It would be difficult to squeeze two states into such a limited area in the best of circumstances. But the PLO has been in mortal conflict with Israel during the entire existence of both groups. How can such an arrangement possibly be compatible with security?

Moreover, a return to pre-1967 borders would still leave almost as many Arabs under Israeli control as live on the West Bank minus Gaza. How is one going to justify that one group of Arabs must live under Israeli rule while other Arabs are entitled to self-determination? Thus a restoration of pre-1967 borders, coupled with the formation of a Palestinian state, could easily turn into the first step to the further destruction of Israel, if not its ultimate destruction.

Third, acceptance of Israel is not only a legal but above all a psychological challenge. And I find it hard to believe that any legal formula can by itself provide for Israeli security. After all, Kuwait lived in a state of legal peace with Iraq without being able to prevent Iraqi aggression. And Saddam attacked Israel in a war from which Israel had kept totally aloof because it calculated that many Arabs would support Iraq against Israeli retaliation, no matter how justified. American leaders understandably felt this danger real enough to advise against retaliation. But when reaction to an unprovoked attack becomes an international issue, Israel is still certified



Iranians parading in Teheran before Friday prayers

## If Iraq is left too weak, Iran may seek to fill the vacuum

rael will have a breathing space. This new equation should be translated into a major diplomatic effort within a few months of victory. Far from amounting to linkage and a submission to blackmail, such a move, after Saddam has been defeated, should be viewed as an opportunity resulting from the success of the moderate forces.

Progress will depend on a proper perception of the issues involved. The Arab-Israeli problem is usually stated as a negotiating issue: how to convene an international conference that returns Israel to the 1967 frontiers, defines a new status for Jerusalem, induces the Arabs to "accept" Israel and provides international guarantees for the resulting arrangements. I have

as a pariah and is held hostage for the actions of others.

Fourth, how does one define "credible guarantees"? After all, even in the case of Kuwait, where there was unanimous international support for the victim (something that would be inconceivable with Israel), it took six months to organize resistance while the country was looted and pillaged and the population expelled.

For all these reasons, the peace process as currently conceived is likely to lead to a dead end. It forces each side to accept something they find unbearably difficult: for the Israelis, it is a Palestinian state; and for the Arabs, it is the Israeli state. I know of no conflict between Arab nations—let alone between the Arabs and Israel—that has ever been resolved by the method suggested for the Palestinian issue: namely, with one conclusive negotiation resulting in a legal document intended to last for all time.

A revived peace process should begin by redefining the objectives. A final settlement at this moment seems a legalistic mirage. On the other hand, the status quo will sooner or later sound the death knell for moderates on all sides. As it is, too many Israelis consider the peace process a one-sided means to gain acceptance without sacrifice. They are unwilling to give up any occupied territory, or will do so only if de facto Israeli control is maintained. Too many Arabs, especially in the PLO, see in the Middle East a replay of Vietnam, where peace talks were used to soften up the opponent for escalating pressures leading to his ultimate collapse.

An interim solution might seek to introduce the moderate Arab governments, fresh from the victory over Iraq, as a buffer between Israel and the PLO. It might reduce the amount of territory Israel is asked to give up in return for something less than formal peace. A possible approach, mediated by the United States, might unfold like this:

- A conference would be assembled, under the aegis of the U.N. secretary-general, composed of the United States, Israel and the Arab states allied with America in the gulf crisis.

- The moderate Arab countries would agree to act as trustees for territories that are returned to Arab control for a specified amount of time, say five to 10 years.

- The moderate Arab states would also commit themselves to demilitarizing these areas under U.N. supervision.

- Israel would give up all of Gaza and the most heavily populated areas of the West

Bank, retaining only territories essential to its security. It would be allowed to participate in verifying the demilitarization of any territory it evacuates.

■ Precise government arrangements would be established by agreement, but would not for the interim period lead to a separate state. As a practical matter, the trustee powers would undoubtedly establish an administration containing individuals acceptable to the PLO.

If this particular scenario turned out to be impractical, some other interim approach must be sought to break the deadlock. The aftermath of an allied victory over Iraq will



Syrian troops driving a tank from Damascus to Lebanon

## Even Assad, hardly a moderate, might go along with an interim approach

offer a perhaps never-to-recur opportunity. Moderate Arab states are disillusioned with the PLO, which in effect has backed Iraq. They are also dismayed by the fact that the PLO has never unambiguously dissociated itself even from terrorism aimed at the moderate Arabs. As a result, these governments may no longer be prepared to give the PLO a veto over their actions.

As for Israel, it must avoid two possible nightmares. If it insists on holding onto every square inch of occupied territory, it could suffer the fate of South Africa and find itself ostracized, and even ultimately under U.N. sanctions. On the other hand, if it follows the maxims of conventional wisdom and gives up all the occupied territories, it runs the risk of winding up like Lebanon,

gradually squeezed to the point of obliteration. For its own sake, Israel must find a middle way. And there is no better moment to do that than when its most dangerous enemy has been defeated.

I do not envy the American negotiator assigned the task of distilling an interim settlement from the confusing passions of the Middle East. Still, with Iraq's military capacity reduced, the moderate Arab leaders, as well as Israel, should be able to turn to the peace process with authority and confidence. President Mubarak of Egypt, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia—and even King Hussein of Jordan, whatever the maneuvers imposed by his vulnerability—are unusually intelligent and prudent. Even President Assad of Syria, by no means a moderate, signed an interim agreement with respect to the Golan Heights which has been in force for 17 years and has been meticulously observed. All these leaders might in the end go along with an intermediate approach as the only way to break an even more dangerous deadlock. And there are surely Israeli leaders who recognize that a gradual approach will provide their best prospect for a satisfactory outcome—especially when the moderate Arabs are triumphant and radical Arabs are in retreat.

America should act as a mediator in this effort, having earned the trust of both sides. Our initial challenge may well be philosophical. The best way to produce a successful negotiation is to advance a new concept, to convince both sides that the proposed new course serves their common interest. If that demonstration cannot be made, no negotiating gimmick can serve as a substitute.

In several thousand years of recorded history, the Middle East has produced more conflicts than any other region. As the source of three great religions, it has always inspired great passions. It is therefore unlikely that any one negotiation can bring permanent tranquility to this turbulent area. An Arab-Israeli negotiation will not end all the turmoil, because many Middle East problems are quite independent of that conflict. Fundamentalism in Iran has next to nothing to do with the Palestinian issue, though Teheran has exploited it. And Saddam Hussein would have tried to dominate his neighbors even if the Palestinian problem did not exist. But what the Arab-Israeli conflict has done is to make it difficult for the voices of moderation in the Arab world to cooperate with their supporters in the West. Victory in the gulf will create a historic opportunity to alter that particular equation—and it should be seized. ■

# Caught in a Cross-fire

As usual, Palestinians will be among the losers

Fate put Yasir Arafat at a funeral when the war started. As Desert Storm thundered over Baghdad, the chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization was far away in Tunis, laying to rest a murdered comrade. Before a PLO bodyguard killed him, Salah Khalaf had warned that all Palestinians "are really in the crossfire." He appreciated Saddam Hussein's efforts to dedicate the war to the Palestinian cause, Khalaf told a French newspaper. "But at the same time, I don't want my own cause to be associated with the destruction of the Arab region." The PLO could only watch Khalaf's worst fears take shape. As in the past, chaos and conflict threatened to leave the Palestinians helpless and alone.

Arafat, all his disclaimers and double-talk aside, has bound the fate of the Palestinians to Saddam Hussein. In the sprawling refugee camps of the Middle East, among the embattled youths of the *intifada*, Saddam stands tall as the one leader in the Arab world with the guts and the guns to challenge Israel. "Everyone has closed the door to us," said a doctor in Gaza. "There's just one light coming through, and it's coming from Saddam Hussein. Can you blame us for wanting to follow that light to the end?"

The Iraq war left Palestinians torn between humiliation and rage, alternately filled with wild hopes and numbed by fear. "Do you have shelters in Jerusalem?" a 19-year-old boy on the West Bank asked when the shooting started. "We don't have shelters or gas masks. If there's an attack, we'll die in flocks. If we make any problems, [Israeli soldiers] will flatten the whole area." News of Saddam's missile attacks on Israel brought a fatalistic elation. "For the first time in Arab history we have a man who does what he says he's going to do," said a young Palestinian in Amman. "With these flimsy rockets he put the whole of Israel in the bunker." There were even faint hopes that Saddam's strikes against Tel Aviv might somehow balance the scales of pride enough to allow a settlement. "Of course lots of



Anti-U.S. demonstrators in Amman on the eve of war

## THE WAR LOOKING AHEAD

people are getting killed," said economist Riad Khouri in Amman. "But what this amounts to is a diplomatic seesaw. What one hopes is that they can reach the same level and jump off and reach a solution."

Such hopes were slim, at best. Many Palestinians expect the war to produce only regional apocalypse. They envision the fall of regimes in Syria, the gulf, Egypt, even Algeria. Jordan could become first a battlefield, then a dumping ground for Israel's Palestinians—perhaps, by Palestinian lights, a second-rate substitute homeland. At the very least, defeat for Saddam will mean a new surge of Islamic fundamentalism. "In every setback, our religious conviction has been strengthened," said a 64-year-old Nablus man who has lived with war and defeat since 1948. Assurances from America and Europe—that the Palestinian issue will

rank high on the agenda after the war—came across as more empty words. "One of the worst effects of this war will be the emergence of Israel as an undeterrible force," said a senior Palestinian official in Jordan's government.

A Western strategist might argue that after defeating Saddam, who was Israel's most powerful enemy, Washington will be in position to propel the Israelis to negotiate a durable peace. But all the Palestinians can see is U.S. power crushing their would-be savior. Israel itself remains flatly opposed to the idea of an international conference on the Palestinian question. "There would be no new ideas brought up," former prime minister Yitzhak Rabin said last week. And Washington historically has failed to bring the unwilling Israelis to the table. "The Americans and the Israelis don't want the Arab people to lift up their head," said Khalaf Mahmoud, a dental technician in Amman. "If they do, they cut it off."

The Palestinians fear that Israel's strategy is to force each of its neighbors to make a separate peace. With Egypt it succeeded in 1979. After the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, only Syrian-backed terrorism stopped Israel from garnering a Lebanese treaty. Saboteurs killed the Lebanese president who was to sign it, and suicide bombers helped drive out the U.S. Marines who defended it. Jordan and Syria have held out for an international conference that includes all the parties to the conflict. In any other framework they would be too weak to deal with the Israelis on equal terms. Jordan also came to depend on Iraq for military and financial backup in the region's delicate, complex balance of power. Should Iraq be destroyed, a senior Jordanian official said late last year, Jordan could be left with no choice but to sign a separate treaty with Israel. The Palestinians, unrecognized by Israel as a people with national rights, and with no land of their own, fear they will be left out of the picture altogether.

The Europeans have been well intentioned toward the Palestinians, but ineffectual. The gulf Arabs have paid lip service to the Palestinian cause since the invasion of Kuwait, but they have expelled Palestinian workers and cut off donations to PLO coffers. Many Kuwaitis and Saudis are frank-

**Once Iraq is defeated, would you support or oppose a comprehensive Mideast peace conference that would take up the issue of Israel and the Palestinians?**

80% Support

9% Oppose

From the NEWSWEEK Poll of Jan. 17-18, 1991.

ly vindictive. Arafat put all his eggs in Saddam's basket, says one Kuwaiti financier, "and his eggs are going to get scrambled."

If Palestinian terrorist groups lash out in defense of Iraq, the war's aftermath could be that much worse for the PLO. Arafat spokesman Bassam Abu Sharif said last week the organization would "condemn any act against America and the European countries." But Abul Abbas, a PLO executive committee member in Baghdad, nonetheless called for attacks on Western interests worldwide.

As these conflicting pressures mount, the murder of Salah Khalaf (known as Abu Iyad) may have reflected the bitter schisms that already exist among Palestinian leaders. The PLO officially blamed the killing on Israeli intelligence. Khalaf, Arafat's second in command, and a close friend since the 1950s, was the patron of the group that carried out the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre of Israeli athletes. Many of the operatives from that incident have already been killed by Israeli hit teams. Commentators in Israel have suggested the secret services of Syria, Saudi Arabia or Egypt may have been involved in the Khalaf murder, as a warning not to plot actions against them. The killing might even have been linked to a crime of passion, given Khalaf's reputation as a womanizer. But the most obvious suspect was the infamous PLO renegade Sabri al-Banna (Abu Nidal). Khalaf's killer had served Abu Nidal for years before "repenting" and returning to Arafat's organization.

**'Never forget':** If the killer was Abu Nidal's mole, then Saddam himself could be implicated. Khalaf, along with Hamid and another aide—both also murdered—may have been dissenting voices who knew too much about the secret workings of Iraq and its allies and had too many contacts with Western intelligence agencies for Saddam's taste. Iraq's intelligence services gave Abu Nidal his start, a PLO official observes: "Don't forget that. We never forget it."

Can the PLO chairman weather such turmoil? He has before. "Arafat is a master of survival," says Rabin. Over the years, assassins' bullets and Arafat's own political savvy have made him an indelible symbol of the Palestinian cause. Despite Arafat's mistakes, perhaps even despite his support of Saddam, he could yet retain his position. Demoralized and divided, the Palestinians may find no other choice. They are left isolated and vulnerable, as so often before, hoping and praying they can ride out this Desert Storm and find a new light to follow.

CHRISTOPHER DICKEY in Amman with  
RUTH MARSHALL in Paris and  
THEODORE STANGER in Jerusalem



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Stepped-up security at Heathrow airport as Baghdad radio issued a call 'to crush the enemy and erase the disgrace'

## Terror: Iraq's Second Front

Saddam's threats put security officials on alert

**L**eave the aggressors' interests be set on fire, and let them be hunted down wherever they may be in every corner of the world." Declaring that "there is no longer any room for delay," Baghdad radio called on Muslims last week to attack the "interests, facilities, symbols and figures" of the United States and its gulf coalition partners. "The time has come," blared the broadcast, "to crush the enemy and erase the disgrace."

Saddam Hussein had threatened to open a "second front" of terrorism in the gulf war—and now that the United States has struck, experts believe Saddam's sympathizers will, too. Last week security officials around the world went on high alert. The London Underground mustered a new emergency squad and increased surveillance at vulnerable stations. Police armed with machine guns patrolled the lobbies of Heathrow airport, while light tanks lined up outside the major terminals. In Frankfurt, officials banned all electronic equipment from luggage and warned passengers to allow three hours for airport security procedures. America's airports deployed extra guards to tow unattended cars and destroy unclaimed luggage. Concrete barriers went up at the site of Sunday's Super Bowl in

Florida and around government buildings in Washington, and guards checked under the hoods of cars at federal parking lots.

**Spread a dragnet:** In addition to protecting targets, security experts were looking for possible terrorists. U.S. immigration officials began closely questioning visitors from the Mideast. The FBI interviewed hundreds of Arab-Americans about their political leanings and spread a dragnet for 3,000 Iraqis whose visas have expired. That provoked complaints of discrimination and raised fears of reprisals. But the FBI said it had interrupted "more than five" incidents by lone zealots, including a New York City taxi driver who allegedly offered to lead a hit squad. Britain, which has deported 161 Iraqi and

Palestinian visitors since the crisis began, began barring Iraqi citizens from entering the country. Police in Berlin and Bonn stormed apartments and businesses belonging to suspected Iraqi sympathizers and made dozens of pre-emptive arrests. At the weekend there had been only scattered incidents, including a time-activated plastic bomb that wrecked a New Delhi travel agency, and an apparent failed bombing attempt in the Philippines that killed a would-be Iraqi assailant and seriously injured his alleged accomplice.

But no one was resting easy. "It's going to be brutal," says Noel Koch, a counterterrorism expert for the Reagan administration.

Nobody could predict what form a large-scale terrorist attack might take. Given Saddam's affection for chemical and biological weapons, some feared that his agents of terror would try to poison water supplies or ventilation systems. But biological weapons are hard to transport and dangerous to use, and most experts believe Iraq's terrorists will rely on the trade's usual tools: grenades, machine guns and high-explosive bombs. "Terrorists have tended to be conservative in tactics and methods," says Paul Wilkinson, director of London's Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism. "And long may it be so."

American jitters may be exaggerated, for the United States would be the toughest target. "It would take a long time to smuggle or gather the necessary arms and explosives

### THE WAR LOOKING AHEAD

#### Which of the following applies to you because of concern about terrorism after the military attack on Iraq?

- 63% Less likely to take an overseas airline trip
- 39% Less likely to take a domestic airline trip

From the NEWSWEEK Poll of Jan. 17-18, 1991.

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Two million men worldwide have tried Rogaine. In year-long clinical tests conducted by dermatologists at 27 medical centers nationwide, virtually half (48%)

"I may not have grown any hair after 6 months, but most of my hair's stopped falling out."

"I'm glad I got to the doctor fast." —Lewis Silvo, 20

of the men who tried Rogaine saw at least moderate hair regrowth. Thirty-six percent had minimal regrowth and the rest (16%) had no regrowth.

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"My hair's completely filled in. It started growing in under 2 months. It was amazing! Early treatment...it works!" —Jim Wilets, 30



"I may not have grown any hair after 6 months, but most of my hair's stopped falling out."

"I'm glad I got to the doctor fast." —Lewis Silvo, 20



"The first time I saw hair growing was at about 8 months. I hadn't lost much...but I'm not taking any chances." —Tony Vilo

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Dear Mr. Barton:

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City/State/Zip \_\_\_\_\_

Phone \_\_\_\_\_ Age \_\_\_\_\_

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November 1990

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# A Recovery as Early as Spring?

Hope rises for business

BY JANE BRYANT QUINN

The first days of war sent an unexpected message of hope to the flagging American economy. If the Saudi Arabian oilfields can be defended, then most of the conflict's economic damage is behind us.

We've washed out the prewar spike in oil prices, which drove 1990's inflation rate to a worrisome 6.1 percent. We're finished, one hopes, with the stunning collapse in consumer confidence that choked off business at year-end. If the war is short—say, a few weeks—the economy should nurture a comforting run of lower inflation, lower interest rates, rising confidence and somewhat stronger business. Optimists think the rebound might be felt as early as spring and no later than summer. "Worst-case scenarios don't make sense anymore," says economist David Rolley of the forecasting firm DRI/McGraw-Hill in Lexington, Mass.

Still, the markets are jumpy—all the more so, as television carries the moment-by-moment alarms of war into every home. Should doubts arise as to the length or severity of the conflict—in particular, if the United States gets bogged down in a bloody ground war—confidence might slip again, delaying the recession's end.

**Few jobs:** Americans are inclined to believe that wars boost an economy and create jobs. But that's not the case. The true source of a wartime boom is government spending and money growth which, in the present instance, weren't supplied. The Iraqi threat was actually a job destroyer in the early months, contributing, as it did, to the drop in confidence and consumer spending. If the war doesn't drag out very long, defense production won't gear up—so you won't find extra jobs there, either. War spending did rise an extra \$2.7 billion last year and perhaps \$12 billion to \$15 billion so far this year, according to congressional sources. But most of that money is being consumed by daily operations. Barry Blechman, president of Defense Forecasts in Washington, D.C., says that the procurement contracts are chiefly for munitions and soft goods: desert camouflage, netting,

## THE WAR LOOKING AHEAD

Iraqis hit an oil storage tank in Kafji, Saudi Arabia, but failed to interrupt supplies

freeze-dried foods, antidotes to chemical weapons, and the like. "The major defense contractors are laying off workers and will continue to do so," he says.

Where the economy will make gains is on the beleaguered civilian side. It's hard to think of an industry that can't be helped by lower interest rates and oil prices.

Economist Roger Bird, a vice president of the forecasting firm, the WEFA Group, is especially optimistic about the manufacturing firms that produce for export (heavily concentrated in the Midwest). Europe has been a heavy buyer of American-made machine tools, business electronics and other capital goods. Safer, cheaper oil supplies will support Europe's growth and its appetite for shopping in the United States.

Oil prices may jump around but John Lichtblau, chairman of the Petroleum Industry Research Foundation, thinks they cannot rise by much. The entire world stocked up on crude, for fear that the Saudi fields would close. When they didn't, the oversupply spilled into the market, driving prices—in just one day—from \$32 a barrel down to \$21. At that price, gasoline at the pump should fall by 20 cents a gallon, says Ben Brockwell, editor of the Oil Price Information Service. Heating oil could drop by 10 cents a gallon almost immediately and 45 cents by next September. At the end of last week, crude closed at \$19.25 a barrel, compared to \$21.54 on Aug. 1, the day before Saddam Hussein overran Kuwait.

Slower inflation and easier money should lower interest rates even further, in the opinion of Jerry Jordan, chief economist at First Interstate Bancorp in Los Angeles. He puts the prime business lending rate at 8.5 percent by spring, down from 9.5 percent today. If he's right, the debt load will be greatly lightened for businesses and

any individuals whose loan-interest rates are pegged to the prime. Such a broad drop in rates should also bring out strong demand for home-mortgage money.

Jordan's interest-rate forecast falls on the optimistic side. Still, most economists believe that, barring a long war, the prospect of much higher rates is remote. If you're living on income from your savings, consider switching out of floating-rate money-market mutual funds or bank accounts and into intermediate-term (five- to 10-year) Treasuries and CDs. The returns from short-term accounts should shrink.

As for U.S. stocks, many analysts doubt that a new bull market has begun, despite the explosive 4.6 percent rally on the war's first day. At last Friday's close, the Dow Jones industrial average topped 2646, for the best one-week performance ever. Doubters point to the lingering recession as reason to think that stocks may ultimately find their footing at lower prices. But who knows? Steady buyers of mutual funds should stick with their programs. Heiko Thieme, consultant to the Deutsche Bank Capital Corp. in New York, expects foreign investors to plunge into U.S. securities in 1991 because, he says, in terms of their home currencies the markets here are both cheap and undervalued.

Amidst all the speculation last week, I heard no "cautious middle." Observers are either expecting the best or predicting the worst—the latter defined as some form of financial collapse. The bears concede the good effects of lancing the boil in the Persian Gulf but expect the recession to resume. Gold is no haven. "The disinflationary trend is bad for all tangible assets—gold, real estate, silver and other commodities," says August Arace, who runs the Freedom Gold & Government Fund. Treasuries remain the worry bead of choice.

Associate: VIRGINIA WILSON



GEORGES MERRILLON—GAMMA-LIAISON

# 1 MISSSED SIGNALS

**T**he dog days were creeping up on the Washington Navy Yard, a placid backwater in the District of Columbia. One sultry day last August, Vice Adm. Francis R. Donovan, chief of the Navy's Military Sealift Command, sat down with his senior staff to review the overnight cables. There on the table in front of them lay the Defense Department's morning intelligence briefing. Those rumors about Iraq invading Kuwait? Rumors—just rumors. No basis in fact. Discount them. Looking up, the admiral studied a TV screen across the room. CNN was broadcasting invasion bulletins from the Persian Gulf. Saddam Hussein already had Kuwait in his pocket. As the bad news spilled from the set, an aide waved at the intelligence report and said, "Whoever wrote *this* should be out of a job."

They all laughed nervously; Saddam had thrown everyone off balance. In retrospect, perhaps, the remarkable thing was how quickly the American government righted itself after the initial fiasco. Over the next five months, an odd symmetry shaped the unfolding confrontation between Saddam and George Bush. The first round went to Saddam, who struck while the president was preoccupied with the reunification of Germany, the democratization of Eastern Europe and the perils of Mikhail Gorbachev. Although American intelligence accurately tracked every belch of his tanks, no one got his intentions right in time to stop him. The second round went to Bush. Weathering three frightening weeks in August, he deployed an American force in Saudi Arabia with astounding speed. He organized the industrialized democracies, the majority of the Arab League states and the United Nations into an allied coalition that put teeth into gummy commitments to collective security. Then he assembled his own invasion force, the largest since Dwight Eisenhower's landings in Normandy. Saddam had counted on raking in a buccaneer's easy prize. Instead, he bought himself a full-scale war.

This is the behind-the-scenes story of the road to that war. It opens with a humiliation: the earnest efforts of President Bush to cultivate Saddam as a force for peace in the gulf at the very moment the dictator was nurturing his aggressive designs. It moves through the failure of the American intelligence network to predict Saddam's invasion of Kuwait, even though he had talked wildly of slicing off bits of the Arabian Peninsula. And it looks behind the placid surface of President Bush's summer vacation in

Maine to find his aides wondering nervously whether Saddam intended to invade Saudi Arabia, blow up its oilfields and challenge the United States to a war for which it was quite unprepared.

Then, the momentum shifts. Starting with a hopelessly outdated plan of battle, the Pentagon marshals a massive fighting force. Exhausted officers cobble together an intricate plan to move it halfway round the world—an exercise that overcomes some foul-ups and prospers from some deft deception. Finally, the president wages an enormously delicate campaign on three fronts—military, diplomatic and political—in his final effort to pry Saddam out of Kuwait peacefully.

It began with a severe case of American myopia. For years, sizing up Saddam Hussein had been a frustrating exercise for the United States. During the Iran-Iraq War, when Ronald Reagan restored diplomatic relations with Iraq, he also slipped a CIA station into Baghdad. But the job was to share intelligence with Saddam, not to snoop on him. A shortage of Arabic-speaking case officers made it harder to keep up with the dictator. Before last August the conventional wisdom within the U.S. intelligence community was that while Saddam's goal was to control the gulf, it would take him about three years to position himself and he wouldn't risk another war for perhaps a decade. "We had his intentions right a little over a year ago," says CIA Director William Webster. "We did not, I suppose, accurately pin down the time frame in which he was prepared to act the way he did act."

Instead, a bright veil of wishful thinking descended over American analysis of Saddam's dark designs. After Iraq's cease-fire with Iran, Joseph Wilson, a tough-minded young diplomat, arrived in Baghdad to work as U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie's deputy chief of mission. "We were advised by our friends in the region that the Iraqi government was seeking an opening to the West and was seeking to moderate its behavior," he recalls. The same friends advised Washington to encourage Saddam in that supposed course; incentives, it was said, would work better with him than sanctions. The policy was


consistent with what the United States had done successfully elsewhere, but did it misfire? Wilson now says, "It sure did."

Diplomats in the Middle East now think Saddam began preparing for the invasion of Kuwait a year ago. At a meeting of the Arab Cooperation Council in Amman and at an Arab summit in Baghdad earlier this year, he argued that the United States wanted to dominate the gulf, succor Israel and humiliate the Arabs, who could no longer count on Moscow to help them. He picked a fight

# THE ROAD TO WAR

**A behind-the-scenes account of gross errors and deft maneuvers**

**On guard: Allied forces grew from a perilously thin tripwire unit to the greatest invasion army assembled since Normandy**



with Kuwait over oil prices and OPEC production quotas, protesting that Emir Jaber al-Ahmad al-Sabah was keeping world prices low and crippling Iraq when it was struggling to pay \$80 billion in war debts. Even after Kuwait agreed to cut production and OPEC raised oil prices, he didn't let up. Some of his advisers pointed out that by combining the OPEC quotas of Iraq and Kuwait and by forcing prices up to \$30 a barrel, he would raise in \$60 billion each year, double his development budget and still pay off his debts within four years. He would also expand Iraq's coastline from a mere 37 miles to 225 miles and wind up with a deepwater port. All he had to do was gobble up Kuwait.

A secret defense intelligence profile calls Saddam "irrational"; Israeli intelligence has concluded that he suffers from "a form of mania." It is too glib to dismiss him as crazy, but some of his maneuvers during the year before the invasion were outlandish. President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt told a U.S. senator that at one point Saddam took him aside and proposed a military coalition of Iraq, Egypt, Syria and Jordan. They would pool their weapons and carve up Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (with which Iraq has a nonaggression pact). Egypt would get \$25 billion in spoils. Mubarak said no thanks. On another occasion, he offered Yemen two of Saudi Arabia's southern provinces. He once told Jordan's King Hussein that he could have the western part of the Saudi Peninsula. Then, according to Saudi sources, he turned around and suggested to Saudi Arabia's King Fahd that the smaller countries of the gulf just "didn't make sense" and declared that he was going to seize Kuwait. To the startled Saudi monarch, he added, "You take Qatar."

His fellow Arabs didn't take this seriously enough until it was too late. His Iraqi colleagues took him all too seriously; his men knew that their lives depended on letting Saddam be Saddam. They didn't challenge him or give him bad news. According to the lore of Baghdad, one Iraqi minister of health made the mistake of suggesting that the dictator step down for a while during the Iran-Iraq War. Saddam personally shot him, then had his body chopped up and delivered to his wife in a black canvas bag. True or false, such stories had an effect. Instead of correcting his delusions, his advisers fed them. One of these counselors was Mohammad al-Mashat, Iraq's ambassador to the United States. Chain-smoking in his gloomy embassy off Dupont Circle in Washington, al-Mashat fired off cables warning that the Americans, the Israelis and the media were out to get Saddam. "I'd begun to suspect that there was some kind of conspiracy to destabilize Iraq," he says. Why else would tiny Kuwait be so stiff-necked?

Iraq and Kuwait had been playing cat and mouse for 30 years: Iraq clawed periodically, then Kuwait bought it off. In the latest spasm between them, Iraq complained that Kuwait had stolen \$2.4 billion worth of oil from its Rumaila oilfield by slanting wells down from the small Kuwaiti corner of the field. What's more, Kuwait was helping to drive down world oil prices by exceeding its OPEC quota. Iraq demanded that Kuwait pay \$13 billion to \$15 billion in reparations. Saddam also accused the Kuwaitis of advancing their border 45 miles to the north while

Baghdad was preoccupied with its war with Iran. Iraq wanted that border rectified; it wanted Kuwait to give up its corner of Rumaila and it wanted a long lease on two Kuwaiti islands that block unrestricted Iraqi access to the Persian Gulf. On top of this, Iraq demanded that Kuwait forgive \$10 billion in war debts. Private negotiations between the two countries had begun, brokered by the Egyptians. The Kuwaitis were hanging tough, exasperated by Saddam's ingratitude for billions of dollars of Kuwaiti aid during the Iran-Iraq War and reckoning he was still too weakened to launch another. Still, the Americans expected the dispute to be settled, as usual, by a few concessions on both sides. They thought Saddam could be reasoned with. Finally, when the game became more serious this year, Washington was still treating Saddam with extreme daintiness. Despite Iraq's terrible human-rights record, its experiments with chemical warfare, its Exocet missile that killed 37 American sailors aboard the USS Stark and its pursuit of nuclear weapons, the administration kept trying to cultivate Saddam.

"It is better to be talking to this man than isolating him," Glaspie argued. Many agreed. Last April, when Saddam harangued a group of senators about American plots, Sen. Robert Dole said, "Not President Bush. He told us yesterday he is against that." Sen. Alan Simpson said Saddam's real problem was "conceited" Western reporters.

Stroking didn't slow Saddam down. And there in the background al-Mashat was doing some calculations. Did the United States send troops when Turkey invaded Cyprus? Did it interfere when China invaded Tibet? Did it intrude when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan? Why worry? Who was to stop Iraq? Saddam tried a Big Lie of gargantuan proportions, telling everyone he had no intention of invading anyone, this year at any rate. And it worked.

On July 25 Saddam called Ambassador Glaspie to his palace, her first meeting since her posting two years before. He accused the State Department and CIA of waging economic war against him; he said the White House was plotting with Kuwait to keep oil prices down. "Yours is a society which cannot accept 10,000 dead in one battle," he declared. He warned the United States to pick its enemies and friends wisely. If America brought pressure on him, he would respond with terrorism.

The ambassador, normally blunt, was also loyal, a diplomat who stuck by the book. And the book still called for cajolery. She said, "I have direct instructions from President Bush to seek better relations with Iraq." When she said that the United States was concerned about Iraqi troop movements on Kuwait's border, Saddam told her he would do nothing until he had more time to talk to fellow Arabs about the situation. He picked up the telephone in front of her and repeated the same lie to Egypt's President Mubarak. She told the dictator she would go ahead with her plans for a summer vacation.

Top aides to Secretary of State James Baker later leaked word that the transcript of the meeting had shocked them. They did not say why no one had thought to change Glaspie's instructions before-hand. "The blame had to shift down the line so Baker could continue

## Turning Points on a Deadly Path

■ **Late July: A few mid-level intelligence officers predict invasion of Kuwait, but superiors disagree.**

■ **Aug. 4: At Camp David, Powell says 'This is the Super Bowl,' and advises land, sea, air intervention in the gulf.**

■ **October: Schwarzkopf realizes he needs more troops for successful flanking movement. Phase two of Desert Shield commences.**

■ **Dec. 21: Bush goes to Camp David, talks on phone to world leaders and advisers, makes peace with likelihood he will have to go to war.**

to operate with credibility," explains one Glaspie loyalist. "That's the way the system is set up, and everybody understands it." The system is different in Britain, for example. When Argentina took Margaret Thatcher by surprise and invaded the Falklands, Lord Carrington, her foreign secretary, took responsibility and stepped down. Under American rules, Glaspie took the rap. After her chat with Saddam the department cabled a message to Baghdad from President Bush saying that the United States would stand by its friends and protect its interests in the region. But the letter called for no dérâché explicitly warning Iraq not to attack Kuwait.

What the administration lost was the opportunity to stop Saddam before his tanks and troops were dug in around Kuwait City. Two days before the invasion, senior State Department and White House people telephoned Rep. Howard Berman four times, asking him to postpone a vote on the bill he had introduced in the House to cut off trade with Iraq. He now says, "The administration spent more time trying to dissuade Congress from imposing sanctions than it did dissuading Saddam from invading Kuwait." Berman is a partisan Democrat; still, the charge is mortifying.

Shortly before the invasion, an American KH-11 spy satellite picked up 100,000 Iraqi troops along Kuwait's border. Saddam had tripled his forces. Satellite photos also showed a new "logistics train" that gave him everything he needed to invade. Noting that he had done nothing to disguise his moves, the U.S. intelligence community assumed it was a bluff to bully Kuwait into a more compliant oil policy. It was a classic case of making the intelligence fit the policy, instead of making the policy fit the intelligence. The CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research all concluded there was little serious danger.

In the days leading up to the invasion, the intelligence agencies sent President Bush a list of predictions. The list was arranged in order of probability. "No one had as their first choice the prediction that Saddam Hussein would attack," says one intelligence operative who saw the reports. Prediction No. 1 was that Saddam was bluffing. Prediction No. 2 was that he might seize part of the Rumaila oilfield that straddles Iraq and Kuwait and possibly Warba and Zubayyan islands, two mud flats blocking Iraq's access to the Persian Gulf. It was assumed that he would pull back from Kuwait once the islands were secured. "The line we kept hearing around here was that he's just massed there along the Kuwait border to drive the price of oil up," recalls one senior Pentagon officer. "If people were saying he's for real and he's going to invade, it wasn't briefed to us as definite."

Several sounder voices did predict an invasion, but they went unheard. One midlevel Mideast analyst at the CIA got it right, but his warning "got lost" in the momentum of the opposing consensus. Marine Corps officers, scanning satellite photos that showed Iraqi air-defense units, tanks and artillery deployed forward at the Kuwait border, surmised that this could only mean an invasion, but they kept their silence because of bureaucratic pressures. The Defense Intelligence Agency's top analyst for the Middle East was convinced that Saddam would invade and warned the Senate

Intelligence Committee that the dictator might not be bluffing. His own shop didn't buy it. The DIA went along with the pack.

While the Iraqis and Kuwaitis gathered in Jidda for a final haggle over oil and borders, the House Foreign Affairs Committee summoned John Kelly, the assistant secretary of state covering the Mideast, to explain what was going on. "If Iraq, for example, charged into Kuwait for whatever reason, what would our position be with regard to the use of U.S. forces?" chairman Lee Hamilton inquired. "That, Mr. Chairman, is a hypothetical or a contingency question, the kind which I can't get into," Kelly replied. Was there a treaty committing the United States to use force? Kelly said there was none. That was true, though the United States had sent its warships to protect Kuwait's oil tankers during the most fiery days of the Iran-Iraq War. However, not since 1950, when Dean Acheson announced that South Korea was not within America's Asian defense perimeter, had the State Department left a friendly nation so open to attack. Still, given the intelligence about Saddam's intentions that Kelly was receiving, his performance was not surprising. Arab leaders insisted that Saddam would not invade; even Kuwait had relaxed its military alert.

Two days later Kelly sat in his sixth-floor office at the State Department glaring at Ambassador al-Mashat. "Our national interest is at stake," the Iraqi began. "We are forced to take military action." Furious, Kelly cut him off. He demanded that the Iraqis pull out. Al-Mashat looked at him and said nothing.

The invasion of Kuwait took less than a day. The closest American forces were on the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, 2,500 miles away. There, a squadron of five MPS-2 cargo ships held enough ammunition and equipment to supply a brigade of 16,500 Marines for 30 days of combat. But in June, as Saddam's plans were taking shape, one of the ships was sent home to Norfolk, Va., on routine maintenance. In late July, as the crisis was coming to a boil, another vessel, the USS Fisher, set off for Norfolk on the same mission. When Saddam broke into Kuwait the Fisher was rounding the southern tip of Africa. As it had been for months, the United States was headed in the wrong direction.



SUSAN MAY TELL—SABA  
The Big Lie worked: Saddam (right) with Mubarak

## The Iraqi leader kept suggesting to his fellow Arabs that they carve up Saudi Arabia and divide the spoils

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## 2 A LINE IN THE SAND

**T**he vanguard of the Iraqi Army smashed across the border of Kuwait at 2 a.m. on Aug. 2. Roaring past the customs shed and a gas station at Abdali, the Iraqis sped down a six-lane superhighway for Kuwait City 80 miles away. In the darkness, the crump of artillery shells and the rattle of machine-gun fire awakened Kuwaitis. They looked out their windows to find Saddam's jets and helicopter gunships buzzing the city. Rockets torched the Dasman Palace of Emir al-Sabah. One step ahead of Saddam, he jumped

into his own chopper and fled to Saudi Arabia. Tanks shouldered up to the central bank, the repository of much of Kuwait's cash and gold bullion. Troops assaulted the Ministry of Information, where Kuwaiti state radio and television had their studios. "Hurry to our aid," a voice cried over the air. Then the transmitter went dead.

Seven thousand miles and eight time zones to the west, President Bush was sitting in the family quarters at the White House. At about 8 p.m. his phone rang. Brent Scowcroft, the national-security adviser, was on the line. The first CIA intelligence reports still suggested that Saddam was not intent on any deep penetration; it soon became clear that he meant to occupy Kuwait. After a round of crisis meetings, the president caught a few hours' sleep. The next day at 5 a.m., Scowcroft was standing outside his bedroom door with two executive orders freezing all Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets in the United States. Half an hour later the president was in the Oval Office with Scowcroft sorting through the immediate problems: how to persuade allies to expand the freeze on assets, how to quiet the Israelis and how to enlist the help of the Soviet Union.

Both men saw in the invasion a challenge to the post-cold-war leadership of the United States. The question was how. That morning, before a meeting of the National Security Council, Bush twice told reporters that he had no plans to use American troops. But once the media were gone, the president looked at his top political and military advisers and said, "What if we do nothing?" The result would be catastrophic. Saddam had hijacked an entire nation. "This must be reversed," Bush said as they adjourned. At that moment, the president has told a few close aides, he wasn't quite sure what he was going to do to make Saddam stand down.

The invasion caught the administration at a moment of considerable political preoccupation. During the preceding weeks the reunification of Germany and Gorbachev's difficulties had absorbed Bush, Scowcroft and Secretary of State James Baker. A week earlier the president had been engaged in the intricacies of finding a nominee to replace William Brennan on the Supreme Court. Political opponents had been calling his son Neil the poster child of the S&L crisis. He needed some time to think. Later that day he flew to Aspen, Colo., where he was to give a speech on East-West relations. On the flight west, he phoned Saudi Arabia's King Fahd and President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt. Saddam had lied to both about his plans. "Are you sure?" Fahd had mumbled when his royal retainers got him out of bed with the news of the invasion. "I'm shocked," Mubarak had declared. Both Arab leaders were still casting about for an Arab solution to the invasion. Neither asked for American troops.

In his first public appearances after the invasion, Bush seemed a bit nonplussed. On the trip west, his resolve began to stiffen. By chance, Britain's Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was also in Aspen. She had received news of the invasion the night before at U.S. Ambassador to Britain Henry Catto's mountain guest house. She understood Saddam. "He must be stopped," she told the president. They spent two hours talking. Thatcher argued that the only way to convince Saddam that he would not get away with the invasion was to send troops immediately.

"What about the French?" Bush asked, thinking the rest of Europe might not stand up to Saddam quite so firmly. "Don't worry about France," Thatcher replied. "When it gets tough, she'll be with you." The special relationship between the United States and Britain provided a base upon which Bush could build an international coalition against Iraq. "It was not that some magical, restorative medicine was applied that day to the president's rubber spine," recalls one senior British aide who was there. "But the Rubicon between what happened and a much weaker response was crossed that afternoon."

Back in Washington the next morning, the president convened the National Security Council in the Cabinet Room. "What are our interests?" he asked. One by one his counselors reviewed the main ones: the danger to oil supplies, Saddam's program to develop

nuclear weapons, the security of Israel, the threat to the credibility of American leadership now that only one superpower was left on its feet. The dangers were real. The most intelligent way to confront them was harder to define.

The first difficulty was to be sure that the Arabs in Saddam's sights were willing to defend themselves. The "Arab nation" to which they all swore fidelity existed more as a state of mind than as any reality of state. Traditional tactics in the Middle East called for rich Arabs simply to buy off bandits. Tradition clearly wasn't going to work this time. That afternoon, in the E Ring inner sanctum of the Pentagon, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, Saudi Arabia's ambassador to the United States, sat down at a small conference table with Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and Gen. Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The ambassador said that the House of Saud doubted the United States meant to do all it would take to drive Saddam back. He reminded them that during an earlier Mideast flare-up, Jimmy Carter had sent only a dozen unarmed F-15 fighters to defend the kingdom. Only a fool would accept such tokens this time. The royal family was already arguing over the wisdom of accepting American military support. King Fahd wasn't interested in a puny show of force that would only goad Saddam. Was the United States really willing to stop him?

**C**heney and Powell showed the prince the classified U.S. military-operations plan that the Pentagon had worked up to defend Saudi Arabia against an attack from Iraq. The package was a bit dusty—it had been on the shelf for several years—but it did call for deploying two and one third U.S. divisions, an air wing and a carrier task force. The president had not approved the deployment, Cheney told Bandar, but he was leaning toward it. Bandar was impressed. He said if the United States meant business, he thought the royal family would welcome American troops.

At 5 p.m., the president reconvened the National Security Council. Having been embarrassed by its predictions on the invasion, the CIA was taking no chances. Director William Webster now argued forcefully that Saddam intended a second invasion. Together with Defense Department analysts, the agency reported that Iraq's elite troops were moving south toward the Saudi border. The CIA's guess was that Saddam meant to take over the oilfields of eastern Saudi Arabia, and that the Saudis would not fight back.

A few senior political and military advisers were not convinced, but the president was. He said he had concluded that Saddam intended to take Saudi Arabia. The threat to oil supplies was unmistakable. Americans in Iraq and Kuwait were in danger. The United States could not condone a military adventure that would rearrange the Middle East and jar the global economy. Sensing that the commander in chief was ready to use force, Powell advised him to "draw a line in the sand." He said the United States did not have to send many troops, but it had to send enough "for him to know that if he attacks Saudi Arabia, he attacks the United States." When others asked the president if he was prepared to decide which troops to send, Bush replied, "I don't believe I have enough information to make those decisions now." He asked the Joint Chiefs to meet him the next morning at Camp David to discuss the options. At the end of the meeting, he said, "I believe we go." Before taking his Marine Corps helicopter up to the Catoctins, he told an Arab visitor that if Saudi Arabia asked for his help, "I'm going to give it and I'm going to give it in such a massive way that it will send the right signal to Saddam."

In Camp David's Aspen Lodge next morning, the president and his men set the course that ultimately led to war. Jim Baker had already put the diplomatic machine in motion. The invasion had caught him heading for a hunting trip in Mongolia. Wheeling around, in a quick burst of diplomacy, he persuaded the Soviets to condemn Saddam and cut off his supplies of Soviet weapons. While the partnership with Britain was helpful to the United States, the

administration's good working relationship with the Soviet Union was crucial. It isolated Iraq in a way that would have been impossible 10 years earlier and kept the crisis in the gulf from turning into a superpower confrontation. The next step was to get the United Nations to put some teeth behind its condemnation of the invasion by imposing economic sanctions and a naval embargo on Iraq. Baker left Camp David early to press on with this successful effort.

Well before Baker had to leave, Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, the Army commander responsible for the Middle East, and John Kelly, assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs, laid the military possibilities before Bush and his men: what troops were available, how quickly they could get to the gulf, the most likely hitches and delays. They warned the president that sending planes and ships would not be enough. He would have to deploy ground forces. For a moment they discussed asking Mubarak to do the job with Egyptian troops, then dropped the idea. Saddam would not have been impressed. They had to get American boots on the sand.

In the middle of the session, the war council got a jolt: "a very authoritative report" from a friendly head of state that the Saudis had decided to reject American troops. The signal contradicted those that Bandar had sent the day before. The president rose, left the room and placed a call to King Fahd. He didn't mention the tip he had just received. Instead, he told the king that he was firmly committed to defending Saudi Arabia, that he didn't want any permanent military bases, that he would withdraw all American troops whenever the king thought the right time had come. Then, turning Bandar's arguments on Fahd, he advised the king not even to ask for troops if all he wanted was a token force. The call seemed to help, though the king remained shaky. Bush returned to the meeting and said that the Saudis still seemed willing to accept troops.

What level of force to apply was the critical issue. The president's military advisers warned him that it would take months before the United States could fight Saddam on the ground without suffering huge casualties. They outlined a few ideas for pushing the dictator out of Kuwait, but said the cost in lives would be terrible. "This is the Super Bowl," said Powell. "Don't count on the easy ways." To dislodge the dictator, Bush would have to do more than order a gunboat to the gulf and lob a few shells. Powell told the president that if he meant to use troops at all, he should send as many as he could muster. The president eventually settled on the plan favored by Powell and Schwarzkopf: a massive deployment of American air, sea and ground forces to defend the Saudis.

As a realist, Bush knew that it might ultimately take a war to defeat Saddam, but at first he thought diplomacy and economic sanctions might do the job. His initial military deployment was defensive. He agreed to send a tripwire force of 2,300 men from the 82nd Airborne's lightly armed "ready brigade" to be protected by Navy carrier planes and Air Force F-15s. A 16,500-man Marine amphibious brigade with heavy armor aboard its prepositioned ships would steam in next, followed by 19,000 troops of the 101st air mobile division, good tank killers and up to 12,000 troops of the

24th heavy armored division, trained in desert warfare. No one recommended an offensive to liberate Kuwait, nor did the president order one. The only offensive action envisioned in the original plan was to use air power to neutralize Saddam if he attacked Saudi oilfields.

The next day the Saudis were still dithering. The president had asked King Fahd to accept a visit from Cheney, and the king had tried to beg off, saying it made more sense to send a lower-level emissary so it wouldn't look bad if anything went wrong. Then, in another flourish of The Big Lie, Saddam broke a promise he had made to brother Arabs to withdraw almost immediately from Kuwait (though he meant to install a puppet regime to do his bidding). This galvanized the king. After a 14-hour delay, he invited Cheney to come ahead.

The mercurial Arabs were trying Bush's patience. That morning the president watched an advance tape of an interview with Jordan's King Hussein on "60 Minutes." Before the broadcast he had asked for the Jordanian monarch's support; King Hussein chose instead to attack American intentions. Now Bush had had enough. When he got off his helicopter on his return from Camp David, he barked angrily at reporters, "This will not stand. This will not stand—this aggression against Kuwait." Listening, one of his closest advisers heard a tone in the voice that had not been there before. "This is a fight George Bush has been preparing for all his life," he thought. "Saddam Hussein doesn't know what he is in for."

Iraq only grew more bellicose. That weekend Saddam sent two divisions around Kuwait City toward the Saudi border, and the Iraqi Air Force began to load its bomb racks and to deploy forward. As Cheney winged eastward, the Saudi royal palace was convulsed with infighting. The king spent two hours talking to the secretary of defense. CIA operatives used maps and satellite photos to prove how Saddam had lied about his buildup. Crown Prince Abdullah said the Saudi military could cope with Iraq, and that as long as Kuwait existed as a country, an Arab solution was possible. The king dismissed that notion. "Kuwait," he said, "is a country whose only territory is in hotel rooms in Saudi Arabia."

The session was a critical moment on the road to war. The administration wanted Saudi Arabia to cut off Iraq's oil pipeline across its territory. This was a clear act of war; it was sure to enrage Saddam. The Saudis, more used to caviar than combat, had to be sure the United States would deploy enough force to keep him at bay. Sources in the Middle East and in Washington differ over the exact wording of the assurances Fahd wanted. But they say the king demanded that if there were a fight, Saddam would "not get up again." This could be taken as an early commitment to total war, the kind that eventually broke out. Cheney repeated the assurances Bush had made over the telephone. Finally, the king turned to the secretary of defense and said, "We accept." He added that he trusted the United States because he trusted President Bush. There was something else. As one senior American recalled later, the Saudis feared for their country. When Cheney called the White House to report Fahd's decision,



Blitzkrieg: Iraq took over Kuwait in less than a day

## Now the CIA took a different line: Saddam meant to invade Saudi Arabia, and the Saudis would not fight.

he was put on a speakerphone in the Oval Office, where Bush, Scowcroft and Powell were meeting with Prime Minister Thatcher. During a diplomatically arranged "refueling stop" on her way back to London from Aspen, she once again reinforced the president's determination. As they were talking, Baker came in; so did White House chief of staff John Sununu and Vice President Quayle. "It really was like a mini-U.S. cabinet meeting with Mrs. Thatcher participating," recalls a party who was there. Some of Thatcher's civil servants and even a few political counselors were urging her to let the United Nations lead the charge against Saddam. She rejected the advice. "She was very gungho," says an aide. The next day the president went on television to tell the country that he was sending troops to the Middle East. "The mission is wholly defensive," he said. Mentioning only two allies, Canada and Britain, he added, "There has been no friend of freedom in the world better than Margaret Thatcher." The complex job of securing full political and financial support from France, Germany and Japan still lay ahead of him.

Although he had just ordered 125,000 troops to the gulf, the president wanted to project a business-as-usual image. Eager to avoid the impression Jimmy Carter had given of being trapped in the White House during the Iran hostage crisis, he went to his summer home in Kennebunkport, Maine, for a three-week vacation. He also believed that Ronald Reagan's sentimental feelings for American hostages in Lebanon had led him into the Iran-contra debacle. With 3,000 Americans and 1.5 million other foreign nationals now trapped in Kuwait and Iraq, he faced a far larger hostage crisis of his own. For weeks he didn't even use the word hostage in his public statements. But there was another gauge of his feelings: his deliberate display of the near-manic athleticism that had always marked his vacations—nonstop golf and horseshoes, iron-man jogs, marathon sets of tennis, relentless trolls for bluefish aboard his speedboat Fidelity. When he was president, he was president, he said, and when he was "recreating," he was recreating."

The surface calm at Kennebunkport was highly deceptive. For the better part of three weeks, the president's advisers had to fight off panic as they waited for Saddam's next move. Iraqi fighters darted in and out of Saudi airspace, testing defenses. Satellite scans indicated that Saddam was reinforcing his Army and moving closer to the Saudi border. When Bush concluded that a quick naval blockade was the only way to enforce U.N. sanctions, he had no way of knowing whether Saddam would shoot back. Anxieties creased the first time the Navy fired a shot across the bow of an Iraqi tanker. "It was the scariest moment of the crisis," says one of the president's men. "I would sit on my bed looking out the window down the Kennebunk River and I could almost see those destroyers on the horizon. At any moment I thought we were going to war."

During those critical three weeks, Saddam could have advanced in any direction he chose: down the gulf coast to the Arab Emirates, through Jordan toward Israel. "We had nothing there to speak of," admits one senior administration officer. "We were

scared to death he'd figure out that he didn't have to hold the [Saudi] oilfields; he just had to blow them up. There was no way we could have stopped him." Bush paced. He talked about his own war experiences, watching the debris from a crashing fighter decapitate one friend and sever the leg of another. He talked about his own children and grandchildren. Some of his aides wondered if he was beginning to think military action might not be worth it. Then one morning, as he stood in the kitchen at Kennebunkport, he said, "You know, one of these days, there's going to be a provocation and we are going to have to go."

At the time there was really only one American battle plan. In the most secret operation of the early buildup, he ordered 50 B-52s to Diego Garcia. If Saddam moved into Saudi Arabia, "we

are going to flatten Iraq," said a top military adviser. Fully loaded, a cell of three B-52s can drop 76,500 pounds of high explosives on an objective. The Pentagon selected military targets, not cities, for the bomb runs. But the goal was to inflict so much damage that the entire country would come to a halt. The theory was that this would lead to Saddam's overthrow.

The dictator hesitated, and Bush was able to keep the defensive. At the time, both Scowcroft and Baker were advising him to give diplomacy and the U.N. sanctions plenty of time to work. One morning in late August, Bush invited Scowcroft to go fishing with him. "Dawn's early light" golfing and fishing trips were not Scowcroft's favorite pastimes. But he went, and they spent four hours talking. What if sanctions didn't work? How long should they stick to them? How long would the support of world leaders and the American people hold up? What should they do about the hostages? They couldn't let emotions dictate their actions. They tried to put themselves in Saddam's position. They calculated his next moves. Bush caught two bluefish, Scowcroft hooked only one. But the national

security adviser talked eloquently about diplomacy and a new world order, and Fidelity brought the president back to the dock determined to avoid a shooting war. He thought his chances of succeeding were no better than 50-50.



No vacation: Bush (phone) and Scowcroft (center)

## In Kennebunkport, the president's advisers were alarmed that Iraq might move before the gulf force was ready

### FROM DEFENSE TO OFFENSE

**O**n Aug. 4, Colin Powell hurried back from Camp David to the Pentagon, where he briefed his generals and admirals on the decision to confront Saddam with American troops. About 50 warships—including the aircraft carriers USS Independence and USS Eisenhower—were sent steaming toward the gulf to begin enforcing the embargo. A top-secret order was flashed to Schwarzkopf's headquarters in Tampa, Fla., directing him to develop detailed plans for deploying forces. The next day Powell phoned Gen. Hansford T. Johnson, chief of the U.S. Trans-

port Command. "Here's what we are thinking about," he said: the biggest, fastest, farthest military deployment in the country's history. Just 24 hours later, Col. Rick Fields sat in the Military Sealift message center at the Washington Navy Yard scanning an astonishing stream of orders. Hotfooting it to his office, he pulled the secret Mideast deployment plan out of his file safe. It was hopelessly out of date. "Oh my God, how are we going to do this?" he thought. "We don't have a plan."

The mission that led to war with Iraq started in chaos. The Pentagon did have a plan (1002-88) that spelled out the way the United States could fight a war in the Persian Gulf, but its basic assumptions were badly outdated. The scenario envisioned the United States and the Soviet Union waging a two-front world war in Europe and Southwest Asia; the gulf fight was a sideshow. The plan assumed that the president would be able to give the Pentagon 30 days warning to get two and a third divisions up and rolling. Saddam hadn't given them any time at all. The news wasn't all bad, however. During the summer of 1989, after the Joint Chiefs concluded that a superpower clash was unlikely, Schwarzkopf had begun work to turn 1002-88 into an updated 1002-90 plan. By good luck, in June and July of 1990, he had run an elaborate war game—a "command post exercise," or CPX in military jargon—that projected Iraq as the adversary. The test led him to conclude that in a scrape he would need four and a third divisions to keep Saddam at bay.

But it wasn't as simple as that. Civilians tend to think armies, air forces and navies just salute and march off to glory when they get their orders. In fact a million details have to be worked out first. For every deployment plan, computer wizards in the Pentagon compile a separate program they call a Time Phased Force Deployment List, nicknamed Tip Fiddle. It is the Tip Fiddle, whose computer printout measures three feet high, that shows how to get everyone and everything from the base to the battlefield. And no one had reft the draft 1002-90 plan with anything like a new Tip Fiddle. The Pentagon had not even decided whether Schwarzkopf's ideas were "transportation feasible." To get the first units off, they would have to use the old 1002-88 Tip Fiddle. And when they looked for it, it was gone. The Tip Fiddle's info had been taken out of the computer for updating. "There wasn't a single source document in the computer bank," recalls one Army colonel. "The central piece of data that drives the whole thing wasn't there." While the computer people were scrambling to recover, transport officers had to improvise. The intricate plan they patched together, in record time, now seems a military miracle. One officer would later look back on it as "a Dunkirk in reverse."

At Langley Air Force Base in Hampton, Va., word had gone out after the invasion "lean forward and green up" for action. On Aug. 6 orders came to deploy two squadrons of F-15 Eagles to secret airfields near Riyadh and Dharan. The objective was to establish air superiority over Saddam's jets and bombers, so the 82nd Airborne wouldn't land naked. The next afternoon, hundreds of cars lined up at Langley's West Gate. Word had gone around, and

ordinary Americans from Hampton Beach were there to see the First Tactical Air Wing off. As the F-15s roared into the sky, "It wasn't, 'Let's go kick some butts,'" recalls one Air Force major who watched. "It was, 'My God. What are we doing?'"

Those 48 F-15s were the first Desert Shield forces to be landing in Saudi Arabia, and at the time the Air Force was afraid they might have to shoot their way into the Middle East. Accordingly, their mission was timed to land at dusk; Iraqi pilots don't like night flying. "Welcome to Saudi Arabia," a crewman said to one of the first pilots to arrive. "You're going to be a hostage in three hours." The pilot didn't laugh.

Iraq had plenty of planes to throw at the First Tactical Air Wing. The Americans weren't as worried about Soviet MiGs as they were about a few other elements. (Manuals that the Soviets left behind in East Europe supplied useful information on Iraq's Soviet weaponry, including the top-line MiG 29.) The 30 Mirage fighters Saddam had bought from France presented the first problem. The Americans had never trained against them. Hurried calls to Paris brought tips on what the planes would do and their French-trained pilots could do. The most frightening specter was the 150 American Hawk antiaircraft missiles Saddam had captured in Kuwait. If the Iraqis ever figured out how to fire them, they could be deadly against F-15s.

Arriving with the First Tactical Air Wing, the paratroopers of the 82nd Airborne hit Saudi Arabia in combat gear outmanned and outgunned. The brigade was armed with light antitank weapons and M551 Sheridan armored reconnaissance vehicles. It had no tanks of its own, and none arrived for a week. For the first 100 hours of the operation, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Carl E. Vuono agonized over the vulnerability of the 82nd. If Saddam had broken across the Saudi border, and if the paratroopers had not been able to hold their enclave at Dhahran, Pentagon insiders believe, they would have been pulled out. The defeat would have been humiliating, but there was no acceptable alternative. "We would not have sacrificed them," says one knowledgeable Army officer. "They would have been heroes, but they would have been dead heroes."

For the first month, Desert Shield was a test of Schwarzkopf's agility and nerve and the president's ability to bluff. "Schwarzkopf was terrified about our vulnerability," recalls an aide. After the invasion the DIA compiled an updated order of battle listing Saddam's main assets: a million-man army with eight years of combat experience against Iran. The Iraqis had seized Kuwait three times faster than the DIA had believed possible. Then the CIA took another scan and reported that the Iraqis had 1,000 more tanks, 2,000 more armored personnel carriers and 250 more combat aircraft than had been publicly estimated. And they were pouring into Kuwait.

Schwarzkopf had to improvise a credible defense from whatever he could scratch up. At one point he phoned the Navy to ask what Iraqi targets the USS Wisconsin could hit with its sea-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles. The answer came back: zero. The Tomahawks must be programmed with electronic terrain maps to



DAVID AKE—AP

Waiting game: An F-14 on the Independence

## It took a month to program the Navy's cruise missiles with electronic maps needed for targeting

home in on their targets. The CIA and DIA, preoccupied with monitoring the Soviet Union's withdrawal of conventional forces in Eastern Europe, hadn't programmed their satellites to make such maps for Iraq. The maps didn't arrive until the end of August.

What Schwarzkopf needed to cope with Saddam could be summed up in one word: more. The main thing was to get the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division with its 216 M-1A1 tanks into the country. The original Desert Shield plan called for the delivery of all cargo in 120 days; the Navy was able to cut the time to 95 days. While he was waiting, he tore up tidy computer projections and ordered all the tank killers he could lay his hands on: more Air Force fighters and A-10 close-support planes, more Apache choppers with their Hellfire missiles. To protect his increasing troops and growing bases against Saddam's Air Force and Soviet Scud B missiles, he wangled more Patriot antiaircraft missiles.

**H**e had no choice but to gamble that Saddam wouldn't overrun Dhahran. He had to cut corners. To bring in more firepower, he had to postpone the arrival of hospital units. During the first month of Desert Shield he had only 80 doctors and 500 beds and a handful of Airborne medics. And he resorted to outright deception. The Pentagon orchestrated a stream of public announcements of units deployed in the gulf; the statements left out the fact that only elements of these units had actually been sent. Saddam had no satellites or spy planes to watch the buildup; he got much of his intelligence from CNN. So Schwarzkopf made sure television crews were out each day shooting the giant C-5 Galaxy transports that landed every few minutes in Dhahran.

Schwarzkopf was a heavy-army man; his heart wasn't in exotics like the Green Berets. Special-operations officers, heroes during the Panama invasion, griped when he bumped their commandos from early flights to bring in more heavy infantry units. He killed half-baked plans to stir up resistance among the Kurds and Shiite Muslims. But he did encourage Army special-operations officers to set up escape-and-evasion nets for American pilots who might be shot down. And he provided support to special reconnaissance teams whose job was to sneak across the border and use lasers to guide "smart" bombs and missiles onto Iraqi command bunkers when hostilities began. American law barred any attempt to assassinate Saddam. But early in Desert Shield, an Iraqi defector told CIA operatives that Saddam had hired foreign contractors to build several dozen underground bunkers for his family and friends. The agency reviewed bales of satellite photos taken over Baghdad throughout the 1980s and identified many of the sites.

The Pentagon's transport people fought against exhaustion to keep up with Schwarzkopf's needs. Moving the troops, weapons and supplies was harder than anything done at Normandy. The distances were greater, the amount of cargo huge. There had been no time to prepare; there was little immediately available logistics support. Computers whirred and located 450 C-5, C-130 and C-141 transports scattered around the world. They whirred again, and officers ripped programs off the printers to send planes, trucks and ships moving only hours later. Army and Navy transport officers stood on rail carts and docks directing loading like traffic cops. There were snafus. On bad days, cargo planes arrived in the wrong places; guns went one way, ammunition the other. In Savannah, Ga., the transport ship Capella began sinking into the mud when units of the 24th Mechanized Division streamed aboard; no one had ever practiced boarding with the extra weight of full combat gear and full loads of fuel. Even on good days, weapons and supplies arrived in such surges that they swamped cargo handlers. But by the end of August the cargo planes, flying as many as 300 missions a day, had shuttled 72,000 passengers and 100,000 tons of cargo to the gulf.

What happened at sea was also extraordinary. The only way to get heavy infantry to the gulf was in ships. To get the bulk of military cargo to the gulf, the Navy was forced to use 96 mothballed Victory ships from World War II. "The first guys we put on

those ships couldn't believe it," recalls one Pentagon hand. "They said, 'You want me to ride across the Atlantic in this piece of junk?'" Harried planners had to scour union halls to find crews who knew how to fire antique boilers and longshoremen who could handle "breakbulk" cargo, the loose stowing system now supplanted by containers. After some embarrassing breakdowns, the Navy made do with ingenuity, baling wire and grit. The 24th Mechanized Division arrived in the gulf in early September. And for the first time, Schwarzkopf could breathe easier.

At the beginning of September, the United States still occupied a defensive posture against Saddam. The president, Baker and Scowcroft hoped the sanctions would bring the dictator to his senses. The CIA was closely monitoring everything from the size of bread loaves in Baghdad to the fuel consumption of Iraqi airliners at foreign airports. Sanctions and the naval blockade had cut off 90 percent of Iraq's imports and exports. But the war with Iran had taught the country how to absorb misery, and Saddam was willing to let his countrymen suffer to keep his troops supplied. Toward late September, the CIA sent a secret assessment to the White House. The agency predicted that "in the short or medium term," sanctions would not drive the dictator from Kuwait.

The report did not lead Bush, Baker and Scowcroft to give up entirely on sanctions, but it strengthened the hands of Powell and Cheney, who had always been skeptical about their effectiveness. In any case, it was clear to the president that he would have to devise other methods of squeezing Iraq harder. The alternative was to go beyond the defense of Saudi Arabia and prepare to move onto the offensive. At the beginning of Desert Shield, the Pentagon had estimated that if the president ever chose to go on the attack, Schwarzkopf would need two more heavy divisions, perhaps 100,000 additional troops. The original thinking was that the Marines and the allies would pin Saddam's Army on the Kuwait border while Schwarzkopf's XVIII Corps would sweep around Kuwait in a flanking maneuver and surround the Iraqis. But in the intervening two months, the tactical landscape had changed. Saddam had stripped his defenses on the Iranian border, a move that took the Pentagon by surprise. He moved hundreds of thousands of reinforcements into Kuwait. The Iraqis built roads, improved supply lines and dug protective earth berms for their tanks; they implanted antiaircraft defenses and enlarged minefields. They also rigged Kuwait's oilfields and refineries with plastic explosives.

Saddam had another surprise for Schwarzkopf. He withdrew his crack Republican Guards to southern Iraq and reinforced them with 150,000 troops. The Iraqis at the Saudi border were poorly trained cannon fodder, but they could be counted on to stick their heads out of their foxholes and fire their AK-47s to slow an advance. Behind them Saddam arrayed tougher mechanized and armored units. Then came the Republican Guards. The result was a layered, politically sophisticated array. "His defense was designed to attrit us," says one Pentagon officer. "Every American you kill, it's another family protesting the war. If he kills enough of us, the president has to stop the war." Saddam thought he had found Schwarzkopf's strategic weak point—American public opinion.

In another shrewd move, Saddam replaced light infantry units along the coast of Kuwait with heavy armored divisions; he also moved heavy armor to the neutral zone between Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The line that Schwarzkopf had meant to sweep around was now dangerously long. Even if XVIII Corps succeeded in its flanking movement, it would not trap the Republican Guards. They could still counterattack the Americans in Kuwait, inflicting punishing casualties and a political backlash. To neutralize the threat, Schwarzkopf needed a new plan requiring more troops. He would have to launch a much wider flanking attack, beginning farther west, in order to cut off the Republican Guards. For this he would need VII Corps from Germany, which could field two and a third armored divisions and an armored cavalry regiment, plus the 1st Mechanized In-

fantry Division from Fort Riley, Kans.: "The Big Red One."

The commander in the field had a sympathetic listener in the chairman of the Joint Chiefs. During the weeks that followed, Schwarzkopf sent a preliminary outline of his ideas to Powell. Then, on Oct. 21, Powell flew to Saudi Arabia to talk to him. Their meeting was crucial. Schwarzkopf argued that the United States had to be imaginative and daring if it was going to avoid another Vietnam. He asked for VII Corps and the other outfits. Powell flew home and sold Cheney on a plan that they began to call "the enhanced option." "The guy who dominated this strategy was Powell," says one Pentagon hand in on the brainstorming. "He has driven this point home: we can't think in small terms." Powell limited knowledge of the enhanced option to no more than 25 senior officers. The planning team beefed up Schwarzkopf's original request. It dispatched three more aircraft carrier battle groups and a battleship, the Second Marine Expeditionary Force and Fifth Marine Expeditionary Brigade. It also cranked up three Army National Guard combat brigades for possible action.

The escalation added up to 200,000 troops. If the president accepted it, he would be doubling his bet against Saddam. What happened next was instructive. Powell and Schwarzkopf handled the military end of the plan much better than the civilians in the administration handled the politics. On Oct. 24 Cheney went to S-407, the sound-proof room near the dome of the Capitol, to testify before the Senate Armed Services Committee. He said nothing about the buildup. On three network talk shows the next morning, however, he hinted that the United States might be sending as many as 100,000 more troops to the gulf. Later, word leaked that the Pentagon was considering canceling the early rotation of troops in the war zone. When angry aides on the Armed Services Committee phoned to find out what was going on, they were told that nothing new was afoot; that no one had ever put a lid on the number of troops it might take to curb Saddam. On Oct. 30 Cheney and Powell offered a more candid briefing to the president, who had been told earlier about Schwarzkopf's thinking. They said phase two of Desert Shield, the new buildup, would take until about Jan. 15 to complete. Bush listened closely.

The next day—Halloween—Bush, Baker, Cheney, Powell, Scowcroft and Sununu met at the White House. Many people had told the president that Saddam did not believe the United States would ever use force against him. It was essential to establish "a credible military threat." What was on the table was the enhanced option. Bush approved it. The decision moved the administration squarely from the defense to the offense, though it didn't look that way at the time. The president himself did not think the escalation would necessarily lead to war. What he hoped was that a doubled show of military power would bluff Saddam into backing down.

Everyone in the room agreed that they must inform the members of the international coalition about the change in strategy. Then there was the question of how the shift would play at home. They were at a very sensitive juncture. They decided not to tell the country until after the November elections.

## 4 BEFORE THE STORM

**T**he secretary of state was wearing khaki and cowboy boots. For 90 minutes his helicopter flew across endless white dunes to an outpost of the First Cavalry Division in Saudi Arabia. On landing, Baker stepped out into whirling sand so fine it instantly powdered his eyebrows and stuck in his throat. He found 4,200 American troops waiting for him under the hot sun. "These are the guys who are going to get chewed up," thought one of his aides, suddenly depressed. The secretary gave a short pep talk. "This is a long, long way from home, but I think Americans are home wherever their principles are," he said. Then he plunged among the men and women of the First Cav, shaking hands, thanking them. One after another they said, "Let's get this over with and go home."

By Nov. 3, Baker was on an intricate mission. The administration faced a difficult political problem: how to send a tougher message to Saddam without rousing the home-front opposition by making it look as if the president were hungry for war. Bush and his men wanted to give diplomacy every chance, even as the American military escalation proceeded. Consequently, the United States would lobby the United Nations to approve a resolution endorsing the use of force against Iraq if Saddam didn't comply unconditionally with U.N. resolutions demanding his withdrawal from Kuwait. The NSC and Defense were worried about this task: they feared that the United Nations might grant the authority, only to withdraw it later. But Baker pointed out that if the United Nations passed a war-powers resolution, it would

make it hard for Congress not to do the same.

Baker's trip thus had two objectives: to bind the leaders of the coalition to the expanded goals of phase two and to persuade the Soviet Union to support an authorization of force by the United Nations. The most important early stop and early success was in Jidda. At a meeting with King Fahd, Prince Bandar was all for the expanded effort: "Mr. Secretary, as your fellow Texan Lyndon Johnson used to say, 'Never tell a fellow to go to hell unless you mean to send him there!'"

Two days later Baker flew to Moscow, where the going was more complicated. Gorbachev had sent an emissary of his own to Baghdad twice: Yevgeny Primakov, an old-school Soviet Arabist who did not want to lose Moscow's longstanding special relationship with Iraq. Would Gorbachev side with Primakov, or with Shevardnadze, who saw things Baker's way? Gorbachev invited Baker to his *dacha* outside Moscow. He was pessimistic about the chances for peace unless they stepped up the heat. He made no commitments. But he held two fingers together and said, "We have to stay like this." Later in Moscow, Shevardnadze said certain situations might indeed require the use of force.

While Baker was working the allies, Bush was limping through



WALLY McNAMEE—NEWSWEEK  
Thanksgiving in the gulf: Bush salutes the troops

## He read the account of Iraqi atrocities cover to cover, and challenged a bishop to do the same

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While Baker was working the allies, Bush was limping through

the final week of the fall elections. The president had drawn some homestretch applause by playing up the hostage issue and adopting a kick-ass tone toward Iraq. But his polls were down by more than 20 points, partly because of nervousness about the gulf, partly because of his budget bungling. Two days after the election, Bush finally announced his decision of late October: he was doubling his troop commitments in the gulf.

The ensuing uproar over the buildup astonished him. "The public thought it meant war was inevitable," recalls one top Bush aide. "We saw it as part of the Big Bluff." The president had thought the passing of the election would free him to proceed with phase two of Desert Shield, but it also liberated congressmen to oppose him. The polls showed that most Americans wanted to stay with economic sanctions even if they failed to prod Saddam out of Kuwait by January or February. Only one in four wanted to go to war over Kuwait. On Nov. 10, Bush invited a number of close friends and public-relations counselors to a lunch in the East Wing of the White House. "What am I doing wrong?" he asked them. After some talk about domestic affairs, the talk turned to the gulf. The friends told him his support was crumbling; they said he had to get out every day and explain why he was there. The advice only frustrated him. He said he had made his case over and over.

One of the angriest men on the Hill was Sen. Sam Nunn of Georgia, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. In August, when Powell briefed Nunn and other senators on the initial deployment, he said the idea was to use air power with land support; he said nothing about large numbers of ground troops. The president had failed to keep Nunn abreast of phase two. Cheney telephoned him in Georgia only an hour before Bush announced the troop buildup. "I was not consulted, I was informed," Nunn said later, huffily. And he went on CBS's "Face the Nation" to say Bush was applying the wrong strategy in the wrong place; that it was one thing to try forcing Iraq out of Kuwait with sanctions, quite another to do it with guns; and that the president was playing into Saddam's hands.

Nunn ordered up public hearings before his committee that swiftly kindled a far-ranging national debate on the crisis. Among the first witnesses were former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and former secretaries of defense, who urged that sanctions should be given a better chance. This made it politically safe for Democrats like House Speaker Thomas Foley and Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell, who had strong doubts about using force, to go on the attack. The opposition camp was itself far from united. Some Democrats sensed Bush's political vulnerability and itched to exploit it. Some didn't want to fight a war under any circumstances; some thought the issue was oil and that it wasn't worth a battle; some, like Nunn and Rep. Les Aspin, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, believed that if it came to fighting, most of it should be done from the air.

Before they recovered their political equilibrium, the president and his advisers stumbled again. With one eye on the polls, they started casting about for the kind of buzzwords they had coined so

well in Bush's political campaigns. When pollsters said Americans were deeply worried about Saddam's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, the administration let it be known that it might take Saddam only one year to get the Bomb, not the five years the intelligence people had been claiming. In another off-moment, Baker said the whole confusing business in the gulf could be summed up in a single word: jobs. He had a point. Saddam's bid to dominate gulf oil directly threatened America's economic health. But it was just too glib; the buzzword campaign flopped. "It was an embarrassing display," recalls one of the president's old image counselors. "Very few people were fooled."

Bush returned from a Thanksgiving visit to the gulf in a subdued mood. He had studied the eyes of men and women who might have to die, and aides saw a change in him. Where was that breezy friendliness? He grew short with the staff. He read Amnesty International's account of Iraqi atrocities in Kuwait. Aboard Air Force One he kept a copy of Martin Gilbert's "The Second World War." He told aides he had noticed that when Hitler's Death's Head regiments had invaded Poland in 1939, they had done things "hauntingly similar" to the crimes committed by Iraqi troops during the invasion of Kuwait. He became convinced that Saddam was so evil that anyone would be morally justified in bringing him down. When the Rt. Rev. Edmond Browning, presiding bishop of the Episcopal Church, came to the Oval Office to urge patience on him, he said, "You should read the Amnesty International report. Then you tell me what I should do."

Meanwhile, Baker was nudging the U.N. Security Council toward approving the use-of-force resolution against Saddam. There was one stumbling block. The Soviet Union insisted on a deadline, thinking it would help. Baker wanted no deadlines, but Moscow insisted. He then suggested Jan. 1. Moscow came back

with Jan. 15, the United States readily concurred. On the last day of November, the Security Council approved the resolution.

Although Baker had won, the administration once again found itself trying to execute a somewhat contradictory strategy. It had to quiet domestic rumbling at the very moment it was trying to stir Saddam's anxieties. The U.N. resolution set off more domestic war jitters. To calm them, Bush tried a new diplomatic gambit: he invited Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz to Washington and he offered to dispatch Baker to Baghdad. Saddam responded by accepting the invitation for Aziz; then he topped Bush's gesture by freeing all the hostages. The result was a muddle. The president and Baker hoped the hostage release indicated that Saddam might yet yield on the rest of the U.N. resolutions. While they could not budge from the United Nations' demands for unconditional compliance, they had been hinting to Saddam for months that after he withdrew from Kuwait, some of his preoccupations could be addressed, like a Mideast peace conference covering the Palestinians and new border arrangements with Kuwait. That was as far as they would go on the crucial question of "linkage." But at no time did Saddam show any interest in so open-ended a bargain, and he sent word that he



WALLY McNAMEE—NEWSWEEK  
Les majesty: Nobody told Sam Nunn in time

## Election Day freed the president's hand, but he forgot that it also freed his opponents to speak out

wouldn't receive Baker in Baghdad until the very eve of the U.N. deadline. It seemed clear to the administration that he was trying to stall, not to talk.

The problem was that the administration was trying to play to two quite different audiences at the same time: fearful Americans and reckless Saddam. "Every time we score with one, we set ourselves back with the other," groaned one top Baker aide. Bush's proposal of Washington and Baghdad meetings placated the peace camp at home, but it may have strengthened Saddam's view that the Americans had no stomach for battle. It could be argued that the Security Council's action had finally gotten his attention; that he knew he was in trouble; that he was looking for a way out and that was why he had released the hostages. But it could also be argued that he had no intention of complying with the U.N. resolutions; that he saw U.S. diplomacy and congressional criticism as tokens of weakness; that he didn't believe the United States would really go after him. "You tell me which scenario to believe," said one frustrated senior administration official.

As Bush fenced with Saddam over the dates of the Aziz and Baker trips, he also faced renewed congressional sniping over whether he was giving sanctions enough time to work. As the national debate heated up, a personal edge crept in, even at the official level. One day the secretary of state walked into a meeting to find two of his top women counselors arguing with his men over the direction things were taking. "Everyone says there's a fundamental difference in attitude between men and women on war and peace," Baker said. "I guess I'm seeing it now." If he meant to ease the tension, he didn't succeed. "You're right," replied Janet Mullins, his legislative chief. "Women do think differently. Women want to know that if their sons and daughters are going over there to die, it's not because their president ordered them there in a fit of pique."

In this increasingly testy atmosphere, Cheney and Powell flew to Saudi Arabia the week before Christmas. They ran into a small disaster. Eight reporters were traveling with Cheney. Press aides scheduled an interview for them with Lt. Gen. Calvin A. H. Waller. In a burst of misguided candor, the general correctly told them he didn't think the Army would be completely ready to take the offensive until mid-February. You could hear the air leaking from the Big Bluff. Schwarzkopf later gave him some private instruction in dealing with the press. In a staff meeting, Cheney said, "Welcome to the NFL, general." It was an object lesson in a delicate balancing act the administration was trying to achieve: on the one hand, it wanted to leave the military planning to the soldiers; on the other, it expected them to behave like politicians.

Four days before Christmas, passing up his annual turkey shoot down in Beeville and New Year's Eve at his Houston condominium, Bush left for a 12-day retreat at Camp David. For a while he took to the phone, calling Gorbachev and other foreign leaders. He conducted his own opinion survey of staffers, members of Congress and personal friends. Then he hung up and took some time to think. "He was communing with his private God on this," recalls a close adviser. "And when he came back it was done." He had made

peace with the possibility that Saddam would not back down, that he would have to enforce the U.N. resolutions, that he would have to go to war.

On New Year's Day, Bush invited a half dozen of his closest advisers to the White House. They met in the family quarters upstairs. For an hour or so they nursed soft drinks and ate popcorn from silver bowls. The president listened as they considered the polls and brainstormed the debate that was sure to erupt when Congress reconvened. They wondered about the Israelis. They considered the seams and cracks in the international coalition. No one talked much about Desert Shield. The next day Bush walked into the first senior-staff meeting of the New Year. When he started talking about the gulf, it became clear that whatever

doubts he may have had about starting a war, he had exorcised them at Camp David. He said he had come to terms with the problem, sorted it all through. "For me it boils down to a very moral case of good versus evil, black versus white. If I have to go, it's not going to matter to me if there isn't one congressman who supports this, or what happens to public opinion. If it's right, it's gotta be done."

He offered Saddam one last chance: he would send Baker to meet Aziz in Geneva, a gesture designed in part to reassure the Congress which was about to debate its own war-powers resolution. Once again the world hoped for a breakthrough. But the president had no faith in Aziz. He viewed him as Saddam's lap dog who might not tell Saddam what Baker had to say. To make sure there could be no mistakes, he wrote Saddam a letter. Aziz refused to accept it. The insult turned out to be a political gift. It took the onus for intransigence off the president. Three days later Congress voted on the use of force. It was a close-run thing; the margin in the Senate was only 5 votes. One could almost sense a sigh of relief from the losing as well as the winning side: no one wanted to contemplate the constitutional spectacle of a president going into battle against the expressed wishes of the Congress.

As the Jan. 15 deadline approached, the old Bush was back, friendly, confident, almost eerily serene. He still found it hard to believe that Saddam could look at the firepower Cheney, Powell and Schwarzkopf had arrayed before him and not believe the president meant to use it. He shook his head at the way Saddam was willing to sacrifice his people and his country for vanity alone. But that was not Bush's responsibility. His own course was now absolutely clear to him. Powell, the commander in chief's top soldier, had told the troops, "If we go in, we go in to win, not to fool around." Saddam failed to get the message. The road to war had ended. With the thunder of jets and the lightning of missiles, Desert Shield exploded into Desert Storm.

*The Road to War* was written by Tom Mathews with principal reporting by Douglas Waller. Additional reports came from Thomas M. DeFrank, Ann McDaniel and Margaret Garrard Warner in Washington; Ray Wilkinson, Christopher Dickey and Jeffrey Bartholet in the gulf and Daniel Pedersen in London.



**The die is cast: The U.N. approves the use of force**

## Baker figured that if the United Nations approved war powers, the Congress could do no less

# From Bayonets to Tomahawks



Saddam is learning a lethal lesson about the links between militaries and societies

**G**eneral Schwarzkopf, his voice as flat as Kansas, his language spare, said, "The Iraqis had no concept of what they were getting involved in." Indeed, how could they have known what had begun when the first Tomahawk missile detonated in Baghdad? By making the cradle of ancient civilization a theater of war involving the most modern nation, Saddam was slapped in the face by this fact: Today's weaponry evolves rapidly, sophistication increases exponentially. When a scientific nation like America goes 15 years between wars, it brings to the next battle new weapons never tested in the crucible that counts. America's new array is passing its test and proving this point to Saddam: Modern science makes militarism increasingly untenable for societies that are not comprehensively modern.

The weapons Wellington's men used at Waterloo in 1815 were like those Marlborough's men used at Blenheim in 1704. But America's inventory of weapons today is significantly different from that of the Vietnam War. Saddam, too, has some advanced systems. A bane of the modern world has been the acquisition of sophisticated technology by political primitives. Saddam is a primitive at large in, but not at home in, the modern world. The marriage of a modern military apparatus to a politically and culturally underdeveloped society is bound to fail because of irreconcilable incompatibilities. Saddam struck it rich in the oil business, went on a shopping binge and imported some military modernity. But today he is learning, late, a lethal lesson about the relationship between militaries and societies. Saddam is making disastrous history for Iraq because he knows so little history, particularly of war.

Early in this century Europe bled nearly to death because of ignorance of the new realities of war. In 1914 many Europeans welcomed war. They were gripped by an old, romantic idea that soon would be machine-gunned to death at the Somme. The idea was that in war morale matters more than matériel—three times more, Napoleon said.

In 1914, graduates of the French military academy marched into battle wearing white gloves and pompons. German university graduates marched singing, with arms linked, toward British trenches. Several British contingents kicked soccer balls as they advanced through no man's land. For four years generals fought machine guns with young men's chests. The old men did not understand that war, the greatest engine of social change, had unleashed forces that profoundly changed war itself.

We have come a long way from the infantryman's pike, to

the bayonet, to the Tomahawk. In the early age of handguns, 16 feet was thought to be a good length for a pike because most pistols were inaccurate at that distance. The bayonet (invented for the protection of hunters who found themselves with empty guns, facing wounded beasts) made armies reluctant to close with one another. That made fire-power over distances more important. Today, a sailor in the gulf programs a computer and minutes later a Tomahawk deals destruction deep in Iraq's interior.

Historian Michael Howard noted that Viking longboats and Magyar ponies made warriors mobile across long distances. Eighth-century Franks developed the stirrup, making horses useful for fighting as well as mobility. The 12th century's technological marvel, the crossbow, shrank battlefield distances and devalued armor. Combustible materials had been hurled by catapults in sieges of cities and naval engagements. Then the process was reversed. Combustion was used to propel things. The age of cannon arrived when Turkish artillery battered down the walls of Constantinople.

Until industrialism produced a social surplus, the scale of war was severely restricted by its expense. The cost of a single mounted and armored soldier could require several years' income of an entire 12th-century village. Henry V had only 6,000 soldiers at Agincourt. Napoleon was to take 600,000 to Russia. With Napoleon's notion of "the nation in arms," war entered the era of mass effects. But it entered slowly, hauled by horses, dependent on fodder.

**Destructive power:** War did not really get rolling until the coming of the steam engine, and then the internal-combustion engine. These spared soldiers long marches, saving their energies for ferocity in combat. In America's Civil War railroads transported mass-produced conscripts who were carrying canned rations and rifles mass-produced from interchangeable parts. Breech-loading replaced muzzle-loading weapons so infantrymen could fire lying down, killing at a range of several hundred yards while not making themselves targets. Rifling of gun barrels improved range and accuracy by a factor of five. Calibrated rifle sights made raw conscripts better marksmen than Frederick the Great's finest grenadiers. And by 1914 a regiment of field guns could deliver on a few hundred square yards more destructive power in an hour than had been fired by all the guns on both sides in all the Napoleonic wars.

Mars said the industrial working class would acknowledge no fatherland and would serve no nation's military efforts. Actually, public education made workers skillful, trade unions made them loyal, sensationalizing newspapers made them fervid. Improved sanitation and medicine made armies more efficient. Before 1870, sickness usually killed five times as many soldiers as enemy action did.


The 19th century's long peace fostered industrial and scientific progress that made possible the horrors of the 20th century, when wars of armies were supplanted by wars of populations. A 19th-century Indiana inventor named Gatling, appalled by Civil War casualties, thought a gun capable of sustained fire would enable one soldier to do the work of 100, thereby making for smaller armies. But the Gatling gun had the opposite effect. In World War I huge armies were driven into trenches, "shovels replaced chivalry" and war was glamorized.

Until 1914 the military was the last redoubt of romantics in the industrial age. Then the machine gun enabled "three men and a gun to stop a battalion of heroes." Military romantics—not an endangered species, a vanished one, buried in Flanders Fields—regretted the machine gun and would have regretted the Tomahawk because "you can't pin a medal on a piece of metal." But neither can you bury a piece of metal in Arlington Cemetery.

MAN: This Eagle Talon TSi  
and Toyota Celica All-Trac both  
have all-wheel drive. But  
the Celica costs about  
4,000 dollars more.

OFF-CAMERA VOICE: What do those guys at Toyota  
take us for?

MAN: About 4,000 dollars.


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